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THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AS BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDINGS, MODERN MISREADINGS
THOMAS B. McAFFEE*

I.

FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS: THE BASIC CONFUSION

N the modern era, we have almost completely lost track of the relationship that the Framers of the United States Constitution perceived between the structure of our federal system and the protection of popular
rights.1 At least two obvious components of this confusion persist. First, as
we have come to think of rights almost exclusively in terms of the claims of
individuals against the government, we have lost the ability to hear the
Framers' voices referring to rights held by the people in their collective
capacity, including the rights of the people within each of the sovereign
states to be free from undue federal intrusion on their power of self-governance. 2 Second, our familiarity with the modern judiciary's reliance
*Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. This Article is
part of a larger, book-length project on the Ninth Amendment and the idea of an
unwritten Constitution. A review of some of its basic themes was presented in
lecture form at a symposium on federalism in October 1995, and the lecture was
published, with accompanying footnotes, in a symposium issue in volume 1996 of
the Brigham Young University Law Review. See Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the
Protection of Rights: The Modern Ninth Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L.
REv. 351, 351 (1996) (discussing "the relationship that the framers of the United
States Constitution perceived between the structure of our federal system and the
protection of popular rights").
1. The phrase "popular rights" is used purposefully to include rights that were
held by the people collectively as well as rights that are usually called (for good
reason) "individual rights." Although the founding generation often referred to
individual rights (even in cases in which such rights were thought to promote a
social good), they also debated the merits of rights that were to be held by the
people in their collective capacity.
2. Indeed, it is undeniable that some tension exists between the idea of collective rights, in particular the idea of popular rule, and the idea of human rightsrights which might make claims against the authority of the people; but the existence of this real tension within the critical terms of the Framers' political theory
does not exonerate us for failing to perceive that the point of our federal system
(and, indeed, of the Bill of Rights) was partly to secure collective rights (including
rights of local popular governance). See Walter Berns, The Constitution as Bill of
Rights, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 50, 58 (Robert A. Goldwin

& William A. Schambra eds., 1985) (observing that for Framers of American constitutions, both state and federal, "[tihe right to share equally in this decision [on the
form, organization and powers of the government instituted to secure the rights of
all] is the most important human right because government is the means by which
all other rights are secured"); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73 (1991) (discussing federalism dimensions to
original Federal Bill of Rights, with respect to both whole and specific provisions);
Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1542-76 (1995) (analyzing

(17)
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upon specific textual rights provisions as trumps against otherwise valid
claims of legislative authority has blinded us to the fact that claims based
3
on lack of governmental authority are also individual rights claims. Most
Americans, and even many legal thinkers, find it difficult to fathom that
the Framers of the unamended Constitution saw this limited grant of authority as an adequate alternative to a comprehensive statement of rights
4
in a declaration or bill of rights.
These modern tendencies of thought have been powerfully reinforced by the reality that the Framers' expectations of significantly limited
5
federal authority have been largely swept aside in the twentieth century.
This expansion of federal power may have been inevitable, in which case
federalism dimensions of First Amendment and its relation to original federal
structure). See generally Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in
WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION
AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55 (1987) (discussing documentary
contextual approach to constitutional provisions to help clarify First Amendment's
meaning); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James
Madison and the Founders' Searchfor a Workable Balance Between Federaland State Power,
26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1263 (1989) ("[A] reconsideration of the original purpose of the Bill of Rights may be instructive in reminding us that a majority of the
Founders believed that the liberty of the American people depended on a careful
balancing and mutual checking of federal and state government powers.").
3. Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) (referring
to rights reserved by Ninth and Tenth Amendments), with Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6 (1988) ("The Tenth Amendment does not speak of rights, of course, but of reserved 'powers."'); Sanford
Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131,
142 (1988) (observing that Tenth Amendment "refers to powers, not to rights,"
and to lack of "assigned power" even when individual rights are not implicated).
According to one commentator, under the federal scheme, if an act is within a
grant of authority, Congress may legislate "even at the cost of individual rights." Id.
These assertions assume, however, that an individual's claim of immunity from a
federal statute on the ground that it exceeded granted powers is not properly described as presenting a rights claim. Although a Tenth Amendment claim is hardly
an individual rights claim in the modem sense, in that the right being claimed
does not trump powers defined by the scope of the granted power, the founding
generation referred to the security against excessive federal power offered by the
system of delegated powers as "rights" nonetheless. SeeJames Madison, Debates in
the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 69, 82 (Helen E. Veit et

al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (describing Constitution as creating "bill of powers" with "great residuum" being lights of people).
4. But see Madison, supra note 3, at 82 (describing enumerated powers scheme
in Madison's proposed bill of rights). "'[I] t follows that all [the powers] that are
not granted by the constitution are retained,"' and therefore "'the constitution is a
bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people."' Id. For additional evidence of the difficulty modern commentators have in taking this view
seriously, see infra note 11 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g.,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that
Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit state from applying facially neutral law to
religious conduct even in absence of compelling interest); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (finding that federal government's commerce power extends to interstate activities that so affect interstate commerce as to make federal
regulation over such activities appropriate).
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the Framers were wrong in assuming that the limited grant of authority
would be a sufficient means for securing a wide range of rights in our
system of fundamental law. 6 Even if this were true, however, it does not
warrant the modern tendency to denigrate their position as disingenuous
or obviously implausible, let alone to refuse to acknowledge their argument for limited federal authority as its own distinctive form of rights
7
discourse.
A.

Federalism, Rights and the Ninth Amendment

Blindness to a basic understanding of the Framers' design of our federal structure is largely responsible for the confusion that surrounds our
understanding of the Ninth Amendment. 8 Thirty years ago, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,9 Justices Black and Stewart explained in separate dissenting
opinions that the Ninth Amendment's reference to the other rights "retained by the people" alluded to the collective and individual rights that
the people retained by virtue of the Constitution's grant of limited, enumerated powers to the national government.' 0 Although the overwhelm6. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow', ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1033, 1033 (1979) (describing Constitution as "never fixed . . . [but rather]
chang[ing] over time to accommodate altered circumstances and evolving
values").
7. See LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 156
(1988) (arguing difficulty of crediting view that Framers "actually believed their
own arguments to justify the omission of a bill of rights"); Levinson, supra note 3,
at 140 (suggesting that Alexander Hamilton's reliance on enumerated powers
scheme in defending omission of bill of rights "does not fit altogether well with his
defense of implied power only four years later in relation to the chartering of the
Bank of the United States"); see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalReading of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE
LJ. 267, 325 (1993) (referring to typical portrayal of omission of bill of rights as "a
major blunder," and to framers as "fools and knaves who concocted a desperate
defense of a flawed document"). But see Berns, supra note 2, at 52 (concluding
that, on whole, "history has vindicated the Federalists, who insisted that, so far as
the federal government was the object of concern, a bill of rights was unnecessary."); Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1275 (stating view that federalists "genuinely
believed that the rights of state citizens would not be threatened by the Constitution"). For a moderate assessment of the federalist argument, acknowledging both
its force and its limitations, see infra notes 245-56, 267-74 and accompanying text.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.").
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. See id. at 519-20 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that Ninth Amendment was
intended to protect against notion that nonenumerated powers passed to federal
government); id. at 530-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same). Justice Black stated
that the Ninth Amendment was
adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of
Rights did not alter the plan that the Federal Government was to be a
government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers
not delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual States.
Id. at 529-30 (Black, J., dissenting).
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ing evidence supports this interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, it has
been widely rejected, and the single largest barrier to this interpretation's
acceptance has been that the modern American mind has difficulty accepting the idea that the federal system itself was actually considered a
sufficient guarantor of popular rights by those who drafted the
Constitution.'1
Justices Black and Stewart have thus been accused of ignoring the
plain meaning of the Ninth Amendment's text, 12 mistaking a rights provision for one about the allocation of power, 13 and of generally confounding the Ninth with the Tenth Amendment. 14 Until recently, the
center of the critique of the Black/Stewart reading was the basic premise
that federalism is only about governmental structure and not in any direct
sense about securing popular rights.
11. See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction:James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NIrrrTH
AMENDMENT 2 (R. Barnett ed., 1989) (noting that Ninth Amendment has been

construed to have little significance). Barnett stated:
Any provision that has survived [the amending] process must be presumed by interpreters of the Constitution to have some legitimate constitutional function, whether actual or only potential. Despite this longrespected presumption, the Supreme Court has generally interpreted the
Ninth Amendment in a manner that denies it any role in the Constitutional structure.
Id.
12. See LEW, supra note 7, at 269 (stating Ninth Amendment "by force of its
terms protects unenumerated rights of the people"); Stephen Macedo, Reasons,
Rhetoric, and the Ninth Amendment: A Comment on Sanford Levinson, 64 CHI.-KENr L.
REv. 163, 168 (1988) (viewing Ninth Amendment as "an elastic clause for individual rights that is at least as explicit as the Article I Elastic Clause for Congress'
powers").
13. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 142 (documenting modern view of rights as
trumps that impose limits on powers granted to government and noting inference
is that rights provision cannot be about protecting scheme of allocating definite,
limited powers to federal government). Thus, when a famous commentator
dubbed the Black/Stewart construction as the federalism reading of the Ninth
Amendment, he intended the characterization as a criticism that a rights guarantee was being transformed into a power-allocation provision. SeeJoHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEW

34 (1980) (describing

"the received account of the Ninth Amendment," which is known by nearly every
student of history); see also Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory
of JudicialReview, 59 TEX. L. REv. 343, 351-52 (1981) (discussing John Hart Ely's
views on Ninth Amendment); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and "The
Jurisprudence of Original Intention", 74 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1728 (1986) (arguing that
"[iut does not follow from a recognition that certain 'rights' are retained by the
people, that certain 'powers' are retained by the states").
14. See LEW, supra note 7, at 280 (discussing one commentator's confusion
between Ninth and Tenth Amendments); Laurence G. Sager, You Can Raise the
First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the
Ninth Amendment? 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 239, 245 (1988) (discussing state-law thesis
and its view that Ninth Amendment serves to preserve rights-protective enumerated-powers scheme because it "requires us to treat the ninth amendment as a
colossally bad first draft of the tenth" and, thus, has no independent significance
in constitutional scheme).
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In two prior works, this author has defended the view that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to preserve the federal structure against
a unique threat posed by enumeration of significant limits on federal
power. 15 In both works, a major task was to explicate how a structural or
federalist reading of the Ninth Amendment is consistent with the undeniable fact that it is also a rights provision. A central thesis of those works was
that modern readers have been misled in analyzing the textual and historical materials by the modern biases about rights and structure as outlined
above; freed of those biases, the evidence bearing on original meaning
takes on an entirely new cast. In fact, the burden of those works was to
show that the historical evidence reveals that the whole point of the
amendment was to foreclose a feared inference from the inclusion of the
Bill of Rights: the rights-protective scheme of limited, enumerated powers
was being overthrown in favor of a government of general legislative powers subject only to the specific restrictions stated in the Constitution and
its amendments.

Apart from whether these works have established this reading as the
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, the view clearly presents us
with a linguistically coherent and historically plausible accounting of the
rights focus of the amendment. 16 The fear that enumerating rights could
15. See generally Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69
L. REv. 61 (1996) [hereinafter McAffee, Critical Guide] (providing in-depth
analysis of Ninth Amendment's text and its role in constitutional law); Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1215
(1990) [hereinafter McAffee, OriginalMeaning] (providing in-depth analysis of his-

TEMP.

tory of Ninth Amendment).
16. See CALVIN R. MASSEY,

SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
CONSrIrUTION'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 93 (1995) (acknowledging that "[i] t may

be that the dominant motivation for [the amendment's] adoption was the desire
to prevent the argument that enumeration of certain rights carried with it the
implication that the federal government must, therefore, possess unenumerated
powers to invade rights" and this purpose "is directed entirely toward the objective

of cabining implied governmental powers");

MICHAELJ. PERRY,THE CONSTITUTION

65-69 (1985) (rejecting McAffee's reading, although finding his
historical reconstruction plausible, and acknowledging that judge who found its
conclusion more acceptable institutionally might well find it persuasive); cf.MASSEY, supra, at 97 (arguing that we should invoke constitutional cy pres doctrine to
secure rights originally thought to be guaranteed by limited powers scheme because "we no longer make any serious attempt to control the extent of the implied
powers of Congress"). The courts typically apply the cy pres doctrine when they are
faced with the dilemma of an expressed testamentary intent that is impossible to
achieve by effectuating as nearly as possible the testator's intent. See id. (discussing
application of cy pres doctrine). Professor Massey contends:
IN THE COURTS

If the Ninth Amendment's intended purpose was simply to confirm the
extent of congressional power by preventing a latitudinarian interpretation of the scope of that power, it is evident that, apart from a radical
reconstruction of existing doctrine, that intent can no longer be accomplished. To effectuate the original intent as nearly as possible it is necessary to constrain governmental power by reading the Ninth Amendment
as a source ofjudicially enforceable individual rights that operate to limit
the exercise of governmental power.
Id. at 97-98.
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raise an inference against the limited powers scheme was articulated by all
of the Constitution's leading defenders. 17 The logic was simple. The state
constitutions presumed legislatures of general powers and limited the exercise of those powers in their constitutional declarations of rights. In
contrast, the Constitution, like the Articles of Confederation, limited national power by granting specific powers that defined the few areas over
which the national government was to have special competence. 18 If specific limiting provisions were included, they could be construed to suggest
that the national government (like the governments of the states) was to
be a government of general powers limited only by the specific restraints
stated in the Bill of Rights. 19 Many feared that by amending the Constitution to include a number of specific rights that they were anxious to preserve, the people might unwittingly undermine those rights already
inherent in the structure of a limited federal system as established by the
20
original Constitution.
Others contend, of course, that the reference to other rights retained
by the people points beyond the Constitution to implied limitations on the
17. See McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1249-65 (discussing argu-

ments advanced by James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James Iredell and other leading defenders of Constitution).
18. See id. at 1230-32 (analyzing speech by Wilson setting forth dichotomy between state and federal governments). For further documentation on this crucial
dichotomy, see infra notes 175-79.

19. See James Iredell, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 28, 1788), in 4
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-

144, 149 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1866) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE(recording James Iredell's forceful and unequivocal statement of this point
before North Carolina Ratifying Convention). A bill of rights would have been
both proper and necessary if the Constitutional Convention had devised a general
legislature of undefined powers as in "some of the American constitutions" because "it would have then operated as an exception to the legislative authority in
such particulars"; where the Framers, however, had "expressly defined" legislative
"powers of a particular nature .... [a bill of rights] is not only unnecessary, but...
absurd and dangerous." Id.
20. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 141 (posing as central question of argument
opposing Bill of Rights, "[d]id any enumeration of limitations on government
carry with it the negative pregnant that everything else was in fact permitted?"). If
the answer to this question was in the affirmative, the clear implication would be a
national government of general, rather than of assigned powers. See id. (addressing question of whether violation of those rights that were not enumerated was
therefore permitted). As James Madison noted:
"[B]y enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government,
and were consequently insecure."
Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 3, at 77). The Ninth Amendment, however,
guards against granting to the federal government those powers that were not enumerated. See id. (stating that message of Ninth Amendment is "that the specification of some rights [is] not to be interpreted as denying the equal presence within
the legal system of other, unenumerated rights").
ERAL CONSTITUTION
BATES]
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powers granted to the national government (and possibly on the states as
well), which were to be deduced by judicial reference to natural law or to
common law methodology. 2 1 Perhaps the most striking feature of most of
the modern writings advocating this alternative interpretation is the pervasive reliance on the idea that the other rights retained by the people cannot plausibly reference the rights secured by the Constitution's limited
powers scheme. 22 These critics of the "federal structure" reading of the
amendment, however, have consistently displayed the modern propensity
to denigrate or ignore the importance of the federal system as a means of

securing popular
B.

rights.

23

Federalism and Affirmative Rights: A Countertheme Emerges

The standard arguments against the structural interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment, as described above, all assume that a constitutional

provision must be either a power-allocation provision or a rights-securing
21. See Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomenato a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten
Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 107, 107 n.4 (1992) (discussing "the [largely
unexplained] historical claim that the founding generation saw the Constitution as
including a written document and unwritten principles of fundamental law").
This author has elsewhere described this view as the "affirmative rights" reading,
given that it presumes that the unenumerated rights referred to in the Ninth
Amendment affirmatively limit national powers; the federal-structure approach, by
contrast, sees the unenumerated rights as the rights existing as a residuum from
federal powers. See generally McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1215 (defining "affirmative rights" approach and contrasting residual-rights reading of
Ninth Amendment with affirmative-rights interpretation).
22. Cf McAffee, OriginalMeaning,supra note 15, at 1218-21, 1238-48, 1255-57,
1269-71 (discussing commentators' tendency to be misled because they fail to correctly apprehend and apply Framer's assumptions about rights-protective nature of
federal system and stating that commentators who acknowledge that Framers relied upon Article I's limited grant of powers to national government in defending
their decision to omit a bill of rights from the Constitution miss significance of this
argument as they seek to explicate expressions of concern that bill of rights might
jeopardize unenumerated rights); McAffee, supra note 21, at 150-64 (noting commentator's failure to correctly analyze Framer's assumptions).
23. But see Archibald Maclaine, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 28,
1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 139, 141 (recording speech defending Constitution in which Maclaine referred to security offered by Constitution's
scheme of enumerated powers in very terms of Ninth Amendment). Maclaine
stated: "We retain all those rights which we have not given away to the general government." Id. (emphasis added); see Samuel Spencer, Debates in the Convention
of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July
29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 163, 163 (contending that if
Constitution contained guarantee that "every power, jurisdiction, and right, which
are not given up by it, remain in the states," there would be no need for bill of
rights); A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD
AT PHILADELPHIA 1787, BY A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN (Nov. 28, 1787) [hereinafter A
FEDERAL REPUBLICAN], in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF

THE CONSTITUTION 303, 304-06 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] (stating that Constitution needed either bill of rights
or declaration that all not "decreed to Congress" is reserved to states).
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provision, an assumption that is belied both by the form in which the First
Amendment is drafted (as a power constraint rather than as an affirmation
of a right) and by the Framers' stated beliefs about the effect of the system
of enumerated powers. 24 These arguments also rest on the assumption
that individual rights cannot be preserved structurally, by the granting and
withholding of powers, even though the founding generation assumed the
contrary.2 - Over the years, however, a fascinating countertheme has
emerged in the literature favoring the more expansive reading of the
Ninth Amendment. Commentators have increasingly come to acknowledge that the federal system was in part a structure for securing popular
rights.

26

24. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (affirmatively protecting rights named therein
by prohibiting Congress from using any of its powers to infringe those rights);
Bybee, supra note 2, at 1556 (recognizing that First Amendment also disables government from interfering in range of areas by reliance on another power-allocative
approach, enumerating powers that can be exercised). In fact, the First Amendment has been read as creating a different sort of protection in substance, and not
merely in form; it creates a "subject-matter disability, as opposed to a procedural
disability" in that it "puts a category of laws beyond the competence of Congress"
rather than merely "qualifying the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. Just as
with enumerated powers, moreover, this no-power approach to the First Amendment works simultaneously to secure freedoms that were thought to be fundamental and to preserve critical areas of concern for the states. See id. at 1557 (stating
that First Amendment's prohibitions against congressional laws establishing religion and regulating free exercise of religion or freedom of speech and press
benefitted American people as well as states). For a treatment of historical claims
that the First Amendment presents us with a broad jurisdictional disability rather
than a typical rights guarantee, see infra notes 406-19 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 13, at 352 (stating that clause referencing
"rights retained by the people" cannot be transformed into one "allocating powers
between the state and federal governments"). This position not only presumes
that structural provisions cannot be about rights, but also forgets that the Tenth
Amendment reserves powers to the people and not alone to the states. The people, however, did not reserve merely the collective power to govern through the
jurisdiction of the state governments; they also reserved to themselves, as rights,
powers that they might have ceded up to government. SeeJames Wilson, Address
to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 387, 388 ("A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved."). Indeed, Wilson contended that
Article I's scheme of enumerated powers provided a better security of popular
rights than a bill of rights because an imperfect "enumeration of the powers of
government reserved all implied power to the people," while an imperfect
enumeration of rights in a bill of rights might implicitly concede dangerous powers to government. Id. Wilson's entire argument proceeds on the assumption that
strictly limited grants of power are as plausible a way to retain rights ("the powers
reserved") as affirmative limitations on powers in favor of specified rights.
26. See Thomas C. Grey, The Original Understandingand the Unwritten Constitution, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: Six ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145,
163-64 (Neil L. York ed., 1988) [hereinafter TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION] (discussing what author considers standard federalist assumptions of implied limitations); Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper,44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 777-86 (1997)
(criticizing McAffee's interpretation of Necessary and Proper Clause); Steven J.
Heyman, Natural Rights, Positivism and the Ninth Amendment: A Response to McAffee,
16 S.ILL. U. LJ. 327, 335 (1992) ("Although on [McAffee's] view natural rights
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25

There is, naturally, a catch: none of these commentators sees the federal structure, and especially the notion of a national government of few
powers, as an alternative, indirect way of securing liberty; by one means or
another, each of these commentators concludes that the federal structure
itself was used as a device for securing affirmative limits on federal powers
in favor of individual rights. 27 Some insist that the Framers' conception of
federalism originally included the general idea of affirmative limits on government, 28 while others suggest that particular amendments to the Constiwould not constitute a barrier against the exercise of governmental powers, they
might nonetheless have an important role in determining the scope of these powers."); David N. Mayer, The NaturalRights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to
Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 313, 316-17 n.13 (1992) (discussing Norman
Redlich's view that "the last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have been
added to conform its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to carry out the intent of both."); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171,
180 (1992) ("Professor McAffee would agree, I think, that there were unspecified
rights (or unspecified limits on governmental powers) and that the Ninth Amendment was designed to guard against the possibility that later generations would
read into the Bill of Rights an intent to codify all of those limits."). Professor
Barnett once ridiculed the idea that the Ninth Amendment could be about preserving the scheme of limited powers; he stated that the Tenth Amendment is
about powers, while correcting a Supreme CourtJustice about basic constitutional
meaning. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 6 ("The Tenth Amendment does not speak
of rights, of course, but of reserved 'powers.'"). Now, however, he suggests that the
Ninth Amendment secures unenumerated rights by providing a rule for construing federal powers, and the Tenth Amendment lends further support to the project. See Barnett, supra, at 776-77, 786 n.149 (relying on James Madison in
contending that unenumerated rights are defended by limiting constructions that
are lent support by these two "explanatory amendments").
27. See generally Grey, supra note 26, at 145; Barnett, supra note 26, at 745;
Heyman, supra note 26, at 327; Mayer, supra note 26, at 313; Sherry, supra note 26,
at 171. It would have been useful, however, had these commentators more fully
acknowledged that their own attempts to link affirmative constraints in favor of
fundamental rights to the Constitution's federal system also served to call into
question the conventional insistence that talk of powers and of allocation of authority cannot be simultaneously talk of rights.
28. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CON-

STITUTION 380-81 (1990) (suggesting that Framers' confidence in limited-powers
scheme rested on expectation that powers granted to Congress would be construed against general background assumption of implied limitations in favor of
natural and customary rights). But see McAffee, Original Meaning,supra note 15, at
1271 n.218 (criticizing assumption of implied limitations view); McAffee, supra
note 21, at 154-58 ("[Tjhe limited construction reading of the Federalists' argument of delegated powers appears to generate more problems than it solves."). A
similar idea is that this same general background assumption in favor of implied
rights was thought to be written into the requirement that Congress' acts be necessary and proper to execute the powers granted by the Constitution. See Grey, supra
note 26, at 163-64 (stating that "laws passed by Congress must be both instrumentally useful in pursuing one of Congress' delegated power (necessary) and consistent with traditionally recognized principles of individual right" and further noting
that sovereign people can grant to Congress any powers they wished, but power to
violate basic rights must be stated in explicit terms). But see McAffee, Original
Meaning, supra note 15, at 1270 n.216 (contending that Grey misconstrues statements made by Theophilus Parsons during Massachusetts Ratifying Convention of
1788 to support contention that Ninth Amendment embodied implied limitations
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tution were designed to build the idea of such limits into the federal
scheme. 29 Both groups, however, agree that the effect of either approach
was to ensure that the Constitution produced a system of limited central
30
government.
The purpose of this Article is to show that these attempts to read
modern fundamental rights law back into the structure of the Constitution
partake of the same fallacious assumptions that prompted commentators
to reject the idea that the federal structure could be the source of the
other rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment. This Article describes
and criticizes three significant variations on the common theme that the
Ninth Amendment was intended to lend support to a federal system that
on grants of power to respond to antifederalist contention that Necessary and
Proper Clause would yield interpretation of federal powers that would allow violations of natural rights).
29. See, e.g.,
Mayer, supra note 26, at 313-16 (concluding that, notwithstanding
federalist claims, lesson of struggle for bill of rights is that federal system of unamended Constitution did not adequately secure all rights to which many were
committed). Accordingly, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were inserted into
the Bill of Rights to secure all the people's rights and to assure the very sort of
implied-rights limiting construction of federal power that others contend would
have been warranted by the federal scheme as originally constructed. For a further
description and analysis of this argument as to the Tenth Amendment, see infra
notes 45-107 and accompanying text.
Going even further, it has even been suggested that tie antifederalist critics of
the Constitution intended the Ninth Amendment to provide another sort of federalism-based security for individual rights. See MAssEY, supra note 16, at 123-73 (arguing that Ninth Amendment limits scope of federal power by protecting rights
created by state constitutions). Specifically, some argue that the Ninth Amendment empowers the states to adopt state constitutional guarantees that would be
included among the unenumerated rights that affirmatively limit, or trump, federal powers. See id. at 124 (contending that "individual liberties secured by state
constitutions against governmental intrusion are federalized by the Ninth Amendment"). For a further description and criticism of the state-law rights thesis, see
infra notes 448-492 and accompanying text.
30. See Sherry, supra note 26, at 180 (suggesting that, so long as all agree that
federal system was intended to preserve rights not specifically enumerated, distinction between affirmative rights and rights defined as residuum from powers
granted is largely irrelevant and idea of unwritten rights reflecting natural rights
tradition is reaffirmed by either view); cf. MASSEY, supra note 16, at 97-98 (advocating application of constitutional cy pres doctrine to ensure that individual rights are
secured even if federal powers scheme has been undermined or has shown itself
ineffective at limiting federal power); Barnett, supra note 26, at 784 (advocating
view that effectively treats rights retained by enumerated powers as warranting
stringent test for whether exercise of power is necessary under the Necessary and
Proper Clause). To the extent that it rests on anything other than pure confusion
about the necessarily contingent nature of rights defined by reference to delegated
powers, this sort of argument simply fails to recognize that the legal arguments
from delegated powers also served to mask the real differences that would emerge
over both the proper construction of federal powers and the appropriate limits to
impose on government. The Constitution's proponents' belief that limited powers
offered important security to the people does not imply that they would have
agreed to an open-ended affirmative-rights provision to be enforced by the courts.
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imposes unenumerated limitations on the powers granted to Congress in
Article I.
C.

A Brief Overview

Part II addresses the claim that, just as the Ninth Amendment's allusion to other rights "retained by the people" references affirmative
prohibitions on powers granted by the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment's allusion to powers reserved "to the people" references the same
affirmative prohibitions. 3 1 According to this theory, the Tenth Amendment merely reinforces what the Ninth Amendment makes explicit, that
there are certain inherent rights that serve to limit government power because they cannot be delegated among the "powers" of government; they
are instead the reserved powers of the people. After raising questions of
whether this reading is the most natural explication of the text,3 2 this Article will show that when the amendment is read in historical context, it
becomes clear that the amendment was viewed as performing a critical
rights-protective function without regard to whether it was drafted in favor
of the states or the people.
The Tenth Amendment grew out of a deep fear that the failure to
make clear and explicit in the Constitution the fundamental idea of the
delegation of a few powers and the reservation of all other powers would
33
endanger the Constitution's approach to ensuring limited government.
The clear reservation of all powers not granted by the Constitution was
viewed as a singularly important protection of the rights of both the states
and the people. 34 This Article will thus demonstrate that the amendment's reference to "the people" is most adequately explained as reflecting a desire to clarify that it is the people under the theory of the
proposed Constitution, who ultimately grant and retain governmental
35
powers.
Part III challenges the even bolder argument that the unenumerated
rights secured by the Ninth Amendment were more than simply preexisting natural or customary rights; they were affirmative rights limitations
that were already implicit in the original constitutional scheme by virtue of
31. For a further discussion of the Tenth Amendment, see infra notes 45-106
and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the most natural explication of the text, see
infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of the history of the Tenth Amendment, see infra
notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
34. See Patrick Henry, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 14, 1788), in 3 EL,
LIOT's DEBATES, supra note 19, at 445-49 (arguing that provision in Constitution
reserving all powers not expressly enumerated is necessary to protect rights of
states and rights of individuals).
35. For a further discussion of the people's importance in the theory of the
proposed Constitution, see infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
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the Necessary and Proper Clause. 36 Under this jurisdictional interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as it is called, the word "proper"
no longer plays a minimal, largely redundant function in the clause, as has
been supposed; instead, the word provides the textual basis for judicial
imposition of rights found to be fundamental in the common law and
natural rights traditions. After summarizing fundamental ambiguities in
this jurisdictional reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, this Article
provides an alternative textual exegesis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause that calls into doubt the above-described interpretation. 37 In addition, it will also demonstrate that this novel reading runs against the grain
of both the known purposes of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
overall thrust of the scheme of enumerated powers as a system for securing effective government while also protecting the rights of states and individuals. 38 We will discover, finally, that the textual and historical
arguments supporting a more modest role for the Necessary and Proper
Clause are strengthened by evidence from the period debate over the rati39
fication of the Constitution and the adoption of the Bill of Rights.

Finally, Part IV will address what is perhaps the most novel claim
about the relationship between the Ninth Amendment and our federal
system: the amendment establishes the authority of states to recognize and
protect fundamental rights so as to preempt even federal law passed pursuant to one of the powers enumerated in the Constitution. 40 Opponents
of the Constitution complained that the states' declarations of rights could
be overridden by the exercise of the expansive new powers given the national government by the Constitution. 4 ' Accordingly, it has been argued
that one purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to reverse this priority in
favor of federal law when it came to the fundamental rights found in the
constitutions of the states. 4 2 The concerns about federal supremacy, how36. For a further discussion of the jurisdictional interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see infra notes 107-436 and accompanying text.
37. For a further discussion of ambiguities encountered under ajurisdictional
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see infra notes 133-83 and accompa-

nying text. For a further discussion of an alternative textual exegesis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see infra notes 188-224 and accompanying text.
38. For a further discussion of the critical analysis of this novel reading, see
infra notes 226-94 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the scheme
of enumerated powers, see infra notes 295-388 and accompanying text.
39. For a further discussion of the period after ratification of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights, see infra notes 392-436 and accompanying text.
40. For a further discussion of the power of the states to create and protect
fundamental rights from federal encroachment, see infra notes 443-92 and accompanying text.
41. See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention (May 6,
1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 92, 94-95 (HerbertJ. Storing
ed., 1981) (proposing that Congress shall have only those powers expressly delegated in Constitution, thereby preventing to some extent Congress from effectively
repealing portions of state bills of rights and state constitutions).
42. See MASsEN, supra note 16, at 123-73 (contending that Ninth Amendment
places individual rights guaranteed by state constitutions on equal footing with any

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/6

12

McAffee: The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Mo

1998]

FEDERAL SYSTEM AS BILL OF RIGHTS

ever, were closely tied to the arguments on behalf of a constitutional
amendment clarifying that all powers not granted to the national government were reserved to the states.4 3 The net result was the adoption of the
Tenth Amendment, not the Ninth. In turn, this Article will show that this
sort of "Reverse Preemption Clause" reading of the Ninth Amendment is
implausible historically and unworkable structurally as adopted in the con44
stitutional scheme.
II.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEE

Traditionally the Tenth Amendment has been viewed as a structural
guarantee designed to clarify the implications flowing from the Constitution's grant of limited powers to the national government. 45 It makes explicit what was already implicit in Article I of the Constitution: the federal
government was to be a government of limited, rather than general, powers, and the states would continue to exercise power over the vast range of
matters over which the national government was not granted authority.
The amendment thus appears to provide a classic example of a declaratory
provision-a provision included in a legal document to confirm an existing understanding of its meaning or implications-rather than a provision to add a new substantive element or to change the document's
meaning or implications. 46 James Madison confirmed this purpose when
he presented a draft of what became the Tenth Amendment to the first
rights specifically enumerated in Federal Constitution); Calvin R. Massey, Anti-Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 987, 988 (1988) (same).
43. For a further discussion of the connection between these two concerns
and these arguments, see infra notes 460-89 and accompanying text.
44. For a further discussion of a criticism of this sort of "Reverse Preemption
Clause," see infra notes 477-492 and accompanying text.
45. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").
46. See Amendments to the Constitution (Sept. 18, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3, 3 (noting Congress itself stated in its resolution
adopting proposed Bill of Rights that states had "expressed a desire, in order to
prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added" (emphasis added)). The Tenth Amendment has
historically been viewed as an example of one of the declaratory clauses to be added to the Constitution. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941)
(contending that Tenth Amendment is largely superfluous). As Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, wrote:
There is nothing in the history of [the Tenth Amendment's] adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
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Congress and acknowledged that many would think it completely unneces47
sary for this reason.
In recent times, however, it has been suggested that the Tenth
Amendment was intended not simply to reaffirm the federal structure, but
also to guarantee fundamental rights limitations on the federal government.48 It is observed that the amendment eventually adopted by the

states was not the same amendment Madison described as purely declaratory of the original federal design. 49 According to one commentator,
"[t]he addition of the words, 'or to the people,' to the end of the Tenth
Amendment as it was finally adopted.., made that amendment not only a
50
guarantor of federalism but also of the retained rights of the people."
How do we know that this additional language was intended to guarantee
limitations on the powers of Congress in addition to the ones set forth in
the first eight amendments? The answer is not that Madison or any of his
5
brethren asserted that this was the function of this additional language. '
Rather, it is that
[t]he last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have been
added to conform its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to
carry out the intent of both-that as to the federal government
47. See Madison, supra note 3, at 85 (acknowledging his understanding that
reserved powers amendment "may be considered as superfluous," but arguing that
"there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that
the fact is as stated").
48. See Mayer, supra note 26, at 371 n.13 (arguing that Tenth Amendment
serves dual role as guarantor of federalism as well as guarantor of retained rights of
people); Norman G. Redlich, "Are There Certain Rights... Retained by the People"?, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 787, 806-07 (1962) (asserting that text of Tenth Amendment implies that people possess powers that neither federal government nor state governments possess).
49. Madison Resolution (June 12, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 11, 14 ("The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively."). On September 7,
1789, the Senate added "or to the people" to the language describing the powers
"not delegated." See id. at 41 n.23.
50. Mayer, supra note 26, at 317 n.13. Mayer's formulation assumes that there
is an important distinction between guaranteeing federalism and guaranteeing
"the retained rights of the people." Id. In the minds of those who fought to include the language that became the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, however, a central end of guaranteeing federalism was precisely to guarantee "the
retained rights of the people," referring to all the rights and powers retained by
the limited grants of power to the national government. See Wilmarth, supra note
2, at 1280-82 (discussing antifederalists' emphasis on state autonomy and their demand for amendment reserving states' rights and powers). One need not posit a
new and dramatic purpose of implying additional qualifications of the powers
granted by the Constitution to recognize that the Tenth Amendment belongs
squarely in the Bill of Rights as a guarantee of the rights reserved to the people in
granting only limited powers to the national government.
51. See Redlich, supra note 48, at 806 (noting that Senate added this language
to House's proposed draft). Moreover, "we have no record of the Senate debates
and this addition did not occasion any further debate in the House, which ultimately accepted the Senate version." Id.
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there were rights, not enumerated in the Constitution, which
were 'retained . . . by the people,' and that because the people

possessed such rights there were powers which neither the federal
52
government nor the states possessed.
Notice that this entire course of argument contradicts central premises in the standard critique of the traditional reading of the Ninth
Amendment; in important ways it turns the standard critique on its head.
As noted above, commentators have uniformly contended that the federal
structure reading of the Ninth Amendment renders the amendment utterly redundant of the Tenth.5 3 This fundamental rights reading of the
52. Id. at 807 (first emphasis added). Professor Mayer endorsed this analysis
by Professor Redlich. See Mayer, supra note 26, at 317 n.13 (citing Redlich for
proposition that last four words of Tenth Amendment were adopted to carry out
intent of both Ninth and Tenth Amendments). More recently, however, Mayer
seems to suggest that the addition of the phrase in question suggested only ajeffersonian rule of strict construction of federal powers because it transformed the provision "from a reservation of powers to the states to a more general rule for
construing federal powers." David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme
Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 339, 351 (1996); see also
id. at 343 (stating purpose of Tenth Amendment was "to ensure that the federal
government is truly a government of enumerated powers"); id. at 352 (describing
amendment as "rule of construction against additional federal powers"). Mayer
thus praises Justice Clarence Thomas for recognizing both that the Tenth Amendment is not a mere "truism," but "a fundamental rule of construction limiting the
federal government generally to a fairly strict reading of its powers enumerated in
the Constitution," and that the Tenth Amendment thus "protects not only the
rights of the states, under a federal system of government, but also the rights of the
people of the United States, under a constitutional scheme of limited government."
Id. at 422. It is difficult to see how this proposed rule of strict construction of
federal powers relates to Mayer's prior argument that the same language, referencing "the people," was an allusion to constitutional rights that would affirmatively
limit the scope of federal powers; nor does Mayer offer any explanation as to how
this added language could have been intended to state both a general rule of strict
construction and a guarantee of affirmative limitations on granted powers.
53. See McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1307 (demonstrating that
traditional claim lacks real merit given that Ninth Amendment secures general
reservation of rights as created by scheme of enumerated powers against unique
threat posed by enumeration of specific rights in Bill of Rights, something Tenth
Amendment does not accomplish). Under this traditional reading, the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments are twin guarantors of our federal system of granted powers
and reserved rights; each is a cautionary provision that reflects the depth of concern and commitment that the Framers had with respect to our liberty-enhancing
system of federalism. See id. at 1306-11 (discussing several theories regarding
symbiotic relationship between Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
Ironically, Redlich apparently viewed this reading of the Tenth Amendment
as saving it from redundancy of the scheme embodied in Article I. He explains
that "[a]s between the federal government and the states the Tenth Amendment is
a redundancy" because in that regard it states the familiar truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. Redlich, supra note 48, at 802-07. Both
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, however, present redundancies in the sense
referred to by Redlich, even with his reading of them. After all, the Ninth Amendment refers to rights already retained by the people, which according to his reading suggests that they are implied or inherent rights that already existed under the
Constitution; in turn, the Tenth Amendment, even according to Redlich's analysis,
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Tenth Amendment, however, suggests that the Tenth Amendment does
everything that modern scholars have contended the Ninth Amendment
does for us: it guarantees fundamental rights limitations beyond those
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. Thus, we
return to the very sort of redundancy that was deemed implausible in the
54
context of assessing the traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment.
Students of the Constitution have also been told that whereas "the
final text of the ninth amendment-which closely tracked the draft generated by the House of Representatives' 'Committee of Eleven' on which
Madison sat-is all about rights; the language of power was reserved for
the tenth amendment." 55 Under the reading discussed above, however,
the powers reserved to the people in the Tenth Amendment reference
individual rights limitations that limit the scope of federal power. This
acknowledges not only that it is possible to talk of rights through the language of powers, but also that a provision referring simply to the reservation of all the powers not granted might allude meaningfully to what the
Ninth Amendment calls the other rights "retained by the people." It
would be a sort of progress in the Ninth Amendment debate if we could all
agree that these phrases-"powers ...

reserved to the . . .people" and

"other [rights] retained by the people"-were equivalencies. Then the debate over the intended meaning of the Ninth Amendment could be resolved by determining from the text of the Tenth Amendment read in its
historical context, what the Framers meant when they referred to the
"powers . . . reserved to the . . .people." And, indeed, that is what this

author proposes to do here in the course of evaluating the fundamentalrights interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.
A.

The Text of the Tenth Amendment

The text of the Tenth Amendment seems to confirm Madison's assurance to Congress that the amendment restates what would already be a
alludes to the powers reserved by the people, not as a residuum from powers, but
nevertheless, as a description of what they were deemed already to possess under
the Constitution without a Ninth or Tenth Amendment.
54. It is striking that neither Mayer nor Redlich saw any need to confront the
obvious redundancy their reading of the Tenth Amendment suggests. Indeed, in a
subsequent writing Mayer seems to clearly separate the function of the provisions,
arguing that the Ninth Amendment was to "guard against the danger of losing
unenumerated rights" while the Tenth Amendment worked "against the danger of
adding to the enumerated powers." Mayer, supra note 52, at 351-52. He offers no
explanation, however, as to how this explication of the allocation of function between the two provisions is reconcilable with his earlier treatment of the meaning
of the Tenth Amendment. It is also striking that, to date, not a single advocate of
the standard critique of the traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment has
noted the reintroduction of such redundancy by fellow advocates of the fundamental-rights reading of the Ninth Amendment.
55. Sager, supra note 14, at 250-51.
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valid inference from the unamended Constitution. 56 Madison suggested
that there should be no objection to the amendment so long as it is agreed
that "the fact is as stated."' 57 The "fact" to which Madison refers is the
fundamental idea that all the powers not granted to the nation by the
Constitution are reserved powers that are beyond the authority of the federal government. Madison's claim about the design of the unamended
Constitution is strongly supported by ordinary rules of construction. The
idea that Congress is limited to the powers granted and all other powers
are reserved, is a reasonable inference from the language of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which enumerates the powers of Congress
under the Constitution. 58 To begin with, Section 8 states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power" and then proceeds to provide a fairly substantial
list of the various powers granted to Congress. 5 9 Considering that this
enumeration of powers followed the practice established in the Articles of
Confederation, which stated the exclusive powers of the national government, this is an appropriate context in which to apply the traditional common law maxim of expressio unius est exclusion alterius-the inclusion of
such a list of powers logically excludes others.
Moreover, the last clause of this section of the Constitution, the one
we know as the Necessary and Proper Clause, further clarifies that this is
indeed the correct inference, as it purports to acknowledge the existence
of ancillary powers and to state the extent to which such powers may legitimately be exercised. 60 If the listing of powers was intended merely to exemplify or illustrate what was intended to be a general set of national
powers, rather than to define and limit the powers to be exercised by the
nation, there would be no reason to state the power to execute the other
named powers. The Necessary and Proper Clause rather obviously includes the pregnant negative; namely, that if an act of Congress does not
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").
57. Madison, supra note 3, at 85.
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating powers of Congress).
59. Id. Congress' powers include the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises; to pay the country's debts and to provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States; to borrow money; to regulate
commerce; to establish uniform rules for naturalization and bankruptcies; to coin
money and to regulate its value; to establish post offices; to protect copyrights; to
constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court to punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas as well as offenses against international law; to declare
war; to raise and support the army and navy; to regulate the armed forces and to
organize and regulate the national militia. See id. (providing also power to punish
counterfeiting of securities and coin, to fix standard weights and measures and to
control seat of national government).
60. See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (stating that Congress' power is "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof").
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bear the stated relationship to one of the enumerated powers, Congress
will have acted beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
The text also seems to support the famous dictum of Justice Stone
that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered."' 6 1 The reserved powers to which the amendment refers are defined negatively as "[t]he powers not delegated." 62 The
text itself suggests that, if any authority is actually delegated to the United
States, it follows that it has not been reserved, whether by the states or the
people. By contrast, notice that the fundamental-rights construction of
the text, which reads the Tenth Amendment as acknowledging the existence of fundamental rights over which the people hold power not delegated to any government, suggests that some of the powers reserved by the
Tenth Amendment are rights that serve to constrain or limit the exercise
of the powers initially delegated. In short, these reserved powers function
as implied limitations.
It might have been conceived, of course, that the fundamental rights
secured by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, were not delegated to the
nation because they could not be, even if a granted power might logically
seem to encompass authority to invade such a right. At the very least,
though, "powers not delegated' remains an unusual way to reference natural
and inalienable rights which, as noted above, are conceived as rights that
in their nature could not have been delegated to any government. 6 3 This
seems especially true given the acknowledgment that, without the addition
61. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). This is only to say, however, that the text of the Tenth Amendment states what was already established
without it. See id. ("[T]here is nothing in the history of [the Tenth Amendment's]
adoption to suggest that it was nothing more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment.").
This does not imply that the construction of the powers granted to the federal
government, and perhaps especially of the doctrine of implied powers, may not
properly be influenced by the governing assumptions as to the authority that had
been left to the states. Nor does it imply that the federal structure, and the idea of
sovereign states, quite apart from the text of the Tenth Amendment, may not be
the source of limits on national power. The historical doctrine of intergovernmental immunities, and the modern doctrine of structural limitations on federal
power, are neither commanded
Amendment.

nor precluded

by the

text of the Tenth

62. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
63. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 26, at 322 (arguing that, for Framers, "written
law was not the source of rights, but merely affirmed preexistent rights, in order to
provide added security"). Individual-rights guarantees like those included in the
federal Bill of Rights were sometimes described as "powers" withheld from government. See Wilson, supra note 25, at 388 (describing bill of rights as "an enumeration of the powers reserved"). Even so, it seems unlikely that the Framers would
have used the phrase "powers not delegated" to refer simultaneously to the residuum of the powers granted, in referring to the states' reserved powers, and to
unspecified fundamental-rights limitations in referring to powers reserved by the
people. This, however, is the thesis that the fundamental-rights reading asks us to

adopt.
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of the language suggesting powers reserved to the people, the powers "not
delegated," but reserved to the states, referred to the residuum of the powers granted by Article I and did not include any implied limitations on
64
those powers.
Surprising or not, the fundamental-rights reading might still make
the best sense of the Tenth Amendment's text if we had reason to believe
that the language referring to the reserved powers of the people was added to the amendment so that it would conform to a fundamental-rights
understanding of the Ninth Amendment-one that read the rights "retained by the people" as a reference to affirmative limitations on government powers in favor of human rights. This demonstrates that the text
seldom resolves such disputes definitively. Traditionally, however, we have
used tools that focus attention beyond the text to clarify the intended
meaning of the text, including an analysis of the mischief to which the
amendment was actually addressed and the remedy that the amendment
was thought to supply. By examining the relevant history, we may be able
to determine whether the Framers in fact used "powers not delegated" to
refer to separate sorts of things-the residuum from the powers actually
granted the national government and a set of fundamental rights that were
apparently never delegated because they could not be.
B.

The Mischief to Which the Tenth Amendment Was Addressed

The participants in the debate over ratification of the Constitution
would have agreed that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers,
however framed, added further security for popular rights. At the same
time, the historical evidence undercuts the view that the people's reserved
powers included affirmative limitations on the powers granted to the national government. The textual antecedent to the Tenth Amendment is,
of course, Article II of the Articles of Confederation, the original federal
constitution, which provided that each state "retains every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to
the United States."'65 Although this state sovereignty guarantee referred to
retained rights, it is clear from the text that this language reserved gov64. See Redlich, supra note 48, at 806 (stating that, as between federal government and states, Tenth Amendment "isa redundancy" because it states familiar
truism that all that has not been surrendered is retained). See generally id. at 806-07
(discussing significance of addition of four words, "or to the people," to Tenth
Amendment). It is equally clear that this straightforward idea of reserved powers
was viewed as rights protective; for example, Madison spoke of enumerated powers
as a system for securing rights because "it follows that all [the powers] that are not
granted by the constitution are retained," and hence "the constitution is a bill of
powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people." Madison, supra note 3,
at 82. In this context at least, for Madison the "powers not granted" referred to the
residuum that would be defined by reference to the powers, and did not refer to
additional limitations on the exercise of granted powers. See id. (discussing meaning of "powers not granted").
65. See generally ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION (1777).
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erning power to the respective states rather than specific individual rights
limitations in the modern sense.
Even so, the antifederalist 66 critics of the Constitution made the omission of the language of Article II of the Articles of the Confederation a
linchpin in their arguments to defeat the Constitution. 67 The antifederalists argued that the omission of Article II raised an inference of unlimited
sovereignty in the national government, especially given the tendency of
interpreters to presume that the omission of such crucial language from a
succeeding document must have a purpose. 68 Interpreters thus would
conclude that the general government possessed general powers that superseded all the powers of the states. States, therefore, held no reserved
sovereign powers at all, but acted completely at the sufferance of the na69
tional government.
Given this fear that an all-powerful consolidated form of government
was the proper inference to be drawn from the omission of a general reservation clause, the antifederalists concurred with the view that such a provision would be "a summary of a bill of rights, which gentlemen are
anxious to obtain." 70 This conclusion was reached for at least two reasons.
First, the states were considered to be mediating institutions that preserved the people's traditional rights, both in the common law and in the
state constitutions' declarations of rights. Consequently, the consolidation
of power in the nation by the omission of any general reservation of powers to the states meant that this source of security for individual rights
would be nullified. 7 1 Second, if the inference of unlimited power came
about because of the omission of such a clause, notwithstanding the
enumeration of powers in the Constitution, it meant that "many valuable
and important rights would be concluded to be given up by
implication."

72

66. Although a traditional spelling is "anti-federalist," this Article follows the
spelling used by the editors of The Ratification of the Constitution. See generally THE
COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST, supra note 41; THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23.

67. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1244-45 (discussing
antifederalists' arguments based on Article II of Articles of Confederation).
68. See id. at 1244 (discussing antifederalists' fear that failure to include general provision in Constitution reserving powers for states would "create a government of unlimited powers").
69. See id. at 1244 n.115 (reporting antifederalists' statements drawing this

inference from omission of Article II's language).
70. Samuel Adams, Debates in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 19, at 130, 131.
71. See Henry, supra note 34, at 448-49 (noting that failure to include bill of
rights in federal constitution invites federal government to intermeddle with and
violate individual fights).
72. George Mason, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constititution (June 14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 19, at 444, 444. Once again, however, the rights that would be
"given up by implication," as George Mason asserted, were the entire body of rights
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Article II of the Articles of Confederation was drafted, as we have
seen, in terms of reserving sovereign powers to the states. In substance,
however, it did not matter whether the general reservation of power was
stated in favor of the states or of the sovereign people. In demanding the
sort of reservation provision that would be embodied in the Tenth Amendment, Patrick Henry asserted "that a general positive provision should be
inserted in the new system, securing to the states and the people every right
which was not conceded to the general government." 73 No one took this
language to be a request for the insertion of previously unstated limits on
granted powers; rather, it was clear that Henry was echoing the pervasive
call for a general reservation of power clause that would operate to enhance the security of the people and the states against excessive federal
power-power that could easily be employed in derogation of liberties tra74
ditionally protected by the states.
For the antifederalists a general reservation of all powers not granted
was simply one of several strategies for ensuring that popular rights were
secured by constitutional text. 75 It was never exclusively about states
rights. For example, the author of Letters from the FederalFarmer,76 the leading work of an opponent of the Constitution, contended that the Constitution was deficient both in its failure to include essential limitations on
federal power and its failure to include a provision reserving the powers
not granted. 77 Conceding that a limited powers approach might be one
way to secure rights, he contended that it would be unwise to rely exclusively upon "silent reservations," as he characterized Article I's implicit reservation of powers by the device of enumeration of powers. 78 The better
alternative was to combine the enumeration of carefully defined powers
(as in Article I) with a general reservation clause and, as to especially imthat would be subject to invasions without limitation if the Constitution were construed as effectively granting unlimited powers; they were not unstated limitations
on powers specifically granted in the Constitution. See id.
73. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
74. See Henry, supra note 34, at 446 (contending that without provision from
Confederation "that every right was retained by the states, respectively, which was
not given up to the government of the United States," it would follow, "by a natural
and unavoidable implication," that people give up all their rights to general government); Mason, supra note 72, at 444 (suggesting similar loss).
75. See LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER II (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 230, 233-34 (arguing that Constitution places very extensive powers in inherently defective federal government,
which results in either neglected laws or military enforcement leading, in either
case, to despotism).
76. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 214 ("The Observations of the Federal Farmer are generally, and correctly, considered to be one of
the ablest Anti-Federalist pieces ....").
77. See LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 323, 323-26 (arguing that bill of
rights must be included in Constitution to limit powers of federal government as
well as a provision reserving those powers not enumerated.

78. Id. at 324.
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portant rights, specific limitations on the exercise of the powers granted
by the Constitution:
[W]e might advantageously enumerate the powers given, and
then in general words, according to the mode adopted in the 2d
art. of the confederation, declare that all powers, rights and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly given
up ....
But admitting, on the general principle, that all rights
are reserved of course, which are not expressly surrendered, the
people could with sufficient certainty assert their rights on all occasions, and establish them with ease, still there are infinite advantages in particularly enumerating many of the most essential
rights reserved in all cases; and as to the less important ones, we
may declare in general terms, that all not expressly surrendered
79
are reserved.
Advocates of the fundamental-rights reading of the Tenth Amendment might be tempted to read into this statement of the Federal Farmer
the notion that the author is advocating a general reservation of implied
limitations on the powers granted by the Constitution rather than a provision reserving to the people the residuum of the powers not granted to
the national government. This, however, would be implausible. 80 For one
thing, the author's reliance on Article II of the Articles of Confederation,
tracking a consistent theme of the Constitution's opponents, suggests that
he is advocating the standard provision advocated hundreds of times in
1787 and 1788 to make explicit the idea that all powers not granted would
be reserved.8 1 Moreover, the Federal Farmer is an unlikely candidate to
79. Id.
80. For one thing, as we have seen, Redlich and Mayer contend that the
Tenth Amendment was transformed into a fundamental-rights provision, responsive to the notion of unenumerated rights embodied in the Ninth Amendment.
See Mayer, supra note 26, at 317 n.13 (emphasizing addition of "or to the people"
to proposed Tenth Amendment); Redlich, supra note 48, at 806-07 (underscoring
language change referencing peoples' retained rights and linking it to Ninth
Amendment); cf. Mayer, supra note 26, at 313-16 (contending that unamended
Constitution's scheme of enumerated powers and reserved rights was flawed device
for securing rights as reflected in ratification debate and that its demonstrable
failures prompted adoption of Bill of Rights). One implication of Mayer's arguments is that he understood the initial proposals to make the reservation of powers
explicit as a straightforward argument about the powers granted without reference
to any implied fundamental-rights limitations. Moreover, there is no reason to
think that the Federal Farmer held any novel views as to the significance of advocating a general reservation of rights and powers in accordance with the pattern
set by Article II of the Articles of Confederation.
81. Similar pleas for reliance on a general reservation of powers, as well as
inclusion of a few key rights limitations, became a theme. See Letter from William
R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 3, at 246 ("Instead of a Bill of rights attempting to enumerate the rights of the
indivi[du]al or the State Governments, they seem to prefer some general negative
confining Congress to the exercise of the powers particularly granted, with some
express negative restriction in some important cases." (alteration in original)).
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accept the premise that implied constitutional limits on powers were
granted by the Constitution. As I have documented elsewhere, this leading antifederalist made clear in his writings that a central purpose of a
written constitution is to specify important limitations on government and
that customary and natural rights do not function as implied constitutional limitations. 8 2 Thus, the Federal Farmer pointed to the most oftdiscussed right omitted from the Constitution, freedom of the press, and
made clear his view not only that the sovereign people hold the power to
"annihilate or limit this right," but also that "[t] his may be done by giving
83
general powers, as well as by using particular words."
Every state convention that offered amendments to the Constitution
included a proposed amendment based on Article II of the Articles of
Confederation.8 4 Every one of these proposals related back to the ratification-struggle argument about the potential dangers of omitting such a provision from the Constitution. 85 In all the convention speeches, as well as
the publications that sought to influence the conventions by the swaying
of public opinion, not a single statement appeared in which proponents of
such an amendment suggested that they held a concern that inherent or
implied limitations on granted powers might be at risk because of the
omission of such a provision from the Constitution. 86 The only question
left is whether there are reasons to think that a novel remedy to an entirely
distinguishable mischief was inserted into this amendment at the eleventh
hour.

82. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the
Rights "Retained" by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 277-79 (1992) (discussing Federal Farmer's writings); McAffee, supra note 21, at 144-45 (same); McAffee, Original

Meaning, supra note 15, at 1273-75 (same).
83. LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 329.
84. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1242 ("[A] provision like
the tenth amendment is the only one that appears in the proposals of every ratifying convention that offered any.").
85. Compare Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 25, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES,
supra note 19, at 653 (offering proposal for vote that "the powers granted under
the [unamended] Constitution are the gift of the people, and every power not
granted thereby remains with them, and at their will"), with LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 324-26 (arguing that failure to include clause
reserving powers to states could lead to infringement of rights).
86. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 34, at 448-49 (asserting that, in contrast to Virginia Constitution's provision for essential rights, Federal Constitution invites federal government to violate individual rights with no suggestion that rights might
ever be read in by implication); LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note
77, at 324 (stating risk of relying on implied general reservation is that powers will
not be adequately defined to sufficiently "draw the line" between powers granted
and rights reserved). The Federal Farmer implied that it is safer to list essential
rights and rely on a limited powers scheme as a backup guarantee. See id. (failing
to suggest implied rights limitations or that failure to include general reservation
of powers clause cuts against any implied rights).
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The "Remedy" Embodied in the Tenth Amendment

It was noted above that critics of the Constitution expressed fears for
the rights of the people and the states if the Constitution were adopted
without a provision stating a general reservation of powers not granted by
the Constitution. This concern for the rights of both the people and the
states is clearly reflected in an amendment proposed by the New York Ratifying Convention:
[E]very Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains
to the People of the several States, or to their respective State
Governments to whom they may have granted the same ....87
Additionally, general reservation clauses were worded in several different
ways. Most of the states that proposed constitutional amendments, including Virginia, worded the amendment in terms of the reserved rights and
powers of the states. 88 These provisions, however, were just as often
touted as important guarantees of popular rights as those framed in terms
of "the people," just as the New York provision could equally be described
as a "state rights" proposal. In each case, the purpose was to state the basic
principle embodied in Article II of the Articles of Confederation. In the
voluminous materials relating to the debate over ratification of the Constitution, no statement suggests that the participants perceived any difference in substance between the New York and Virginia forms of the
proposed amendment.
This is not to say that the distinction between "the people" and "the
states" had no relevance to those who employed the terms. The federalist
proponents of the Constitution frequently relied upon the doctrine of
popular sovereignty to justify the Philadelphia Convention's decision to
draft a new Constitution, rather than follow the original charge to amend
the Articles of Confederation, as well as to explain how governmental authority could be divided between the national and state governments without violating the traditional dictum against the possibility of divided
87. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 91112 (1971); see The Ratifications of the Twelve States Reported in the General Convention (Rhode Island) (June 16, 1790), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at
334, 334 (stating proposed amendment in substantially same language as New York
proposal).
88. See The Ratifications of the Twelve States Reported in the General Convention (Massachusetts) (Feb. 7, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, Supra note 19, at
322, 322 ("[A]II powers not expressly delegated . . .are reserved to the several
states .... "); The Ratifications of the Twelve States Reported in the General Convention (South Carolina) (May 23, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at
325, 325 (noting states "retain every power not expressly relinquished by them");
The Ratifications of the Twelve States Reported in the General Convention (New
Hampshire) (June 21, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 325, 325-326
(declaring powers are "reserved to the several states").
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sovereignty. 89 If the people were truly the sovereign, as posited in American revolutionary theory, they held authority to reconsider their commitment to the Articles of Confederation and to withdraw power from their
respective state governments in favor of a stronger central government. 90
89. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The PoliticalIdeology of the Founders, in TOWARD A
MORE PERFEcT UNION, supra note 26, at 7-19 (contending that very idea and role of
popular sovereignty was altered by federalist attempts to confront objections to
shifting locus of sovereignty from states to national government). In responding
to the argument that sovereignty could not be divided between the federal government and the states, James Wilson contended before the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention that true sovereign power, "from which there is no appeal, and which
is therefore called absolute, supreme and uncontrollable," resides "with the people." James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Alexander
J. Dallas ed., Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
23, at 340, 348; accordWood, supra,at 22 (quoting Wilson). Moreover, because this
sovereignty "'resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government,"' the people
"'can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and under
such limitations, as they think proper.'" Wood, supra, at 22 (quoting Wilson).
Wood summarized the position that emerged:
[T] he people give some of their power to the institutions of the national
government, some to the various state governments, and some at other
extraordinary times to constitutional conventions for the specific purpose
of making or amending constitutions. But unlike the British people in
relation to their Parliament, the American people never surrender to any
political institution or even to all political institutions together their full
and final sovereign power.
Id. Wilson was not saying, as men had for ages, that all governmental power was
derived from the people. Instead he was saying that all government was only a temporary and limited agency of the people-out, so to speak, on a short-term, always
recallable, loan. See id.
90. Cf Merrill Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, the Founders, and Constitutional

Change, in THE

AMERICAN FOUNDING:

ESSAYS

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITU-

276, 276 (. Barlow et al. eds., 1988) ("'Political society is derived from the
people, and established with their consent."' (quoting Delaware Constitution)).
Such restatements of fundamental revolutionary theory provided a foundation for
the argument that the people's authority to adopt a new arrangement for the distribution of power was not limited by the terms of the existing compact among the
states.
As early as 1776, two counties in North Carolina had informed delegates to
their 1776 convention that "' [p]olitical power ... is of two kinds, one principal
and superior, the other derived and inferior ....
The principal supreme power is
possessed by the people at large, the derived and inferior power by the servants
which they employ[.]'" INSTRUCTIONS OF MECKLENBURG AND ORANGE COUNTIES
TION

(1776), quoted in

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,

1776-87 364-65 n.37 (1969). Because authority of the people exceeded that of
their representatives, it followed that the people could redistribute authority according to their own estimation of the public good. See id. (discussing problems of
groups in 1776 being deeply mistrustful of legislatures); see also FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECrUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
277-81 (1985) (summarizing popular sovereignty grounding of response to argument that Constitution sought to divide sovereignty); Charles Lofgren, The Origins
of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty, and the Problem of ConstitutionalIntention,
in GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR,
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERALISM

70, 92-97 (1986) (describing complexity and

differing points of emphasis among federalists relying on popular sovereignty to
confront problem of divided sovereignty).
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By contrast, the antifederalists tended to be stronger proponents of state
power; many of them continued to see the states as the central building
blocks in the union symbolized by the Constitution.9 1 These differing perspectives undoubtedly played a role in the tendency of some to emphasize
the reserved powers of the states and for others to stress the concept of the
reserved sovereign power of the people.
At the same time, the different formulations of the various state general reservation proposals do not reflect differences of any great substance
as to their intended meaning and application. Madison, for example, was
an important proponent of the popular sovereignty rationales for explaining the Convention's authority to propose a new Constitution and for the
Constitution's adoption of the popular process.9 2 He served, however, on
the committee that wrote proposed amendments for the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, which drafted the reserved powers provision in terms of powers reserved to the states. 93 As we have seen, he also followed Virginia's
lead in focusing on the reservation of sovereign power to the states in his
9 4

own draft.

What little evidence we have from the first Congress tends to confirm
that the Tenth Amendment's language change, proposed by Congress and
adopted by the Senate, reflected the preference for underscoring that it is
the people who grant and reserve powers to both the federal and state
governments. 9 5 This is the same idea previously embodied in the New
York proposal.9 6 We do know that a similar proposal was offered in the
91. See Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1276 (stating that antifederalists feared that
"ratification of the Constitution would create an oppressive national government
and destroy the political authority of the United States").
92. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (stating that governments of nation and states were "different agents
and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for
different purposes").
93. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1236 (describing
Madison's service on Virginia Drafting Committee). Federalists John Marshall,
George Wythe andJames Madison, as well as leading antifederalists Patrick Henry
and George Mason were members of the Virginia Drafting Committee. See id.
94. For a discussion of Madison's proposed reserved powers provision, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment, see infra notes 45-106 and
accompanying test.
96. See The Ratification of the Twelve States Reported in the General Conven-

tion (New York) (July 26, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S

DEBATES,

supra note 19, at 327, 327

(describing amendments from convention). The New York amendments stated
that every proper jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the several
states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may have
granted the same; and that those clauses in said Constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to
certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
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House of Representatives on August 22, 1789, and that Representative
Daniel Carroll objected to the change "as it tended to create a distinction
97
between the people and their legislatures."
The question of wording, however, arose again in the Senate, undoubtedly because the final version of the Tenth Amendment conforms
more completely to the theory of the Constitution defended by its chief
proponents than a provision that seemed to hearken back to the notion of
the states as the parties to the agreement who delegated authority to the
nation in the first instance. 98 And because neither the critics nor the defenders of the Constitution saw a great difference of substance in the basic
thrust of the proposed amendment-with or without the reference to the
people's reseived powers-it is not surprising that the language change
passed with a minimum of discussion or debate. 9 9 The unique history of
Id.
97. Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 22, 1789), in CREATING THE
supra note 3, at 192, 193. An amendment with a similar purpose
had also been proposed on August 18 by Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker,
who would have added a prefix, "all powers being derived from the people," to the
proposed reserved powers provision, followed by the text being considered.
Thomas Tucker, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 18, 1789), in CREBILL OF RIGHTS,

ATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 3, at 193, 197. The nature of the reaction to

this proposal, however, is obscured because it was combined with a proposal to
insert the word "express" into the amendment, a change which Madison adamantly opposed. See id. (stating that Tucker's proposed changes thus were rejected by House along with proposal to insert word "express").
98. But cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 402-05 (1819) (arguing against state-compact theory employed by Maryland's counsel to justify strict
construction of federal powers under Article I of Constitution).
99. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 295, 295-96 (objecting to change of
language in proposed reserved powers provision during 1789 debate). In his letter, Lee expressed bitter disappointment that additional amendments were not
proposed by Congress, particularly in favor of states' rights, and then claimed that
the insertion of "the people" suggested that the reservation was on behalf of "[the]
People of the United States, not of the Individual States," and that it thus "was evidently calculatedto give the Residuum to the people of the U. States, which was the
Constitutional language [We the People &C.], and to deny it to the people of the
Indiv. State." Id. (first alteration in original). Lee's objection confirms that at least
some antifederalists would have feared the language referring to "the people" precisely because it lends support to the idea that the people of the entire United
States constitute the sovereign power that establishes the Constitution, a view that
cuts against the idea of a confederation of states that Lee and others preferred.
This was, in fact, an old complaint, often lodged against the proposed Constitution
more generally. See Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1276-77 (summarizing objection of
Patrick Henry and other antifederalists to preamble's use of "We The People").
Lee did not suggest, however, that the basic operational effect of the provision, or
the content of the guarantee embodied in the Tenth Amendment, would be altered by this language change. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick
Henry, supra, at 295-96. Indeed, Lee's reading reflects the general consensus, described throughout the text above, that the rights secured by this reserved-powers
provision were defined as "the Residuum" from the powers granted to Congress;
this language was not a reference to fundamental rights limitations on the powers
granted to the national government. See id.
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the Tenth Amendment and its relation to the general theory of the Constitution thus provides a complete explanation of the purpose of adding language to the amendment as drafted by Madison and approved by the
House of Representatives. 10 0
The fundamental-rights construction, by contrast, requires us to imagine, despite a dearth of evidence to support the conclusion, that the first
Congress inserted this language about powers reserved to the people to
transform dramatically the meaning and scope of the provision so as to
reinforce the doctrine of unenumerated fundamental-rights limitations
that is asserted to be the assumption underlying the Ninth Amendment. 1 1 Yet, when the two amendments were actually discussed together
during the debate over the ratification of the Bill of Rights in Virginia, the
debate proceeded on the assumption that the purpose of both provisions
was to provide, in the words of the prominent federalist Edmund Randolph, a "reservation against constructive power."' 02 In the course of con100. Cf Lofgren, supra note 90, at 108-09 (contending that addition of language "or to the people" had "primarily a declaratory meaning to those in Congress" and may have been inserted in Tenth Amendment because somewhat

similar language proposed for preamble had not been adopted). His further suggestions that the language (1) may have served the purpose of clarifying that the
Constitution was not premised on "the notion of legislative or governmental sovereignty" but ultimately on popular sovereignty and (2) avoided any potential inference of state governmental sovereignty are also consistent with the analysis in this
Article. Id. at 109. Lofgren's analysis supplies a compelling explanation for the
addition of this language without any reference to the Ninth Amendment or the
idea of implied, affirmative limitations on national powers. See id. at 113 (concluding that Tenth Amendment was "[d]eclaratory of the overall constitutional
scheme" and "had no independent force as originally understood").
101. But see McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1277-1304 (giving

historical evidence that purpose of Ninth Amendment was to assure that general
reservation of rights and powers embodied in Article I and Tenth Amendment was
not jeopardized by enumeration of specific rights, framed as specific limitations on
granted powers, in Bill of Rights as well as in body of Constitution). One might
have expected the logic to run in the opposite direction. Given the evidence that
the reservation of soverign power in the Tenth Amendment was viewed as a means
of securing popular rights, it would make sense to consider whether the other
rights retained by the people in the Ninth Amendment are not merely the same
reservation from granted powers rather than implied limits on government.
102. Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5
SCHwARTZ, supra note 87, at 1188, 1188. In fact, the connection between the two
amendments was widely perceived. For example, at the time Congress was considering the proposed Bill of Rights, a Virginia judge, Richard Parker, wrote to Richard Henry Lee that he considered a bill of rights unnecessary because "the States
claim & have all power but what they have given away." Letter from Richard
Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 3, at 260, 260. Even so, he stated that he had "no objection to such a bill of
Rights as has been proposed by Mr. Madison because we declare that we do not
abridge our Rights by the reservation but that we retain all we have not specifically
given." Id. Similarly, a prominent southern gentleman, William Smith, identified
the proposed Ninth and Tenth Amendments with each other and viewed them as
together offering protection to the state law institution of slavery. See Letter from
William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 10, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RiGHTS, supra note 3, at 273, 273 (arguing that amendments should contain limit-
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sidering the proposed amendments, Randolph expressed concern that the
Ninth Amendment's text had been revised away from Virginia's original
proposal, which had stated a specific prohibition of an inference of extended national powers from the enumeration of specific limits on
granted powers.10 3 Hardin Burnley, a member of the Virginia Assembly
that debated the Amendments, contended in response that whether the
Amendment was framed in terms of powers or rights, it would serve to
prevent undue extensions of federal power only "if [Congress'] powers are
not too extensive already."' 0 4 According to Burnley, the efficacy of both
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments would ultimately turn on whether the
Framers had adequately performed the task of defining national powers so
that the people had successfully retained a great many rights and powers.10 5 This interpretation undermines both the modern fundamentalrights reading of the Ninth Amendment and the equivalent construction
of the Tenth Amendment. It indicates that the reserved rights and powers
to which these amendments refer are simply the residuum from the pow10 6
ers delegated to the national government.
ing language on congressional powers and language subsequently added as Ninth
Amendment). He noted that:
[A] ny exception to the powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to
give it any powers not expressly given, & the enumeration of certain rights
shall not be so construed as to deny others retained by the people-& the
powers not delegated by this Constn. nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively.
Id. Furthermore, Smith noted that these amendments would "go a great way in
preventing Congress from interfering with our negroes after 20 years." Id.
103. See Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, supra note 102, at
1188 ("It would be more safe, and more consistent with the spirit of the ... amendments proposed by Virginia.").
104. Id.
105. See id. (stating if powers of Congress are not too extensive "the rights of
the people & of the States" will be secured by the language of Ninth Amendment
as finally adopted). That Bumley identified the Ninth Amendment's rights "retained by the people" with the rights of the people and the states reflects that
reserved powers and the retained rights were thought of synonymously, but not in
terms of affirmative limitations on granted powers. See id. (stating that Burnley did
not see distinction between these concepts). Madison endorsed Burnley's view of
the matter. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789)
in 5 ScHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 1189, 1190 ("If a line can be drawn between the
powers granted and the rights retained, it would be the same thing, whether the
latter be secured.., by declaring that they shall ....or that the former shall not be
extended."). For an extensive review of Burnley and Madison's letters, see McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supranote 15, at 1287-93. For evidence that Burnley's discussion of whether the line had been adequately drawn between federal power and
state and popular rights was a reprise of arguments advanced during the struggle
to ratify the Constitution, see infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
106. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 752 (1833) (discussing Tenth Amendment's meaning). This commentator
noted:
[The Tenth Amendment] is a mere affirmation of what... is a necessary
rule of interpreting the constitution. Being an instrument of limited and
enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is
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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE "PROPER" SCOPE OF THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE

The traditional understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause is
that it performs the mundane task of affirming the fundamental idea that
Congress may exercise reasonable discretion in enacting legislation to implement the powers granted by Article I, Section 8.107 As suggested by its
derogatory nickname, the "Sweeping Clause" generated great fears among
those who were concerned that the Constitution portended a tyrannical
federal government.10 8 During the debate over ratification of the Constitution, the Constitution's antifederalist opponents launched some of their
harshest attacks on the so-called Sweeping Clause, charging that its purpose was to grant unlimited authority to Congress so as to establish a consolidated government of general legislative powers that could displace
state authority at will. 109 In its defense, the federalists denied that the
withheld, and belongs to the state authorities, if invested by their constitutions of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is
retained BY THE PEOPLE, as a part of their residuary sovereignty.
Id.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 ("The Congress shall have Power... To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or Officer thereof."); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, at 305 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (explaining that Philadelphia Convention included clause, rather than relying on obvious
inference that properly should have been drawn in favor of ancillary powers, to
remove "a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union"); THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 205-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating clause was introduced "for
greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might
hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the
Union"); cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819) (stating
that Necessary and Proper Clause reflects "the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be
involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble"). Hamilton further suggested that the Convention feared State jealousy of federal power,
and, under such circumstances, apparently thought it "necessary, in so cardinal a
point, to leave nothing to construction." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra,at 205-06.

108. For a discussion of these fears, see infra note 113 and accompanying text.
109. See George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government

Formed by the Convention (1787), in 2

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra

note 41, at 11, 13 (noting under Necessary and Proper Clause, "the State Legislatures have no Security for the Powers now presumed to remain to them; or the
People for their rights"); see also ARISTOCROTIS, THE GOVERNMENT OF NATURE DELINEATED (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at

196, 208 n.2 (treating clause as evidence of scheme to create aristocratic rule);
Essay of Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-

IST, supra note 41, at 417, 421 (stating clause will lend itself to "an equitable construction" of constitution in which most important powers will be "unlimitted [sic]
by any thing but the discretion of the legislature"); LETrER OF CENTINEL V (Nov.
30, 1787), reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 166, 16869 (stating under Necessary and Proper Clause "[w]hatever law congress may
deem necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers vested in
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Necessary and Proper Clause carried the implication of unlimited power,
contending that, if the principle set forth by the clause was not accepted,
there would have been no point in empowering the national government. 110 To these ends, they assured their opponents that the Clause was
purely declaratory in nature and that it merely set forth the principle of
agency that would have followed naturally, with or without such an explicit
text, from the necessity of ancillary authority in a system of limited grants
of power.1 11
The Constitution's leading ratification-era defenders, however, lacked
the help of modern legal commentators. The consequence was that they
overlooked the fact that the Clause their opponents derided as the Sweeping Clause, based on their fear that it would serve to sweep all power into
the federal domain, was actually the most powerful limiting clause in the
them, may be enacted"); LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER IV (Oct. 12, 1787),
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 245, 247 (arguing
although people may hope Congress will act consistently within traditional limiting

principles under Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress "will not be bound by the
constitution to pay respect to those principles"). There are variations on the cen-

tral theme represented here. For some, the Sweeping Clause threatened liberty by
granting an extremely wide discretion in implementing already-broad powers;
others went further still, reading the Clause as making Congress the sole judge of
the scope of its own powers, with the practical implication that Congress' powers
were limitless.
110. See, Letter from C. William Cranch to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26,
1787), in 14 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 224, 226 ("If
they had not the power to 'make all laws which shall be necessary & proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers' . . . the powers would be of no service"); A Landholder V, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 14 RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 23, at 334, 338 (noting without acknowledgment
of this authority, powers would "be evaded by the artful and unjust"); See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 107, at 302 (declaring Necessary and Proper Clause
is provision "by which efficacy is given to all the rest").
111. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 107, at 302 (discussing essential
character of Necessary and Proper Clause). Madison noted:
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt
that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general
powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that
wherever the end is required, the means are authorised; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for
doing it, is included.
Id. at 304-05; accord THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 204 (stating that
Clause declares "a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable

implication from the very act of constituting a Federal Government, and vesting it
with certain specified powers"); id. at 205 (arguing that "a power to lay and collect
taxes must be a power to pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution of that
power; and what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do
more than declare the same truth"); James Wilson, Proceedings and Debates of the
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23, at 465, 469, 482 (noting that Clause "states no more than that the
powers we have already particularly given shall be effectually carried into
execution").
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original Constitution.1 12 At least this is the conclusion reached in a 1993
article by Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger.' 13 With the arguments set
forth by Lawson and Granger in hand, the federalists should have demonstrated how antifederalist fears were belied by the powerful constraining
effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause. As construed and applied by
Lawson and Granger, the so-called Sweeping Clause might have been better nicknamed the "Back Draft" Clause, considering that it was intended to
serve as a virtually open-ended (and, thus, potentially destructive) jurisdictional limitation on the powers actually delegated to the national government by the Constitution-a limitation favoring principles of separation of
powers, states' rights and unenumerated individual rights, apparently to
be explicated over time by the judiciary.1 14 Using the Back Draft Clause as
a weapon, the federalists' defense of the Supremacy Clause, the omission
of a bill of rights and the Constitution as a whole against the charge that
each served to consolidate power in an unlimited national government
would have been greatly simplified, providing, of course, that the federalists were willing to open the door to a discourse with the potential of undermining everything they had labored to accomplish during the long
summer of 1787.
Unlike the logical speculation about the implications of language
changes in the Tenth Amendment, discussed in Part II above, Lawson and
Granger supply modern readers with a painstaking, sweeping review of the
textual and historical materials that might bear on the original meaning of
the Necessary and Proper Clause.1 15 Underlying their prodigious inter112. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 271 (stating that Sweeping Clause
requires "executory laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain or jurisdiction-that is, by requiring that such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional
powers of any federal institution or infringe on the retained rights of the states or
of individuals"). Lawson and Granger note that "[tihe Sweeping Clause, so construed, serves as a textual guardian of principles of separation of powers, principles
of federalism, and unenumerated individual rights." Id.
113. See id. at 270-71 (contending that Sweeping Clause "is not, nor did the
Framers think it to be, a grant of general legislative power"). Lawson and Granger
stated that "[t]he clause's language limits its authorizing scope to laws that are
,necessary and proper."' Id. They submit three reasons in support of their argument that the clause actually serves to limit national power. First, they contend
that the "Sweeping Clause is not a self-contained grant of power." Id. at 274. The
use of the power contained in the Sweeping Clause "must always be tied to the
exercise of some other identifiable constitutional power of the national government." Id. at 274-75. Second, they agree that the laws enacted under the Sweeping
Clause "must be both necessary and proper." Id. at 275. Third, "such laws must in
fact be necessary and proper and not merely thought by Congress to be necessary
and proper" because "Congress [is not] the sole judge of necessity and propriety."
Id. at 276.
114. See id. at 297 (stating jurisdictional construction of Sweeping Clause requires that executory laws be consistent with principles of separation of powers,
federalism and individual rights).
115. See generally id. at 297-326 (describing Founders' understanding of
Sweeping Clause, comparing Sweeping Clause to other constitutional provisions
and state constitutions and analyzing Framer's design of Constitution).
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pretive effort, however, is the same misapprehension of the Framers' commitment to our federal system as a security to popular rights that informs
1 16
It is this
the modern misreading of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
initial misapprehension, which they bring to the task, that determines the
approach they take in resolving every significant question that arises from
the historical and textual materials.
Lawson and Granger contend that the word "proper" in the Necessary
and Proper Clause was "understood as a significant limitation on legislative power" that was jurisdictional in nature. 117 Finding the legislative history unhelpful, the authors analyze the clause's "language and role in the
constitutional design" and conclude that, in the historical and legal context of its usage, "a 'proper' law is one that is within the peculiarjurisdiction
or responsibility of the relevant governmental actor."118 Consequently the
Clause generates "internal limits" that "place constraints on the exercise of
power" to the end of ensuring limited government. 119 Among other implications, the authors conclude that this reading suggests that
"unenumerated substantive rights," including (but not limited to) all of
the rights subsequently included in the Bill of Rights, were secured by the
120
Necessary and Proper Clause even before the Bill of Rights was ratified.
Summing up their conclusions, the authors write:
We submit that the word "proper" serves a critical, although previously largely unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring executory laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain or
jurisdiction-thatis, by requiring that such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional powers of any federal institutions or infringe on the retained rights of the states or of individuals. The
Sweeping Clause, so construed, serves as a textual guardian of
principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and
121
individual unenumerated rights.
116. For a discussion of the Framer's belief that the federal system would
guard popular rights, see infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Lawson and Granger's assumption that their thesis rescues an otherwise
implausible argument from enumerated powers, see generally Lawson & Granger,
supra note 7.
117. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 314. The term 'jurisdictional" is
found not only in the title, but pervasively throughout the article. See id. passim.
The quoted language, which suggests that the authors view this jurisdictional reading as involving important limitations, also seems borne out by the specific conclusions that the authors reach about the implications of their reading. See also id. at
299 (relying on ratification-era argument supporting view that word "proper" is "a
powerful limitation on Congress's executory authority").
118. Id. at 285 & n.66, 291.
119. See id. at 280, 285 (stating that "one would expect the legislative powergranting provisions of a limited government to place constraints on the exercise of
power").
120. See id. at 273-74 (discussing ambit of Necessary and Proper Clause).
121. Id. at 271-72.
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If anything is clear from the authors' treatment of the Sweeping
Clause, it is that the provision creates a jurisdictional barrier to laws that
would invade any of the individual rights deemed to be held by the people, whether those rights are included in constitutional text or not.122 Accordingly, the authors conclude that, even if the traditional understanding
of the Ninth Amendment were in some important sense correct-that its
purpose was to prevent an inference of extended national powers from
the enumeration of rights in a bill of rights-the fundamental rights understanding of modern commentators would also be basically correct.
This is because Congress' enumerated powers were subject to the internal
limitation in favor of individual rights contained in the jurisdictional barrier of the Sweeping Clause, and it is the full extent of this limitation that
is preserved by the prohibition of an inference against the people's re123
tained rights.
Unfortunately, there is much about the authors' thesis that remains
unclear to the careful reader, and a brief description of the interpretive
difficulties presented by the authors' work must precede a critical review
of the textual and historical materials relating to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. After considering these interpretive difficulties, the textual argu-

122. See id. at 271-72 ("[L]aws [must] be peculiarly within Congress's domain
[and] not usurp ... retained rights ... of individuals.").
123. See id. at 273 (describing author's view of effect of Ninth Amendment
under both traditional and modem view). If Lawson and Granger have correctly
construed the Necessary and Proper Clause, it would suggest that the Ninth
Amendment preserves rights already secured by the system of federal powers.
They fail to note, however, that in their interpretation of the word "proper" in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the word is thought to serve the function that enumerated rights filled under the state constitutions and did not purport to state a
general constitutional theory of implied rights. See id. at 273-74 (contending that
Sweeping Clause creates implied rights that are retained by people and, in essence,
is "the precursor of the Tenth Amendment's declaration that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people'"). According to their reading, neither the Necessary and Proper Clause nor the Ninth Amendment would say
anything about the relationship between citizens and state governments. Moreover, given that their interpretation assumes that the system of enumerated powers
and reserved rights, secured by the Necessary and Proper Clause and alluded to in
the Ninth Amendment, was uniquely tied to the system of delegated power embodied in the Federal Constitution, it would seem to follow that the Ninth Amendment would not make a fitting candidate for incorporation against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. If Lawson and Granger are correct that the
source for securing unenumerated rights in the unamended Constitution was the
textual requirement that executory laws be proper, a central goal of modern Ninth
Amendment scholarship, to justify federal fundamental rights decision making
against the states, would not have been realized in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). It seems odd, therefore, that some proponents of the modern,
fundamental rights reading of the Ninth Amendment have embraced the thesis of
Lawson and Granger. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 26, at 773 n.99 (agreeing that
the word "proper" limits general legislative powers.
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ments relied on by Lawson and Granger will be carefully analyzed.1 24 Having concluded that the text alone supports the conventional reading of
the Clause as easily as the one proffered by Lawson and Granger, this Article next examines the historical materials that shed light on the original
1 25
understanding of the provision.
Next, this Article places the Constitution's enumerated powers
scheme and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the setting of the system
of enumerated powers in the Articles of Confederation. It then reviews
the role of enumerated powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause in
the constitutional design as demonstrated in the national debate over ratification of the Constitution. 126 That national debate shows that the Framers of the Constitution combined specific affirmative limits on delegated
powers with carefully selected grants of power in an attempt to create a
government that would be the supreme power with respect to a limited
number of objects of concern. 127 The Necessary and Proper Clause plays
the mundane role of affirming that the powers delegated to the national
government would necessarily include authority to enact laws serving to
execute those powers; it neither adds to nor detracts from the grant of
powers in Article 1.128
The Constitution's limited powers scheme is then placed in the phi12 9
losophy of individual liberty that undergirded the constitutional design.
It shows that the Framers of the Constitution were deeply committed not
only to individual rights, but also to striking an appropriate balance between necessary government energy, which serves both individuals and society, and security for individual liberty. In this setting, it appears as a
remote possibility that the Framers would have included a general limiting
provision, along the lines of the jurisdictional reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause proffered by Lawson and Granger. Finally, this Article
will consider the most important postratification evidence bearing on the
original understanding of the system of enumerated powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 130 We will find that the debates over the first

124. For a further discussion of these difficulties, see infra notes 133-87 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Lawson and Granger's textual arguments, see infra notes 188-225 and accompanying text.
125. For a further discussion of these historical materials, see infra notes 228436 and accompanying text.
126. For a further discussion of the proper role of unenumerated rights, see
infra notes 228-94 and accompanying text.
127. See generally 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19 (giving entire history of
framing of Constitution from Virginia debates).
128. See generally id. (discussing role of Necessary and Proper Clause).
129. For a further discussion of this philosophy, see infra notes 295-388 and
accompanying text.
130. For a further discussion of this postratification evidence, see infra notes
295-388 and accompanying text.
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national bank and the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798131 belie that the
Necessary and Proper Clause was intended to play a crucial role in the
constitutional design as a means of securing affirmative limits on the na132
tional government.
A.

Jurisdictionof the Necessary and Proper Clause-Restatement of
ConstitutionalAssumptions or Source of Internal Limits on
Legislative Power?

Lawson and Granger simultaneously add both plausibility to their thesis and difficulty to the task of assessing it by stating and defending their
basic claims about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause at a
level of generality that makes disagreement difficult. 133 This tendency is
reflected in the subtitle of the article itself, which identifies the authors'
13 4
construction of the Sweeping Clause as a jurisdictional interpretation.
Modern constitutional doctrine, with tap roots going back to McCulloch v.
Maryland,'3 5 treats the Necessary and Proper Clause as jurisdictional in the
sense that any assertion of federal power not explicitly authorized elsewhere in the Constitution must comport with the limiting terms of its
grant of ancillary power. 13 6 Modern doctrine also holds that the authority
131. Act ofJune 18, 1798 (Naturalization Act), ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566; Act ofJune
25, 1798 (Alien Friends Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act ofJuly 6, 1798 (Alien Enemies
Act), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798 (Sedition Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
132. But see generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 280 & n.48, 281-308
(stating that law must be both necessary and proper and, therefore, cannot be
beyond Congress' power). They note that, during the debate over the first bank of
the United States, the members of the House of Representatives accepted the
Sweeping Clause "as a limiting construction." Id. at 282.
133. See generally id. (stating that Sweeping Clause is not general grant of legislative power and must be interpreted to be consistent with principles of separation
of powers, federalism and individual rights).
134. See id. at 267, 272 (definingjurisdictional interpretation as requiring laws
to be "peculiarly within the jurisdiction or competence of Congress-that is, to be
laws that do not tread on the retained rights of individuals or states, or the prerogatives of federal executive or judicial departments").
135. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
136. See, e.g., Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 282-85 (supporting jurisdictional interpretation of Sweeping Clause). If this thesis sounds trivial, it is important to appreciate that the Constitution's first critics pervasively read the Sweeping
Clause as granting unlimited discretion to Congress to determine the reach of its
own powers. Lawson and Granger provide a devastating critique of these pessimism-driven interpretations. See id. (asserting different reasons for why proponents of unlimited congressional discretion might have construed Sweeping
Clause this way and then criticizing those reasons). First, Lawson and Granger
suggest that such an interpretation might have reflected "doubts about tire availability ofjudicial (or presidential) review of legislation; if Congress is the final authority on all questions regarding its constitutional powers, it is of course the final
judge of its powers under the Sweeping Clause." Id. at 284. Second, the interpretation might have been the result of political processes. See id. (stating that interpretation might have been used as political pose because "argument that the
proposed Constitution would in practice create an unlimited national government
was one of the anti-federalists' strongest weapons"). Third, people might have
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granted by the Sweeping Clause is subject to all the same limitations that
confront any other exercise of federal power-limitations found in explicit prohibitions in the Constitution as well as limitations that are implicit in the systems of separation of powers and federalism established by
the Constitution.1 37 As Lawson and Granger observe, the word "proper"
has not received significant attention, and it has often been read to add
little, if any, meaning to the word "necessary"; but, as they acknowledge,
"proper" is often taken as conveying the idea that a law enacted to execute
a granted power cannot pass constitutional muster if it conflicts with a
limiting provision found in the Constitution.1 3 8 Whether textual and
structural limitations on federal powers are taken to be textually based in
the term "proper," or are viewed as external limitations to which even exercises of executory power under the Clause are subject, an important
question is raised as to whether the general thesis of Lawson and Granger
clearly adds anything of substance to the understanding that it purports to
replace.
The authors' analysis of the word "proper," and its function in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, boils down to a general claim that the term
supports the view that Congress' ancillary powers are limited by well-established jurisdictional boundaries rooted in foundational constitutional
principles. 13 9 For example, the authors analogize the use of the term
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause with state constitutional provisions limiting the branches of government to their proper functions in a
made "honest mistakes when interpreting the clause." Id. at 285. Lawson and
Granger contend that, whatever the reason for the claim, the Sweeping Clause
does not give unlimited general legislative power to Congress based on reasoning
from language and structure of the clause. See id. They also tend, however, to treat
statements construing the Clause to state enforceable standards as lending support
to their own jurisdictional reading. See id. at 285-326.
137. See id. at 315-26 (stating that federalists agreed that federal bill of rights
prohibits federal government from violating individuals' or states' rights and liberties, and therefore, amendments limited exercise of federal power). Any law that
violated such a limiting provision would not pass constitutional muster, however
well it advanced an object of legislation authorized by Article I.
138. See id. at 285 & n.68 (" 'The word 'proper' has been read to mean 'appropriate,' which adds little to 'necessary,' except for... that legislation is appropriate
only when it does not conflict with another constitutional provision."' (quoting
Stephen L. Carter, The PoliticalAspects ofJudicialPower: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1341, 1378 (1983))).
139. See id. at 291 ("' [P] roper' law is one that is within the particularjurisdiction
• .. of the relevant governmental actor."). Thus, in describing the use of the term
"proper" in analogous legal texts of the founding era, Lawson and Granger sum up
an early Supreme Court decision's explication of the term "proper" with the conclusion that "[u]nder this interpretation, a 'proper' allocation of governmental
powers is one that conforms to generally accepted jurisdictional lines." Id. at 296.
This incorporation of the term "jurisdictional" in describing a number of treatments of the term in legal contexts suggests that the authors see this focus on
generally accepted boundaries as the sort of inquiry that is called for by the term
.proper" in the Sweeping Clause.
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tripartite scheme.' 40 The bulk of the argument about the probable meaning of the term "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause rests on analysis of uses of the term in legal and constitutional contexts in which the
term seems to refer to the appropriate domain or province of a governmental entity.14 1 If, however, the only implication of Lawson and
Granger's thesis is the recognition that the exercise of executory authority
as set forth in the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot constitutionally
exceed well-established jurisdictional boundaries rooted in the structure
of the constitutional order, their thesis hardly calls for the kind of serious
142
reconsideration of constitutional doctrine that they seem to advocate.
At most, it might suggest the possibility that courts and advocates might
more often employ the term "proper" in articulating why laws furthering
43
constitutional ends might nonetheless violate the Constitution.1
It is hardly clear, however, why it should be considered especially significant whether all commentators agree that structural limitations on
congressional authority stem from an appropriate analysis of the word
"proper," the Necessary and Proper Clause considered as a whole or more
general constitutional reasoning based upon the idea that all powers are
subject to limits imposed by the Constitution itself. The matter of real
import is that all commentators agree that the Sweeping Clause does not
serve to insulate acts of Congress enacted pursuant to its terms from effec140. See id. at 291-92 (citing various state constitutions' language and analogizing to federal model). For example, the Virginia Constitution provided: "The
legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so
that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other." VA. CONST. of
1776, 1 (emphasis added), reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FoRmING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3815

(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter cited as

FEDERAL AND STATE

CONSTITUTIONS].

141. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 291-97 (citing uses of word
"proper" in limiting capacity).
142. See id. at 274 (contending that "word 'proper' serves a critical, although
previously largely unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring executory
laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain or jurisdiction"). They further argue
that the Sweeping Clause, when properly understood as a jurisdictional limitation
on the scope of Congress' power, is a "vital part of the constitutional design." Id.
143. But see generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1969) (arguing that quest for text to focus on sometimes
distracts us from grappling with what are often fundamentally structural issues).
Along these lines, it is striking that the textual focus on the word "proper" proffered by Lawson and Granger as a solution to more than one constitutional conundrum is found in a clause repeatedly described, by both sides of debate over its
meaning, as adding no new content to the Constitution; it is equally striking that,
although the theme that the clause is purely declaratory pervades discussion of the
clause, it is not referred to once in their 69-page article. See Lawson & Granger,
supra note 7 (choosing instead to focus on Founders' understanding of Clause and
comparing it to other constitutional provisions, state constitutions and design of
Federal Constitution); cf. Barnett, supra note 26, at 772-86 (adding 14 pages of
analysis supporting broad jurisdictional reading of Sweeping Clause without referencing this uniform characterization of Clause as purely declaratory in nature).
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tive judicial review based on relevant constitutional limitations on national
powers, whether rooted in specific texts or grounded in general reasoning
from constitutional structure.14 4 At least this suggestion that the general
thesis of the jurisdictional interpretation might be unnecessary seems wellgrounded unless the word "proper" actually does much more work than
what is suggested by these general formulations.
Lawson and Granger often leave the impression that they share this
assessment of the matter, as they manage to assimilate virtually every statement that there are enforceable limitations on congressional authority,
whether grounded on an explication of the term "proper" or not, as lending support to their jurisdictional interpretation of the clause.1 45 When
Representative Niles argues that establishing stagecoaches in contradiction of state law is not sufficiently related to furthering Congress' power to
establish post offices and postal roads, even if mail carriage might become
"a little less expensive" and, thus, concludes that such a law invades states'
rights and can hardly be justified as a proper law pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the authors conclude that he endorses their jurisdictional reading of the clause. 146 Similarly, when St. George Tucker
illustrates his contention that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not
grant unlimited discretion to Congress by positing a law outlawing the
bearing of arms to the end of preventing insurrections, despite the prohibition contained in the Second Amendment, he is taken as endorsing the
jurisdictional reading of the clause and as confirming the general thesis
"that laws that violate individual rights are not 'proper,' regardless of
whether they are 'necessary.' "147
144. Compare Lawson & Granger, supranote 7, at 281 (describing Virginia Ratification Convention's recognition that judiciary had right to scrutinize Congress'
use of its powers under Sweeping Clause and declare any law in excess of those
powers void), with Barnett, supra note 26, at 763 (stating that legislative decisions
were "not immune from judicial assessment of constitutionality and nullification").
145. For examples of their approach, see infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
146. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 300-01 ("'St. George Tucker ex-

pressed a similar view of the Sweeping Clause ....

' (quoting 3

ANNALS OF CONG.

309-10 (1792))). The point here is not that Representative Niles does not discuss
the term "proper," but that his discussion only confirms the conclusion he has
reached based on a fairly restrictive understanding of the term "necessary" that is
undergirded by a strong states-rights understanding. Niles rejects the argument
that establishing a stage-coach line is a "proper" way to save a trifling on the
ground that it would prove too much: "What, sir, may not be construed as proper

to be done by Congress?" 3

ANNALS OF CONG.

310. He does not address the ques-

tion whether the term "proper" does significant work beyond that done by the
term "necessary," nor does he suggest that this law was improper because it violated an affirmative limitation that operated as a constraint on a law that otherwise
would be viewed as sufficiently related to the enumerated power. See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 301 (stating only that permitting this law suggests
that "the whole powers vested in Congress ... will be found in the magic word

prop').
147. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 303. Lawson and Granger concede
that St. George Tucker's statement supports their interpretation "somewhat ob-
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Perhaps most significantly, when Chief Justice Marshall concludes
that an act of Congress establishing a national bank is an "appropriate
measure" because such a measure is not "prohibited by the constitution"
nor enacted "under the pretext of executing its powers" in order to "pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government,"1 48 Lawson and Granger read him as lending support to their jurisdictional construction of the Sweeping Clause. 149 Although ChiefJustice
Marshall clearly perceived federalism limits on the exercise of national
power, beyond the requirement of mere fit between the end of an enumerated power and the means of executory legislation-framed in terms
of a pretextual use of implied power-his argument did not proceed as an
explication of limitations emanating from the term "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 150 Rather, after insisting that the term "necesliquely," acknowledging that he does not explicate his thesis directly in terms of
the jurisdictional analysis of the term "proper" that they espouse. Id. at 301. They
clearly view him, however, as adopting their view in substance. Id. What they fail
to acknowledge, however, is that Tucker's analysis comports with the modern understanding that they purport to reject as well as it does with theirs because the
thrust of his argument is that any other understanding would render the Second
Amendment "'a mere nullity."' Id. at 302 (quoting St. George Tucker, Appendix to
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 302 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia,
Birch & Small 1803)).
Moreover, that Tucker's analysis supports the view that the Necessary and
Proper Clause does not authorize even a supposedly necessary law that conflicts
with specific textual limitations on granted powers does not imply that the word
"proper" supplies a ground for rejecting any statute that the interpreter believes to
violate valid conceptions of individual rights. Tucker was not analyzing the role of
the word "proper" in the constitutional scheme, but was arguing generally against
a view that read the provision as granting limitless discretion to Congress over the
means chosen to implement the granted powers. Lawson and Granger frequently
seem to conflate the notion of enforceable limits on congressional discretion
under the Sweeping Clause with their own jurisdictional interpretation, a move
that threatens to trivialize their thesis.
148. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
149. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 304-05.
150. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (giving Chief Justice Marshall's analysis of
whether law is constitutional). The statement in text is true and that Chief Justice
Marshall neither employs the term "proper" (or, for that matter, "improper") in
describing laws violating these limits nor states in any form the idea that the limits
he contemplates proceed from any logic inherent in the Necessary and Proper
Clause rather than simply from a conception of the constitutional doctrine of legislative powers limited to particular general objects or areas of concern. See id. (stating simply that "the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are
not to be transcended"). Lawson and Granger, however, suggest a subtler argument, that because Marshall's pretext analysis proceeded despite the efficacy of
the law in furthering authorized ends, it follows that he "must have meant that the
law would not be 'proper."' Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 306 (emphasis
added). Their conclusion, however, does not follow. Chief Justice Marshall says
nothing to suggest that the limits passed proceed from the terms "necessary" and
"proper." See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316 (describing power given to government). Rather, Marshall appeared to believe that the Constitution's delegation of
powers is sufficiently clear as to the legitimate ends to be pursued (as well as the
ends not to be pursued) that interpreters would be able to discern when purported
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sary" was not employed to indicate a broad and rigorous limitation on
legislative choice of means, Marshall made a point of emphasizing that the
Constitution itself provided the barrier beyond which Congress may not
15 1
go in selecting the means for executing its granted powers.
As these examples suggest, there is little reason to think that thoughtful commentators have ever perceived the Sweeping Clause as an independent source of limitation on national power. Lawson and Granger
enlist Alexander Hamilton to their cause, contending that he "argued that
the word 'proper' in the Sweeping Clause embodies principles of federalism" and that, thus, he adopted what they call the 'jurisdictional interpretation." 152 This conclusion rests on Hamilton's use of the term
"propriety" in the course of answering his own inquiry with respect to how
to judge "the necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for executing
the powers of the Union." 153 Hamilton defended the Sweeping Clause
against an antifederalist onslaught; the general premise of his defense, as
we have noted, was that the Clause restated what would have been implicit
in the grant of powers.15 4 Consistent with this general premise, Hamilton
responded to his own question: "I answer first that this question arises as
well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers [by the Constitution], as upon the declaratory clause."' 55 According to Hamilton, the resmeans ostensibly served legitimate ends, but only pretextually. See id. at 420-21
(stating that there are limits to government power, although construction of Constitution allows legislature to determine means used to achieve end). For an example of this thesis at work, see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
151. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 420 (demonstrating that ChiefJustice Marshall's
general formulation of this limiting idea takes form of test for evaluating legislative
acts passed pursuant to Necessary and Proper Clause). The Court focused on the
relationship between means and end: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
152. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 299.
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 206. Specifically, Hamilton
answers his own question with the general observation that "[t]he propriety of a
law in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded." Id. Lawson and Granger read Hamilton as suggesting that the key to deciding whether a law exceeds the authority granted by the
Sweeping Clause is to look at its propriety in light of general principles of our
constitutional system. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 299 ("Alexander
Hamilton similarly argued that the word 'proper' in the Sweeping Clause embodies principles of federalism.").
154. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 204 (describing clause as
.necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Federal
Government").
155. Id. at 206. Lawson and Granger fail to note Hamilton's assertion that the
problem of defining the appropriate limits to federal power does not turn on the
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause; accordingly, they offer no explanation as to how Hamilton perceives the clause as containing powerful limiting language. SeeLawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 299 (asserting that Hamilton argued
that word "proper" embodied principles of federalism by relying on single quote
without explaining how quote supports their reading).
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olution of the issue of the scope of Congress' constitutional authority,
however it is framed, "must always be determined by the nature of the
powers upon which [the law] is founded," so that the crux of a determination that Congress had "exceeded its jurisdiction" would be that its claim
of power was based upon "some forced constructions of its authority," not,
he might well have added, on a failure to grasp the jurisdictional interpre156
tation of the Sweeping Clause.
The example of Hamilton's analysis of federal power points out not
only how problematic it is to suggest that a jurisdictional interpretation
offers a unique understanding of the Sweeping Clause, but also how unlikely it is that the invocation of the word "proper," as a touchstone for
analysis, is likely to contribute any of the real work in establishing constitutional claims. In Hamilton's analysis of federal power, he contended that
a federal law that attempted to vary the law of descent from the one established in a state could only be based upon an illegitimate "forced construction[ ]" of federal power.15 7 An apparent implication of Hamilton's
analysis is that the boundaries of federal authority might be especially
clear with respect to some matters-in this case, establishing the law of
succession-contemplated to be within the states' domain by the limited
grant of national powers. This same sort of idea, sometimes referred to as
the pretext doctrine, has been invoked historically, first by Chief Justice
Marshall in dictum in McCulloch,1 58 and subsequently in the Supreme
15 9
Court's rather infamous decisions in Hammer v. Dagenhart
and Bailey v.

156. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 206.
157. Id.

158. McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) ("[N]or
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government."). Hamilton followed
up his "law of descent" hypothetical with an example of a federal law abrogating a
state land tax to facilitate collection of a federal tax, suggesting that such a law
could rest only "upon the pretense of an interference with [federal] revenues."
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 206.
159. 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking down federal statute prohibiting interstate transport of goods produced by companies employing child labor because

statute sanctioned "an invasion by the federal power of the control of the matter
purely local in its character, and over which no authority has been delegated to
Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce among the states").
Although the Court expressly disclaimed any investigation into congressional mo-

tives, Justice Holmes' dissent suggests the extent to which the Court did just that:
[Ilf an act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress, it
seems to me that it is not made any less constitutional because of the

indirect effects that it may have, however obvious it may be that it will
have those effects, and that we are not at liberty upon such grounds to
hold it void. The first step in my argument is to make plain what no one
is likely to dispute-that the statute in question is within the power expressly given to Congress if considered only as to its immediate effects

....
The statute confines itself to prohibiting the carriage of certain
goods in interstate or foreign commerce. Congress is given power to regulate such commerce in unqualified terms.
Id. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Drexel Furniture Co. 16 0 Although these modern invocations of the idea of
the pretextual use of federal authority have been censured as rooted in a
strict construction and a discredited "dual federalism," 161 as well as defended as reflecting the anxiety of many of the Founders with preserving
state sovereignty, it seems extremely dubious to suggest that the jurisdictional reading of the Sweeping Clause will supply us with the debate-stopping argument. 162 Lawson and Granger come close to acknowledging as
much, at least with respect to the federalism issue to which their jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause might seem most clearly to
speak: the question whether federal executory statutes that "impair the
autonomy of state governments can be 'improper"' as conflicting with our
federal system. 163 Although they acknowledge this doctrine's "checkered
history" before the Supreme Court, the authors decline to supply any particular answer as to whether it is justified as an interpretation of the Constitution of the Founders, even as they "do insist that the answer lies in the
64
Sweeping Clause."'
160. 259 U.S. 20, 39-40 (1922) (concluding that child labor tax law at issue
was actually penalty and attempt by Congress to regulate child labor). The Court
invoked Marshall's decision in McCulloch to support its holding:
[S] hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of
the land.
Id.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (stating Hammer's thesis that "the motive of the prohibition or its effect to control in some
measure the use or production within the states of the article thus excluded from
the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority"
had ceased to have force).
162. Thus, if one starts with the proposition that the central goal of the Framers was to create an effective national government, along the lines of the dictum
contained in McCulloch and adds to that the widely held modem conviction that
changes in the nature and extent of commerce have simply brought a vastly larger
category of activities with the domain of commerce that involves two or more
states, it is not difficult to conclude that modem exercises of the commerce power,
especially as illustrated by Hammer v. Dagenhart, "conform[ ] to generally accepted
jurisdictional lines." Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 296. See generally Hammer,
247 U.S. at 251; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 194 (1824); McCulloch 17 U.S. at 408 ("A government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends,
must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.") There are obviously counters to each of these arguments, but the idea that the Sweeping Clause
embodies a jurisdictional barrier does not contribute to building the opposite
case.
163. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 332.
164. Id. Acknowledging the cogency of the Supreme Court's expression of
skepticism about employing "'freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty'" to
measure Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, Lawson and Granger
insist that it is quite a different question whether the Court might have a similar
duty to measure congressional authority under the Sweeping Clause. Id. (quoting
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558 (1985)). Instead,

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43: p. 17

Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that disagreements of real substance with conclusions reached by Lawson and Granger are likely to relate not so much to the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but
to the proper construction of limitations on national powers to be inferred
from the text and structure of the Constitution itself. At the outset of their
article, Lawson and Granger present the individual rights implications
they perceive in the Sweeping Clause as an alternative to the contest between, on the one hand, a textualism that arguably precludes unwritten
rights and, on the other hand, a general theory of implied rights and indeed, of an "unwritten Constitution."' 65 Even so, it seems apparent that
Lawson and Granger have been greatly influenced by the body of scholarly
literature claiming that the Founders not only believed in natural rights,
but viewed them as inherent in the social contract and as an implicit part
of fundamental law under a republican constitution.1 6 6 Indeed, it is difficult in the final analysis not to perceive their jurisdictional interpretation
of the Sweeping Clause as simply another attempt, as with the modern
construction of the Ninth Amendment, to find a textual foundation for a
theory of unwritten rights. 167 Consequently, much of the historical material bearing on their proffered theory of the Sweeping Clause will be material that is also responsive to analogous claims made on behalf of the
Ninth Amendment and the general notion of unwritten rights.
because "the Constitution was enacted against a background understanding of
sound principles of federalism.. . 'proper' executory laws must conform to those
principles." Id. If Hamilton is right that the answers are not found in the declaratory Sweeping Clause, however, or if Lawson and Granger are right that the jurisdictional boundaries embodied in the Sweeping Clause are defined by reference
to "generally accepted jurisdictional lines," it is difficult to see how the question of
implied state sovereignty limits on federal power will turn, either in terms of finding a constitutional basis for or defining the scope of any such limitations, on the
idea that the Sweeping Clause is jurisdictional. See id, at 296 (discussing jurisdictional views as to meaning of "proper"). The jurisdictional thesis reflects the very
mindset that one commentator has appropriately criticized as too wrapped up in
finding textual homes for constitutional doctrine and too little concerned with the
historical and functional questions that necessarily characterize structural analysis.
See BLACK, supra note 143, at 22-32 (arguing for constitutional analysis utilizing
"structure and relation").
165. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 269-70 ("Neither of the views
described above identifies the constitutional source.., of Congress's power ...and
thus never asks whether that source contains internal, textual limits ....").Lawson and Granger note that modern scholars have engaged in a spirited debate as
to whether the founding generation perceived that there were enforceable implied
limitations on government power that were inherent features of early American
constitutions (state and federal) based on natural or fundamental common law.
See id. at 269 & n.6 (collecting sources contributing to debate over unenumerated
limitations on government in favor of individual rights).
166. See, e.g.,
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1127, 1167 (1987) (discussing inherent natural rights as part of "unwritten
constitution").
167. See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 326-30 (interpreting
Sweeping Clause as protecting individual rights similar to Ninth Amendment).
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Notwithstanding these points, however, it is in the individual-rights
area that Lawson and Granger seem to go beyond the clearest and relatively modest implications of their general formulations of the jurisdictional role of the term "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is
in the individual rights arena that they most clearly suggest that the word
"proper" serves as more than a textual repository for the idea that laws
executing federal powers are limited by norms found explicitly or implicitly in jurisdictional boundaries already present in the Constitution. 168 In
this context, at least, the authors appear to claim that the term "proper"
serves as the textual source of a unique doctrine of affirmative constitutional limitations-a doctrine that serves as an unprecedented tool of limited government in the context of a government of enumerated
1 69
powers.
Lawson and Granger thus contrast the Necessary and Proper Clause
with both state and federal constitutional provisions describing the powers
of governments that are not limited to specific areas of legislative authority, provisions that they describe as lacking any "effective internal limitation on the general legislative power." 170 They observe, for example, that
the Territories Clause of the Constitution, 171 granting Congress the power
to make "all needful" rules and regulations respecting American territories, describes a general legislative authority over the territories, as contrasted with the apparently more limiting "necessary and proper"'
requirement describing Congress' power to pass laws to execute the enumerated powers. 172 They conclude that this omission of the word
"proper" from the Territories Clause "highlights the word's role in the
Sweeping Clause as a textual limitation on Congress's legislative powers." l73 According to Lawson and Granger then, the Framers intended
168. See id. at 328 (concluding that by reading Sweeping Clause as "an enumerated power, no different in principle from Congress's other enumerated powers. ... one can completely identify the rights retained by the people and the states
by determining the scope of the national government's delegated powers").
169. See id. at 273 ("[T]he Sweeping Clause's requirement that laws be
'proper' means that Congress never had the delegated power to violate those
rights in the first instance.").
170. Id. at 313 n.190.
171. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
172. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 310-11 ("It is noteworthy that
Congress's general power over territories and property is described as the power to
'make all needful Rules and Regulations' whereas in its role as part of a government
of limited powers, Congress is granted only the power to make laws that are both
'necessary and proper.'" (footnote omitted)).
173. Id. at 311. This same point of contrast is powerfully articulated with respect to the general grants of legislative power to the legislatures of the states
under their state constitutions. See id. at 312 ("The Sweeping Clause has no clear
antecedents in [the constitutions and charters of the original states]."). Lawson
and Granger stated:
[T]he phrase "necessary and proper" does not appear in an American
governmental charter until the Constitution. That absence is not surprising. The state governments were all general governments whose powers
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that the limited-powers design should include unique limitations on the
exercise of federal power in addition to those presented by a straightforward construction of the scope of the powers themselves and any external
limits specified in the Constitution or inherent to all grants of legislative
power; most importantly, the term "proper" provides the textual statement
1 74
of the existence of these limits.
It is precisely at this point, however, where their jurisdictional interpretation appears to have the most bite, that the explication of their theory becomes the most amorphous. If Lawson and Granger are clear that
the individual-rights limitations embodied in the word "proper" stem from
the limited delegation of powers, they fail to supply any background theory that would guide interpreters seeking to determine the contours of
this guarantee. 175 Moreover, although they refer to rights retained by the
people because of the Necessary and Proper Clause, confident that even
prior to the Bill of Rights the Framers contemplated enforcement of
unenumerated affirmative limitations on powers granted by the Constitution, Lawson and Granger do not supply a clue as to how a federal system
or enumerated powers generate or define such legal limits on government. 176 Nor do they explain how it is that these limits on legislative
power are to be understood as well-established jurisdictional boundaries,
given that they acknowledge that these same pre-existing rights did not
did not depend on specific enumerations in a constitution. It would
therefore be odd for a state constitution even to declare that its legislature could pass all necessary laws, much less necessary and proper laws.
Such a provision could be seen, however, as necessary for a government
of limited and enumerated powers.
Id. Lawson and Granger concluded that because the state legislatures are not subject to any "effective internal limitation" on their general powers, it is important
that their otherwise unlimited power be subject to specific limitations in a bill of
rights. Id. at 313 n.190; see also id. at 317 (citing argument in ratification debate
that "'special reservations and exceptions"' provide citizens subject to government
of general powers with security beyond "'the sound policy, good faith, virtue, and
perhaps proper interests"' of government (quoting ALEXANDER C. HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 241-42 (Paul L. Ford ed., B. Franklin 1971 (1888)). Ac-

cording to Lawson and Granger, however, reliance by the Constitution's defenders
on the contrasting federal scheme of enumerated powers as a substitute for a bill
of rights was premised on the limits imposed internally by the jurisdictional language of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. at 318 ("The federalists' argument that a bill of rights was unnecessary makes sense, of course, only if the
national government's enumerated powers do not authorize that government to
violate the people's or the states' rights and liberties.").
174. See id. at 315-21 (discussing Framers' intent in general terms).
175. See generally id. at 330 ("The task of identifying those unenumerated
rights, if any, that the Sweeping Clause and the Ninth Amendment jointly protect
is beyond the scope of our inquiry.").
176. See id. at 271 (stating that aspect ofjurisdictional interpretation of word
proper" isthat Congress may not pass laws that "infringe on the retained rights of
the states or of individuals"). The Sweeping Clause thus serves as "a textual guardian" of "unenumerated individual rights." Id. at 272.
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function as implicit jurisdictional boundaries under the constitutions of
the states.1 77 This point seems especially compelling because Lawson and
Granger seem to reject implicitly the much broader argument that various
fundamental rights were considered to be "inalienable" or "inherent," typically on the ground that these were natural rights retained by individuals
as they entered into society under traditional social contract theory. 178
177. See generally id. at 312-14 (discussing general powers granted by state constitutions). The acknowledgment that these preexisting rights, rooted in English
constitutionalism and natural-rights theory, did not function as legal limitations in
the state constitutions, comports with the thrust of the ratification-era debate. Just
a few weeks after the Constitutional Convention adjourned, James Wilson explained that whereas under the state constitutions the people had "invested their
representatives with every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms
reserve," under the Constitution "the reverse of the proposition prevails, and
everything which is not given, is reserved." James Wilson, Speech in the State House
Yard, PA. HERALD, Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supranote 23, at 167, 167-68; accord George Nicholas, Debates in the Convention of
the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June
14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, su-bra note 19, at 449, 450 (contrasting case of
Virginia, where "all powers were given to the government without any exception,"
with "the general government, to which certain special powers were delegated for
certain purposes"). Nicholas suggests that it is safer to grant "certain limited powers" than "to grant general powers." Nicholas, supra, at 450; see Edmund Randolph, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 5, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 19, at 463, 467 (distinguishing state legislatures that have "no limitation to
their powers" from legislature "with certain delineated powers" and contending
that while bill of rights is "necessary in the former, it would not be in the latter"
because "the best security that can be in the latter is the express enumeration of its
powers"). Wilson's contrasting descriptions, and especially the idea that under the
Federal Constitution all not granted was retained, became almost slogans during
the months of debate that followed this initial presentation. See McAffee, Original
Meaning, supra note 15, at 1231-32 (noting that Wilson, who gave more speeches
than any other member of Philadelphia Convention, strongly influenced Madison
and Hamilton in constructing their defense of Constitution).
This view also comports with a compelling body of historical work showing
that the standard view during the founding era was that natural and customary
rights were viewed as imperfect rights that did not become constitutional and legal
rights until embodied in a written constitution. See, e.g., Phillip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, NaturalLaw, and American Constitutions,102 YALE L.J. 907, 909, 93055 (1993) (espousing imperfect rights view); McAffee, supra note 21, at 136-46 (addressing view of natural rights as "imperfect"). The pervasive antifederalist fears
that their rights were forfeited by the proposed Constitution indicates that traditional and natural rights did not in general hold the status of well-established jurisdictional limitations in a legal sense-a fact that cuts sharply against the view that
the word "proper," to the extent that it textually grounds well-established jurisdictional limits on the exercise of power, would have been understood to include
these traditional and natural-rights limitations on government.
178. See Grey, supra note 26, at 162-68 (describing view that there are
unenumerated individual rights that are protected); Mayer, supra note 26, at 319
(noting that federalists claimed that "enumeration of fundamental rights was unnecessary because these rights were so well known and, in the case of natural
rights, inalienable"); McAffee, Original Meaning,supra note 15, at 1265-77 (describing view "in absence of a bill of rights, the constitutional scheme would recognize
fundamental law and natural rights as limitations on the exercise of the enumer-
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Under the state constitutions the general legislative powers were typically controlled by express limitations contained in a declaration of rights;
a suggestion might be that the word "proper" served as a functional
equivalent to these specific limitations. 179 The state constitutions' declarations of rights, however, hardly explain the reversal of doctrine suggested
by the broad jurisdictional interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. As Lawson and Granger acknowledge, there is a section of the
Constitution, Article I, Section 9, that states specific limitations on the
powers delegated to Congress. 180 Considering that the limited jurisdiction inherent in the idea of granting a few, rather than many, powers
serves by itself as a tool of limited government, logically one might conceive that there would be less need, rather than more, for a provision creating a general, basically undefined limit on legislative jurisdiction in favor
of individual rights. 181 A question raised is whether the founding generaated powers"); McAffee, supra note 21, at 112-19 (noting that according to naturallaw theory, laws have moral foundation); Sherry, supra note 166, at 1133 (stating
that rights found in state constitutions were viewed as "natural," "inherent," "essential" or "inalienable"); cf Redlich, supra note'48, at 806 (discussing Court's views as
to whether there are rights protected that are not enumerated in Constitution).
179. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 312-13 (explaining absence of
"clear antecedents" to Sweeping Clause because it would be odd to declare that
legislatures with general powers could pass necessary laws, much less necessary and
proper laws). They also suggest that such a provision could be seen "as necessary
for a government of limited and enumerated powers." Id. at 313.
180. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9 (stating specific limits on acts of Congress,
including prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws).
181. Professor Barnett does not offer any help in addressing the theory of
rights underlying the purported general requirement that laws be proper. Barnett
was on record as contending there were enforceable implied rights under the unamended Constitution long before discovering the word "proper" as a textual
grounding for the idea. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 745 ("It should go without
saying ... that the framers of the U.S. Constitution believed in 'the pre-existent
rights of nature.'"). Barnett thus appears to endorse a thesis that rests in part on
the idea that the text under consideration is necessary because there is no general
doctrine of implied rights-hence the need to include jurisdictional limiting language in the clause granting executory power-even as he insists that the rights
secured were pre-existent and required no such language. See id. at 792-93 (arguing that Necessary and Proper Clause should be viewed as creating textual limit on
congressional powers that serves to protect unenumerated rights of people and
also noting that prior to Bill of Right's enactment "all of the natural rights retained
by the people were unenumerated"). Moreover, in the context of endorsing (in
some measure) the broad jurisdictional reading of the Sweeping Clause, Barnett
also takes the unusual step of repudiating the works of other scholars, including
his own prior writings, that had perceived the general implied-rights doctrine as
including both inalienable natural rights and rights that had been fundamental as
a matter of positive law (rights such as the right to trial by jury and the prohibition
on general search warrants). See id. at 778-81; Mayer, sup-ra note 26, at 325; Sherry,
supra note 26, at 195. Explicating the jurisdictional limits of the Sweeping Clause,
Barnett concludes that only the inalienable natural rights are retained by the people and, thus, are secured under the Clause. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 793
("The people retained the natural rights that protected their liberties."). He does
not offer, however, a rationale for this change of position; this narrower thesis was
a necessary outgrowth, an attempt to reconcile his new emphasis on a jurisdic-
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tion would have recognized more profound reasons than any mentioned
by Lawson and Granger for subjecting legislative power in the states only
to specific written limitations rather than by reference to a general jurisdictional concept of limited government and undefined individual
18 2
rights.
In any event, the net result of the omission of any foundational theory
for the existence of unenumerated legal limits on legislative authority is
that readers are left essentially in the dark as to how such limits might be
explicated. Stating that the task of identifying the unenumerated rights
protected by the Sweeping Clause was beyond the scope of their inquiry,
Lawson and Granger suggest only that, for originalists at least, such rights
would include "those rights the violation of which the general public in
1789 would have thought 'improper. ' "1 3 Lacking any foundational theory of the relationship between rights and a legislature possessing enumerated powers, however, an obvious question is whether ajudge mightjust as
plausibly construe the term "proper" as an invitation for the judge to determine, by his or her own best lights and without any special regard for
the beliefs of the Framers or the people, what rights the people deserve as
18 4
against the federal authority.
Notwithstanding these interpretive difficulties, however, it is this thesis that the Sweeping Clause embodies "internal limits" on congressional
tional reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause with Madison's position that

Congress' power to enact revenue laws would, absent a Fourth Amendment, enable Congress to permit searches under general search warrants. Cf McAffee,
supra note 21, at 159, 161 & n.179 (suggesting that Barnett's use of implied-rights
understanding of Necessary and Proper Clause was difficult to reconcile with his
own reliance on Madison's justification of Bill of Rights based on concerns about
potential abuses under authority granted by same Clause).
182. For evidence that the Framers of the Federal Constitution saw the task of
providing constitutional limitations, even to a government of limited powers, as
involving a delicate and sensitive task in which the important purposes for which
governments are created must be addressed, see infra notes 299-322 and accompanying text.
183. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 330.
184. Even the evidence relied on by Lawson and Granger lends itself to a very
expansive construction of the notion of individual-rights limitations on Congress.
See, e.g., id. at 321 (relying on assurance of Theophilus Parsons that "'no power was
given to Congress to infringe on any one of the natural rights of the people by this
Constitution"' (quoting Theophilus Parsons, Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
(Feb. 5, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 162)). If Parsons is construed as referring to affirmative limitations on behalf of fundamental natural
rights, it is difficult to avoid the implication that it is natural rights, and not some
1791 consensus, that are protected by the Sweeping Clause. Cf United States v.
Bryan & Woodcock, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 374, 377 (1815) (addressing argument of
legal counsel to effect that retroactive civil law would not be proper law "because it
would overturn instead of 'establish[] justice"'). Lawson and Granger, however,
hint that perhaps only well-established, traditional rights were to be protected by
their jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause. Cf Lawson & Granger,
supra note 7, at 329 n.254 (suggesting possibility that "one or more of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights are not rights whose violation would have been
'improper' before 1791").
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power-and not merely the general idea of unwritten limits on legislative
power-that requires critical review in light of the textual and historical
materials bearing on the meaning of the Clause.18 5 Before turning to that
task, however, two summary observations are required. First, the idea that
the term "proper" might function in part as a textual acknowledgment of
pre-existing (and, indeed, external) limitations on legislative power, ones
implicit or explicit in the Constitution's tripartite scheme or the federal
system itself, could be described as a jurisdictional interpretation, but
would not present an issue of important controversy. It seems reasonable,
therefore, to refer to the Lawson and Granger thesis as presenting a broad
jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, that includes internal
limits deemed essential to preserve some general conception of limited
government thought to be contemplated by the Constitution's drafters. It
is this broad jurisdictional interpretation that will be criticized in what follows. 186 Second, it is critical to recognize that the evaluation of this
broader thesis is aided very little by the careful textual and contextual
analysis used by Lawson and Granger to find that the term "proper," understood historically in a general legal setting, refers to compliance with
established jurisdictional boundaries.' 8 7 The term "proper" already plays
this role under the modern reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
without being viewed as an independent source of additional (internal)
limitations based on some general theory of governments of limited or
enumerated powers. Our focus will necessarily be on the materials bearing on the probability that the Framers intended a single term in the
Sweeping Clause to play the critical role posited by Lawson and Granger,
as well as on the materials related to the Framers' theory of the relationship between our federal structure and popular rights that is reflected in
Article I of the Constitution.
B.

The Text of the Necessary and Proper Clause

As noted above, in developing their jurisdictional interpretation, Lawson and Granger place considerable weight on a careful analysis of the
language of the Sweeping Clause and, in particular, on a close comparison
between it and other power-granting clauses both in the federal and state
constitutions. 18 8 They first review the word "proper" itself, observing that
185. The general debate over unwritten limitations will proceed based on a
careful analysis of historical materials bearing on the relation between thinking

about human rights and written constitutions at the founding. The explicit claim
of Lawson and Granger, however, is that one can find a basis for implied individ-

ual-rights limitations in the text of the Sweeping Clause without resolving the
larger debate over unwritten limitations.

186. For a critical analysis of Lawson and Granger's broad jurisdictional analysis, see infra notes 188-225 and accompanying text.
187. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 291-97 (providing historical analysis of term "proper").
188. See id. at 291-97, 308-14 (comparing state and federal grants of constitutional power).
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the definition in 1787 included the words "fit," "adapted" or "suitable" and
the idea of being peculiarly within a particular domain or of "not belonging to more." 189 They contend that the latter meaning, which they describe as 'Jurisdictional," was the use probably intended by the Framers,
both because it was common "in contexts involving the allocation of governmental powers,"19 0 and because this understanding would avoid conflict with "the venerable legal maxim of document construction that
presumes that every word of a statute or constitution is used for a particular purpose." 19 1 The alternative meaning of the term, referring to fitness
or suitability, would render the word "proper" as redundant of "necessary," leaving the former without any real function in the Clause.
1.

The Question of Redundancy

Although it will hardly settle the issue of the intended meaning of
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, it seems doubtful that the
maxim presuming a particular purpose for each word in a legal document
is likely to contribute much to determining which meaning of the word
"proper" was intended by the Framers of the Sweeping Clause. In the first
place, if the entire clause was viewed as a declaratory provision and, thus,
as redundant of what was already implicit in the enumerated powers
scheme, it would be less than surprising if it contained some internal redundancy as well. More importantly, the cited maxim exists in tension
with common law maxims that require the meaning of general terms to be
limited because of their proximity and relation to other words used in the
same text.192 In his McCulloch opinion, Chief Justice Marshall, whom the
authors rely on in support of the maxim they invoke, strikingly applied the
principle underlying these competing maxims in rejecting Maryland's argument that the term "necessary" required that a law be essential or indis189. Id. at 291.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 290.
192. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
233 (1975) (stating maxim that "words are to be read in context with the neighboring words in the same document (noscitur a sociis) recognizes that in the field of
communication the whole transcends the parts" (footnote omitted)). A closely
related maxim, ejusdem generis, states "that if a series of more than two items ends
with a catch-all term that is broader than the category into which the preceding
items fall but which those items do not exhaust, the catch-all term is presumably
intended to be no broader than that category." Id. at 234. Although the latter
maxim does not literally apply here because "necessary and proper" does not constitute a series of more than two items, the background idea that general words
might properly be given a limiting construction to fit with surrounding language
may well apply here. Of course, scholars have generally agreed that the maxims
can almost never be substituted for a careful analysis of the context of the legal
language being construed, including evidence of the known purposes of the enactment in question. See, e.g., id. at 228 (cautioning against mechanical application of
rules of interpretation). Dickerson warned that "each situation [is] unique and
the particular reader is obliged to do a delicate, complicated balancing act." Id.
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pensable.' 9 3 Based on the premise that "we may derive some aid from
that with which [the word 'necessary'] is associated," Marshall finds it implausible that the Framers would have added the term "proper," the "only
possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning" and
"to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation
not straitened and compressed within the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend. 1 94 Having apparently already concluded that the term
"proper" had been employed to refer to measures that are fitting or
adapted to accomplish authorized ends, Marshall argues that his more limited construction of the word "necessary" better squares with "the usual
course of the human mind" and avoids attributing to the Framers the use
19 5
of contradictory terms.
Beyond confirming that Marshall did not perceive the word "proper"
as playing a critical jurisdictional role, the Chief Justice's analysis raises
important questions regarding the jurisdictional interpretation offered by
Lawson and Granger. 19 6 The term "necessary," particularly as construed
in McCulloch and later decisions, merely restates what the Framers believed
would be apparent even without such a clause, namely, that Congress'
powers implicitly include authority to take action as needed to accomplish
193. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418-19 (1819) ("If
the word 'necessary' was used in that strict and rigorous sense ...it would be an
extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind .. .to add a
word, the only possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous
meaning.").
194. Id. Chief Justice Marshall's criticism, however, did not dampen the enthusiasm of his critics for the argument placing virtually all the weight of the provision on the term "necessary." See A VIRGINIAN'S "AMPHICTYON" ESSAYS, reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCuLIocH V. MAIRYLAND 52, 66 (Gerald Gunther

ed., 1969) [hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE] (responding that "inference
from that association [of 'necessary' with 'proper'] is directly the reverse of that of
the supreme court"). If it were not for the word "necessary,"
Congress might have made all laws which might be 'proper,' that is suitable,
or fit, for carrying into execution the other powers; in that case they
would have had a wider field of discretion: they would then have only
been obliged to enquire what were the suitable means to attain the desired end; .. . After you have ascertained the means which are suitable,
or proper, you must go further and ascertain whether they are necessary.
If they are not necessary to attain the end, although they may be good in
themselves, yet you shall not use them.
Id. Marshall's critic, of course, implicitly establishes Marshall's point-that the
word "proper" is rendered utterly superfluous (because it is contained within "necessary") when "necessary" is construed as such a strong requirement; however,
Marshall and his critic agree on the meaning of "proper" as it is used in the Clause.
See id.; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418-19.
195. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418-19. Earlier in the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall previewed this criticism: "The word 'necessary,' is considered as controlling
the whole sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution of the
granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without which the power would
be nugatory." Id. at 413.
196. For a further discussion of Marshall's interpretation, see supra notes 14851 and accompanying text.
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the authorized ends.' 97 Lawson and Granger suggest that the word
"proper," by contrast, plays a critical role as the textual source of important limitations on congressional authority.1 98 Indeed, their interpretation appears to warrant limiting Congress' powers in ways that would seem
strained based upon the wording of the grant of power themselves, especially as it provides a basis for imposing unwritten limitations on Congress
in behalf of unenumerated individual rights. It can thus be argued that
the more limited interpretation of the word "proper," as suggested by
ChiefJustice Marshall, would fit more cohesively with the word "necessary"
and with the purpose of the Clause, confirmed by various spokespersons,
to declare the existence, of an ordinary power of Congress.1 99
Contrary to the analysis of Lawson and Granger, the contemporaneous power-granting provision that most closely tracks the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I lends support to this construction of "necessary
and proper," which views the phrase as basically expressing a single idea.
The Georgia Constitution of 1789, which the authors note was modeled
after the Federal Constitution, stated that "[t]he general assembly shall
have power to make all laws and ordinances which they shall deem necessary and proper for the good of the State, which shall not be repugnant to
this constitution." 20 0 Lawson and Granger emphasize that this provision
places the phrase "which they shall deem" in front of the necessary and
proper language, thereby granting "the legislature discretion to determine
the necessity and propriety of the laws it makes." 20 1 They argue that the
inclusion of this "express grant of discretion" is suggestive that "the phrase
'necessary and proper' [was] understood as a significant limitation on legislative power," which needed to be qualified to avoid undermining "the
20 2
otherwise general authority of the state legislature."
Another explanation seems more plausible, however. The qualifying
language suggests an inclination to recognize the legislature as generally
the sole judge of the fit between proposed laws and the good of the state,
no doubt in recognition that the initial grant of power was so broad and
general as to render judicial review of such judgments inappropriate (or
even improper). It seems unlikely, however, that the Framers of this provision could have intended to grant an unqualified discretion to the legisla197. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418 ("It is a means for carrying into execution
all sovereign powers .... ).
198. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 271 (stating that word "proper"
requires "executory laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain orjurisdiction").
199. According to this reading of the Sweeping Clause, Congress' powers are
not understood to be wholly discretionary, let alone limitless; it is simply that, beyond the limits on executory authority suggested by Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the terms of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the limits to Congress'
executory authority are external to the Clause and are found in the body of the
Constitution or its subsequent Amendments.
200. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 16.
201. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 313.
202. Id. at 314.
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ture to make decisions as to whether laws pursuing the general aims of
legislation nevertheless overstepped commonly accepted jurisdictional
boundaries. The implication is that the word "proper" was probably understood by those drafting the Constitution as having a more restricted
meaning than the strong jurisdictional interpretation of the term proffered by Lawson and Granger. Lawson and Granger suggest that their interpretation of the Georgia provision is reinforced by the language
limiting the grant of authority to laws not repugnant to the state constitution. 20 3 They reason that the jurisdictional meaning of "proper" would
otherwise imply that the legislature was the final judge of the constitutionality of its own laws. 20 4 Under their reading, however, the provision

amounts to saying that the legislature has complete discretion to determine, among other things, constitutional questions of jurisdictional
boundaries, except when the issue goes to constitutionality. By contrast,
the more restrictive interpretation of "proper" enables an interpreter to
avoid double-talk even while recognizing that the legislature cautiously
sought to clarify that the discretion granted did not extend to constitutional questions.
2.

A ParticularPurposefor the Term "Proper"

Alternatively, there is a construction of "proper" that fits with all of
the common-law maxims reviewed above and comports with the purpose
of including an executory power provision in the first place. It is possible
that the term "proper" was employed because, on the one hand, it fits with
the term "necessary" to suggest that Congress has a reasonable, but limited, discretion to implement its powers; on the other hand, it confirms
what would be true without any executory power clause: Congress' ancillary powers are subject to constitutional limitations or, in other words, that
Congress' executory power is only effective within the jurisdictional parameters of the Constitution. 205 Under this construction, the term makes
a distinctive contribution, in that it provides a barrier against misconstructions that could occur if the term "necessary" was used alone, for example,
the idea that Congress could pass any law with a requisite connection to
promoting an authorized end, notwithstanding limitations stated or implied elsewhere in the Constitution. 20 6 At the same time, it is read so as to
203. See id. ("The provision in the 1789 Georgia constitution that legislation
not be 'repugnant to the constitution' reinforces this interpretation.").
204. See id. ("The measure of the law's constitutionality would be the legislature's belief ...

,.").

205. These limitations would include the prohibitions included in Article I,
Section 9, as well as the limitations implicit in the system of separation of powers
and federalism. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (limiting, for example, Congress'
power to suspend habeas corpus writ, pass bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,
prefer one state's ports over another's and grant titles of nobility).
206. Notice that this reading corresponds with what was described above as
the modern construction, in which the word "proper" is given little independent
weight other than to suggest that executory laws must be constitutional laws. See

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/6

54

McAffee: The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Mo

1998]

FEDERAL SYSTEM AS BILL OF RIGHTS

71

fit well with the term "necessary" and not to turn a clause authorizing ancillary powers into a powerful limiting clause and an independent source
of prohibitions on congressional power. This interpretation renders
neither the term "proper," nor the Clause as a whole, entirely superfluous
20 7
or potentially revolutionary in their implications.
3.

The Form and Placement of the Sweeping Clause

Common-law maxims of construction aside, the interpretation of
"proper" suggested above receives further support from the form and
placement of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Virtually all of Chief Justice Marshall's critique of the restrictive interpretation of congressional
power by reliance on the term "necessary" applies with equal or greater
force to the broad jurisdictional reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause proffered by Lawson and Granger:
The clause is placed among the powers of congress, not among
the limitations on those powers. Its terms purport to enlarge, not
to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to
be an additional power, not a restriction on those already
Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 285 (noting that "word 'proper' has generally
been treated as a constitutional nullity or, at best, as a redundancy" and that there
are "strong textual and structural arguments that suggest that 'proper' ... is a term
distinct from, and supplementary to, 'necessary' and that [the word "proper"]
functions as an integral part of the constitutional design for a limited national
government."). This construction could even be described as a "jurisdictional" interpretation, provided it is understood that the jurisdictional boundaries are the
ordinary ones, external to the Sweeping Clause, for which the term "proper" serves
as a textual confirmation. See id. at 285-326 (describing jurisdictional interpretation of Sweeping Clause). The Clause, according to this reading, does not establish any internal limits on the grants of power in Article I, Section 8.
207. The suggestion that the term "proper" might serve a dual purpose in the
clause granting executory power accords with a similar analysis that Lawson and
Granger supply of the grant of legislative power to Congress to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 311. The Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments empower Congress to enforce the
amendments by "appropriate" legislation, and the question raised concerns "why
the drafters of the amendments adopted during the Reconstruction did not simply
follow the language of the Sweeping Clause." Id. at 311 n.189. Pointing to evidence that the Framers intended to convey essentially the same idea, Lawson and
Granger reason that the word "appropriate" provides "a good substitute for the
phrase 'necessary and proper'" because it "can plausibly function as a synonym
both for 'proper' in its jurisdictional sense and for 'necessary' in its sense of fitness
for a particular end." Id. at 312. Similarly, the term "proper" can plausibly reinforce both notions of fitness for a particular end and compliance with limitations
imposed by the Constitution.
The somewhat more restricted reading of the term "proper" suggested above
also fits more comfortably into the substitute framework of the Reconstruction
amendments that employed the term "appropriate," because no historical evidence suggests that the enforcement clauses of those amendments were intended
to generate significant internal limitations on congressional authority-limitations
going beyond compliance with the limiting norms contained in the Bill of Rights
and elsewhere in the Constitution.
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granted. No reason has been, or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discretion of the national legislature under words which purport to enlarge it. The framers of
the constitution wished its adoption, and well knew that it would
be endangered by its strength, not by. its weakness. Had they
been capable of using language which would convey to the eye
one idea, and, after deep reflection, impress on the mind another, they would rather have disguised the grant of power, than
its limitation. If, then, their intention had been, by this clause, to
restrain the free use of means which might otherwise have been
implied, that intention would have been inserted in another
place, and would have been expressed in terms resembling these.
"In carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all others,
&c., 'no laws shall be passed but such as are necessary and
proper."' Had the intention been to make this clause restrictive,
it would unquestionably have been so in form as well as in
effect.208

The Sweeping Clause as construed by Lawson and Granger amounts
to exactly the sort of limiting provision that Chief Justice Marshall found
to be implausible as a construction of a constitutional provision that purported to be one of the grants of power to Congress. 20 9 Marshall's structural analysis, moreover, seems even more persuasive in this context than
in analyzing the interpretation of "necessary" he criticized. 2 10 It is at least
plausible, after all, to think that the Framers of the Constitution intended
a relatively narrow construction of ancillary powers to the end of ensuring
that the national government remained a government responsible for the
relatively few areas of concern specified in the Constitution; the result
could have been the drafting of a power-granting provision designed to
clarify the priority in favor of somewhat limited congressional discretion in
pursuing national ends. In logical terms, any questions about the relative
importance, as a general matter, of the goals of effective national power
and a national government limited to a few important objects of concern
might properly be addressed in the clause recognizing the concept of im2 11
plied powers.
208. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-20 (1819).
209. See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 285-99 (arguing for reading of word "proper" that goes "well beyond [the] requirement of a telic relationship between means and ends" suggested by word "necessary").
210. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418 (criticizing Maryland's interpretation of
"necessary").
211. It can be argued that Marshall's analysis proceeded on the basis of an
original normative conception of implied powers by which he characterized his
opponents' views as "restrictive" compared to his own model; his opponents regularly denied that their construction posited that the clause was more restrictive
than the common-law agency principle under which the clause was often discussed. See id. at 418-21 (relying on common-law materials to establish strict necessity as standard of necessary).
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As to limitations on the powers granted, in favor of individual rights,
however, the Constitution already included Article I, Section 9, which
specified limits on congressional authority. 2 12 A provision intended to
function in part as a supplement of these specified limits, and not merely
to declare the idea of executory authority, would logically seem to belong
in this section of the Constitution. 2 13 In this context, Chief Justice Marshall's argument that the Framers of the Constitution would not have
drafted such an obscure limiting provision, particularly when opposition
to the Constitution would inevitably come from those fearful of national
power, seems especially powerful; if the Sweeping Clause had been intended as a key to the Constitution's concept of limited government, it
seems likely that it would have been inserted in the power-limiting section
2 14
and in a form along the lines suggested by Chief Justice Marshall.
Recognizing the potential force of Marshall's analysis, Spencer Roane
was especially pointed in denying that the stricter rule of construction proposed by Marshall's critics logically should have dictated placing the clause
as a limiting clause.2 15 In fact, Roane vehemently denied that the Necessary and Proper Clause served as a limitation on the powers granted:
212. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting Congress from suspending writ of
habeas corpus, passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, or imposing taxes or
duties on state exports).
213. Lawson and Granger acknowledge the existence of the Constitution's
limiting provisions, but fail to address why the Necessary and Proper Clause would
not have been included there if it was a limiting provision. See Lawson & Granger,
supra note 7, at 315-16 (noting "government could legitimately exercise only those
powers granted to it, expressly or by fair implication, by the Constitution"). Proponents of the Constitution justified the limitations included in Article I, Section 9 as
essential exceptions to the powers granted by the Constitution-an argument that
simply contradicts the idea that fundamental rights, such as the prohibition on ex
post facto laws, were already implicit in the requirement that executory laws be
proper as well as necessary.
214. Lawson and Granger would undoubtedly resist this argument on the
ground that the limits imposed by the word "proper" constitute "denials of delegated power rather than affirmative constraints." Id. at 328. Their claim, however,
is a purely formal one, considering that, according to their reading, means that
immediately execute granted powers are denied to Congress precisely because
they invade traditional rights. The prohibitions in Section 9 function as means
constraints on means in almost exactly the same way, as do most of the guarantees
included in the Bill of Rights. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 14-19, 25-29 (arguing
that constitutional rights, including unenumerated constitutional rights secured by
Ninth Amendment, operate as means constraints on legitimate government powers as often as they function as end constraints). Barnett also contends that
unenumerated rights are essential to guard against the potential abuse of "means"
afforded by the discretion granted to Congress by the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See id. (stating that, construed this way, constitutional rights will complement delegated powers of federal government); cf Bybee, supra.note 2, at 1556 &
n.73 (describing most of guarantees in Bill of Rights as procedural disabilities suffered by Congress because they qualify or limit manner of exercising legitimate
government powers rather than placing entire categories of laws beyond competence of Congress).
215. See generally Spencer Roane, Roane's "Hampden" Essays, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 11-12, 1819, reprinted inJOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 194, at
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If the object in using [the terms "necessary and proper"] was
merely for greater caution, and to put down all uncertainty on
the subject, that was the proper place for them. It would have
been wrong to have placed [these terms] among the prohibitions, as they are not pretended to prohibitany thing to the general government: it is only contended that they create no
enlargement of the powers previously given. In what place,
2 16
therefore, could these words have been so properly inserted?
Lawson and Granger, by contrast, can make neither of Roane's claims.
Unlike Roane's narrow reading of the common law principle of implied
agency that guides and controls his interpretation of the provision, their
broad jurisdictional reading creates limits on the reach of the granted
powers that are "internal" to the Necessary and Proper Clause; and the
limitations they identify as being dictated by their jurisdictional interpretation would clearly fit into Article I, Section 9.217 In fact, the whole point
of Lawson and Granger's article is to establish that there may not have
been a need for a Bill of Rights because the Necessary and Proper Clause
was the source of powerful, if heretofore neglected, limits on federal powers in favor of unenumerated individual rights-a thesis that simply contradicts Roane's insistence that, correctly analyzed, the Necessary and
Proper Clause did not prohibit anything, but also did not enlarge the powers previously given. 218 It does not bode well for a limiting theory of the
Necessary and Proper Clause when the leading advocate of strict construction of federal powers-and of the Clause-effectively rejects it; if anyone
during the generation following the founding would have been sympathetic to an interpretation of the Constitution that lent itself to limiting
national power, Spencer Roane should have been that individual.

106, 125-38 (analyzing McCulloch decision with respect to "necessary and proper"
language).
216. Id. at 126. Roane's analysis takes on added significance because he was
an important Virginia judge who was a strong advocate of states' rights. See Gerald

Gunther, Introductionto JOHN

MARSHALL'S DEFENSE,

supra note 194, at 1, 9-10 (not-

ing Roane's influence and his role in Richmond Junto, Virginia political group
dedicated to protecting states' rights).
217. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 219-98. When Madison proposed
amendments to Congress that amounted to a Bill of Rights, he included the very
limitations that Lawson and Granger claim were already secured by the Necessary
and Proper Clause, and he proposed that these constraints be included in Article
I, Section 9. See Madison Resolution, supra note 49, at 12 (proposing that "in article 1st, section 9 . . .be inserted these clauses" protecting freedom of religion,
speech and press).
218. See Roane, supra note 215, at 126 ("[T]he terms 'necessary' and 'proper'
are not pretended to prohibit anything to the general government: it is only contended that they create no enlargement of the powers previously given.").
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The Necessay and Proper Clause and the Idea of a Written Constitution

A further advantage of a more restricted reading of "proper" than the
one advanced by Lawson and Granger is that it forecloses, rather than
invites, expansive forms of argument that could undermine the written
Constitution. Among the statements relied upon by Lawson and Granger
to illustrate the use of "proper" in a jurisdictional sense, they state conclusions based on normative argument about constitutional design rather
than based on a description of premises embodied in the text of the Constitution. 219 For example, Lawson and Granger rely on the statement of
one delegate to the Constitutional Convention opposing the granting of
the appointment power to Congress on the ground that "' [t] he Legislature was an improper body for appointments.' ' 2 20 Similarly, at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James Wilson responded to the argument
that "improper powers are . . . blended in the Senate." 22 ' Lawson and
Granger might have noted more generally that the term "proper" was in
fact commonly employed in debate over the drafting of constitutions dur2 22
ing the founding era, as well as in discussing their merits.
A central purpose of the written Constitution was to settle questions
as to the "proper" allocation of government power, even though the de219. See generally Lawson & Granger, supranote 7, at 291-98 ("In each of these
instances, the word "improper" is clearly used to describe a departure from sound
jurisdictional principles of separation of powers.").
220. Id. at 293 (quoting 1 1787: DRArTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 899
(Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986)).
221. James Wilson, Debates in Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 19, at 494, 505.
222. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 268 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (joining debate over powers granted to national government by Constitution by asking "[w]hether any part of the powers transferred to the general Government be unnecessary or improper?"); see also James Madison, Speech to
Philadelphia Convention (Aug. 9, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 230, 235 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (opposing proposed amendment to draft of Constitution that would require 14 years of citizenship as
qualification for Senators on ground that to place such restriction in Constitution
would be "unnecessary, and improper"); Edmund Pendleton, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 293, 301
(defending federal system by arguing that there will be no needless clashes between states and national government "if each power [state and federal] is confined within its proper bounds, and to its proper objects")., Even though they
offered these normative views about the proper scope of federal powers and the
propriety of particular constitutional provisions, these spokespersons would never
have thought that their own views on such questions established jurisdictional
boundaries; that was the point of drafting and ratifying a written Constitution.
None of these questions would have been properly revisited via judicial review of
laws passed to execute delegated powers. If we equate these uses of the term
"proper," however, with a supposed jurisdictional limitation built into the Necessary and Proper Clause, we invite this normative inquiry into the appropriate
boundaries of a national legislature. This is the inquiry Lawson and Granger contend that the word "proper" invites with respect to individual rights.
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bate over ratification was filled with contention as to whether the Convention had "properly" drawn these lines. If anything should be clear,
however, it is that the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause
would not have been inserted as a wild card permitting constitutional interpreters to revisit fundamental questions of constitutional design. A provision permitting interpreters to impose their personal ideas of federalstate relations and the appropriate roles of the branches in a tripartite
scheme of government would have been considered "improper" by everyone involved in the process of drafting the Constitution. Yet the broad
jurisdictional reading proffered by Lawson and Granger implies that decision makers might go outside the constitutional text and plain inferences
of the constitutional structure and, in effect, revisit the question of the
appropriate balance between government authority to accomplish authorized ends and the claims of individuals to freedom from government
223
control.
Moreover, if the word "proper" invites a search for additional limitations on behalf of individual rights, in addition to the limits specified in
the Constitution, it might just as plausibly be read as a normative limitation of federal legislative power in the broadest sense; whatever acts of
Congress are viewed as inconsistent with its peculiar jurisdiction, as understood in the normative constitutional theory of the interpreter, would be
unconstitutional. Although Lawson and Granger do not advocate such an
expansive theory of the role of the term "proper" in limiting congressional
authority, they do not offer any explanation as to how the term might
properly be read to foreclose such a normative inquiry as to questions of
separation of powers or federalism when their own analysis of the individual rights area necessarily requires interpreters to rely upon theories for
limiting power that go well beyond textual provisions or relatively clear
224
structural inferences.
223. See generally Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 298 ("[A] proper law
under the Sweeping Clause must respect limitations that are not expressly enumerated in the constitutional text." (citing An Impartial Citizen V, PETERSBURG, VA. GAZETrE, Feb. 28, 1788, reprinted in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note

23, at 431)). The extent to which their interpretation authorizes an open-ended
normative inquiry depends on the precise theory of rights developed for explicating the limits suggested by the term "proper." Their theory, however, readily lends
itself to the broadest natural-rights theory that would delegate resolution of the
central issues of government authority versus popular liberty to the courts. For a
further discussion of their theory, see supra notes 133-87 and accompanying text.
224. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 297-98 n.131 ("[W]e do not discuss in detail the precise content of the national government's jurisdiction-for
example, whether it is defined solely by reference to express constitutional provisions or in part by background principles that underline the Constitution."). At
the very least, the above analysis points out the risks of placing great reliance, as
Lawson and Granger have done, on the use of a term like "proper" in contexts
other than the Clause under consideration. See id. at 291-97. Use of the term
"proper" in debates over constitutional design did not describe well-established
jurisdictional boundaries or any legal or constitutional doctrine. Its use in such
debates filled the rhetorical need to suggest that one's own position is not simply a
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If the text of the Sweeping Clause hardly requires the broad jurisdictional interpretation, it is fair to say that by itself it does not preclude it
either. If it could be shown that the Framers contemplated affirmative
limitations on the powers of Congress, signaled by the word "proper," but
not enumerated in the text, the text of the Sweeping Clause does not by its
terms clearly foreclose the realization of such a purpose. We must necessarily turn, then, to the evidence extrinsic to the text to determine
whether the text, read in a relevant context, lends support to the broad
225
jurisdictional interpretation.
C.

The Sweeping Clause and the Framers' Concept of Limited Federal Powers

As noted above, Lawson and Granger observe that the drafting history
of the Sweeping Clause is almost completely uninformative. Consequently
they turn to textual and structural analysis to determine that the term
"proper" was intended to play a critically important role in the design of
the Constitution. The lack of a significant drafting history, however, may
be more significant than their analysis suggests. One might have expected
that a provision that was to play such a critical role in the constitutional
design would have received more attention and, perhaps, discussion and
debate. More importantly, however, the lack of relevant legislative history
suggests that the Framers believed the enumeration of powers and the
Sweeping Clause, taken as a whole, formed a scheme that would not be
novel or foreign to the relevant audience. This is almost certainly because
the Constitution's limited-powers scheme was designed to track, by and
large, the system embodied in America's original constitution, the Articles
of Confederation. 22 6 This conclusion is borne out by analysis of the ratifipractical or useful one, but is the one most consistent with the first principles of
republican government. There was disagreement about first principles during the
founding era, however, and these spokespersons understood that. Their employment of the term in that setting would naturally have been much looser than in a
constitutional provision defining the scope of executory power.
225. Cf Barnett, supra note 26, at 777 n.1 13 (offering "normative" rather than
"originalist" argument for adopting "a conception of propriety [in the Sweeping
Clause] that restricts the government's power to violate the background fights retained by the people"). In thus purporting to adopt the basic analysis of Lawson
and Granger, Barnett simply avoids confronting the materials reviewed above as a
plausible construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In the spirit of the
founding period, it should be noted that this author views any approach that ignores the best textual and historical evidence as an improper method for construing a written constitution.
226. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1243-44 (noting that
both new Constitution and Articles of Confederation "creat[ed] a national government of limited and defined powers that related to specific objects of national
concern, with a general reservation of all other rights and powers"). Compare U.S.
CONST. art. I (describing requirements to serve, election of members and powers
of each branch of Congress), with ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. V-IX (1777)
(describing powers of government).
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cation-era debate in which the Articles of Confederation and the Constitu2 27
tion are compared and contrasted.
1.

The Articles of Confederation and the Concept of EnumeratedPowers

Surprisingly enough, although Lawson and Granger draw support for
their interpretation from the discussion of the implications of the enumerated-powers scheme during the ratification-era debates, they fail to examine that scheme against the backdrop of the analogous scheme
employed in the Articles of Confederation. Throughout the debates over
ratification, the federalist proponents of the Constitution defended the
Constitution against the general claim that it would establish an all-powerful Leviathan-as well as against the specific criticism that it threatened
basic rights by its omission of a bill of rights-by relying on the precedent
established by the Articles of Confederation. 228 The centerpiece of this
defense was the straightforward argument that because the national government is given constitutional authority over a few areas of unique concern to the nation as a whole, and the states retain a general jurisdiction
over the great mass of problems to which legislation might be applied,
there is no need for a comprehensive declaration of the rights that the
people retain in granting power to government. 229 It was thus commonplace for federalists to observe that the Articles of Confederation included
no comprehensive declaration of rights along the lines of those included
in a number of the state constitutions in existence at the time it was
drafted; likewise, the proposed Constitution did not require the inclusion
of a bill of rights.

23 0

227. See McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1243-48 (describing how
antifederalists distinguished Constitution from Articles of Confederation while federalists felt Constitution itself ensured rights of people).
228. See generally id. at 1243 (describing how antifederalists distinguished Con-

stitution from Articles of Confederation). As this author noted:
The theory of the Constitution rested on the model of the Articles of
Confederation .... However, the Antifederalists distinguished the Constitution from the Articles of conferred general powers upon the national
government that might allow it to threaten the people's rights....
Second, because the Constitution omitted the provision in the Articles of Confederation that had expressly stipulated that each State "retains every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States," the Antifederalists contended that it would be construed as a surrender of all rights and
as confirming an intent to create a government of unlimited powers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
229. See, e.g., The Report of Connecticut's Delegates to the ConstitutionalConvention,
NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 470, 471 (defending Constitution because its powers "extend only to matters respecting the common interests of the Union, and are
specially defined, so that the particular states retain their Sovereignty in all other
matters").
230. See e.g., An American Citizen IV On the Federal Government, PA. GAZE-rE,
Oct. 21, 1787, reprinted in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
434 (observing that "old [Federal] Constitution contained many of the same things,
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According to the federalists, Article I of the Constitution not only
tracked the pattern of enumerating national powers established in the Articles of Confederation, it also included a provision, the Necessary and
Proper Clause, that served the same function as Article II of the Articles of
Confederation, 23 1 the provision that expressly reserved to the states all
powers not granted to the national government. 23 2 Although the antifederalists resisted the claim that the Sweeping Clause was an adequate substitute for Article II of the Articles of Confederation-and hence the
universal demand for what became the Tenth Amendment-it nonetheless seems apparent that the Clause should be read in para materia with
Article II if we accept Madison's assertion that the Tenth Amendment itself was redundant of the scheme of enumerated powers (including the
Necessary and Proper Clause). As stated already, Article II is a reservation
of sovereign power to the states and does not purport to define national
authority by reference to affirmative limitations on behalf of individual
rights or the means employed to implement the powers granted.
Even the language in Article II that lacks a counterpart in the federal
Constitution-the language reserving all power not "expressly delegated"does not carry any implication of affirmative limitations on national
power. As an example, it is plausible to think that Congress' express powers to make decisions as to peace and war and the use of force generally,
in combination with its express power to raise an army and navy, necessarily included authority to decide whether to rely upon standing armies or
citizen militias. 233 If so, Article II did not create any barrier to the exercise of that power, despite the fact that reliance upon standing armies in
peacetime had been thought to be a violation of the British Constitution
and some state constitutions' declarations of rights purported to limit leg23 4
islative authority to establish standing armies.
which from error or disingenuousness are urged against the new one," and that
"[n] either of them have a bill of fights").
231. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (providing that each state "retains
every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States").
232. See, e.g., CharlesJarvis, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Feb. 4, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 153 ("The first article proposed.., is an explicit reservation of every right and privilege which is nearest and most agreeable
to the people."); Maclaine, supra note 23, at 141 (describing Necessary and Proper
Clause as "an express clause which ... clearly demonstrates that [Congress is]
confined to those powers which are given them").
233. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (stating that Congress "shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war ... to
build and equip a navy . ..raise the men and cloth, arm and equip them in like
manner"); THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 154-55 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that Articles of Confederation imposed no restraint on
United States regarding military establishments in time of peace).
234. For a discussion of the English Constitution and state declarations of
rights, see infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
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This understanding of Article II of the Articles of Confederation, and
hence also of the enumerated-powers scheme of the Federal Constitution,
is powerfully confirmed by the course of debate during the struggle to
ratify the Constitution. Thus, some antifederalist critics of the Constitution acknowledged that, if a federal constitution included a limited set of
carefully defined powers and a general reservation-of-powers clause, the
strategy of enumerating powers might be an adequate substitute for a declaration of rights. 2 3 5 The proposed Constitution could not fit this bill,

however, not only because it omitted a general reservation of all powers
not delegated, but also because the powers granted to the federal government greatly exceeded those granted by the Articles of Confederation and
2 36
could in many ways directly affect the rights and interests of the people.
The addition of various crucial powers, including the powers to tax the
people and to regulate commerce, among others, raised the specter of
federal laws that might invade rights that had come to be held dear by the
people, including the rights stated in the constitutions and declarations of
2 37
rights in the states.
The federalists, by contrast, were adamant that those demanding a
bill of rights simply failed to grasp that the Constitution proceeded on the
235. See Address by Denatus, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 11, 1788, reprinted in 5
supra note 41, at 260, 263 (acknowledging that

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,

there would be "no need of a bill of rights, were the states properly confederated"
by document that created "[a] land-mark clearly drawn between the powers that
give [i.e., the states]" and "the power given"); Luther Martin, Address No. II, MD.J.,
Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at

452, 455 ("[Hlad the government been formed upon principles truly federal, as I
wished it, legislating over and acting upon the states only in their collective or
political capacity, and not on individuals, there would have been no need of a bill

of rights."). Indeed, some antifederalists went so far as to say that, if the proposed
Constitution were amended to include a provision like Article II of the Articles of

Confederation, there would be no need for a comprehensive bill of rights. See
Spencer, supra note 23, at 163 (noting that clause "expressly declaring, that every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which are not given up by it, remain in the states"
would "render a bill of rights unnecessary"); A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, supra note 23,
at 304, 306 (arguing that Constitution should be amended to have all powers accurately defined and include either bill of rights or declaration that powers not delegated to Congress remain rights of citizens).
236. See A DemocraticFederalist,PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23, at 193 (contending that under Arti-

cles of Confederation Congress was "merely an executive body," lacking power to
raise money and adjudicatory power). Of particular concern was that Congress'
expanded power "extend[ed] to the individuals as well as to the states," and national government will possess "the three essential powers of government." Id.; see
Essay of Brutus II, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION at 524, 526-28 (providing extensive analysis of instances in which granted
powers could readily be construed to empower Congress to invade traditional
rights of the people).
237. See generally McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1229 (noting
that antifederalists believed that "broad grants of power contained in article I, read
in conjunction with the supremacy clause, would permit the national government
to override state law, including the fundamental rights secured by declarations in
the various state constitutions").
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basis of a theory of enumerating powers rather than enumerating
rights. 2 3 8 As Madison put it, the standard federalist argument was that

"the Constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of
the people." 2 39 This summary of a standard refrain harks back to the simple idea of granted and retained powers as embodied in the Articles of
Confederation. To the claim that the proposed Constitution unduly expanded national power, which in turn necessitated inclusion of a comprehensive set of limitations, the federalists responded that "[t]he powers
vested in the federal government are only Such as respect the common
interests of the Union, and are particularly defined, So that each State
240
retains [its] Sovereignty in what respects its own internal government."
According to the federalists, the limited nature of the grant of national
power simultaneously protected the states and the people, and the people's rights would receive additional security from the existence of the declarations of rights in their state constitutions.
2.

The Enumerated Powers Scheme and the Argument Against the Necessity of
a Bill of Rights

Lawson and Granger enter the debate over omission of a bill of rights
in the middle, ignoring the dialogue that originated in the analogy to the
Articles
of Confederation, and simply observe that the federalists uniformly claimed that the Constitution did not include the power to invade
basic rights. 24 1 They cite statements, for example, from an impressive list

of the Constitution's leading defenders who joined in denying that the
242
Constitution delegated a "national power over speech and press."
Based on a review of these and other confident assertions about the limited scope of federal powers, they conclude that "the federalists must have
believed that the Sweeping Clause does jurisdictional work." 243 Acknowledging that these assertions were rarely couched in terms of the word
"proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2 44 Lawson and Granger sug238. See id. at 1230-31 (noting that Wilson refuted antifederalist claims by arguing that they failed to perceive distinctive nature of Constitution).
239. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
240. Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown (Dec. 8, 1787), in 14 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23, at 387.

241. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 318-21 (reviewing federalist arguments against necessity of bill of rights).
242. Id. at 319.
243. Id. at 323.
244. Id. Even this acknowledgment that the matter was "rarely explicitly
stated in terms of [improper]," somewhat understates the point. Id. In fact, Lawson and Granger cite to an individual in the ratification debate who claimed that
the term "proper" would stand as a barrier to laws that violate traditional rights,
but otherwise appear to be within the scope of a federal power. See id. at 298-99
(relying on argument set forth by An Impartial Citizen, Lawson and Granger conclude that "this construction of the word 'proper' reflects 'the usual acceptation of
words' as understood by the public" (quoting An ImpartialCitizen V, supra note 223,
at 428, 431)).
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gest the alternative possibility that, in a legal universe not yet dominated
by the reasoning of McCulloch, "[the federalists] could have meant that the
words 'necessary and proper' jointly constrain the national government's
ability to violate protected rights. ' 245 Even this suggestion is almost pure
speculation, however, because virtually all of the statements they cite make
confident assertions about the scope of the grants of powers themselves,
properly construed, and are not cast as interpretations of the.Necessary
246
and Proper Clause or any limiting principle emanating therefrom.
If the Necessary and Proper Clause had really been the key to defending the Constitution, it seems highly probable that the federalists would
have directly invoked its terms at the most critical junctures in the public
debate. Far from invoking the Sweeping Clause, however, the federalists
offered only that it did not add to the powers of Congress, and that it was
merely declaratory of what would have followed from the granting of powers to the national government. 247 Even Lawson's and Granger's argu245. Id. at 322. Lawson and Granger do not base this suggestion on state-

ments made during the debate over ratification of the Constitution, but on a statement by Madison made to Congress during the course ofjustifying the adoption of
a bill of rights. See id. at 322-23 (noting Madison argued that bill of rights would
protect against abuse of "'certain discretionary powers"' granted to Congress
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834))). Madison's
statement, however, does not purport to summarize the position taken by the defenders of the Constitution, either with respect to the scope of national powers or
the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
246. Cf Barnett, supra note 26, at 780 n.127 (appearing to infer that inalienable natural rights, including freedom of press, would be secured by limited delegation of powers idea that rights would operate as jurisdictional limits on powers
even in absence of enumeration of rights). Barnett's assertion, however, misses
that the federalists were not announcing a limiting rule of construction that would
prohibit interpretation of granted powers to allow Congress to impinge on natural
rights; rather, they were stating their convictions as to the appropriate outcome of
a faithful construction of the powers actually granted. Strikingly, a number of the
many statements in which federalists clarify their stance, including the argument
that a free-press clause most certainly would have been essential had Congress
been delegated a power to regulate literary publications, have been readily available even as Barnett blithely continues to read these assurances as though they lent
straightforward support to a doctrine of implied rights that serve to limit any and
all powers actually delegated to Congress. See, e.g., McAffee, Critical Guide, supra
note 15, at 70-72, 86-87 (noting that Iredell stated "'where [there] are powers of a
particular nature, and, expressly defined, as in the case of the [Federal] Constitution before us,... a bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd and
dangerous'" (quoting Iredell, supra note 19, at 149 (alteration in original)));
Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modern Ninth Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L. REv. 351, 371 (1996) (noting that James
Wilson observed that because Constitution did not grant Congress power to regulate press freedom of press guarantee not necessary). One presumes that this use
of the historical record could well be one fruit of preferring a normative to an
originalist reading of the foundations of the Framers' constitutional structure. See
McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1317-19 (finding historical record supports residual rights reading and articulates no theory of unwritten fundamental
law).
247. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 205-06 (stating that
Necessary and Proper Clause was added for protection and to leave nothing to
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ment that the Clause played a role in the securing of popular rights is at
clarified that Congress is
times cast as an argument that the Clause further 248
confined to powers granted by the Constitution.
Having ignored the origins of the argument from enumerated powers
against a bill of rights-that the Constitution tracked the Articles of Confederation-Lawson and Granger not only place their own spin on the
federalist arguments, they also appear to miss highly relevant arguments
that were developed as the dialogue continued. The ensuing discussion,
moreover, proceeded on premises that belie their construction of the federalist arguments. The federalist assurances as to the narrow scope of federal power prompted a continuing, thoroughgoing review of whether the
Constitution adequately identified and defined national powers. Participants in this debate, both critics and proponents, wrote and spoke as
though this was a question to be answered by an analysis of the powers
granted and the definition of the powers set forth in the Constitution; the
debate did not proceed on either side as though an important key to its
resolution could be in the understanding that executory laws that ran
afoul of unenumerated individual rights would be deemed improper and
hence unconstitutional.
James Iredell, for example, defended the omission of a bill of rights
by referring to the enumerated powers themselves, not the Sweeping
Clause, claiming that they included "such a definition of authority as
would leave no doubt" so that "any person by inspecting [the Constitution] may see if the power claimed be enumerated." 249 Indeed, federalists
frequently referred to particular rights that were not enumerated in the
Constitution as to which fears of federal power had been expressed and
challenged their opponents to show which clause in the Constitution em25 0
powered the national government to invade the cherished right.

construction). Once again, even though Lawson and Granger describe the jurisdictional limits imposed by the word "proper" as "denials of delegated power
rather than affirmative constraints on an otherwise delegated power," this distinction of form would hardly have stood in the way of the Constitution's defenders,
faced with charges of having proposed an unlimited government, from directly
relying on the Clause as the provision that served every purpose to be fulfilled by a
bill of rights. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 328.
248. See, e.g., An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government, supranote 230,
at 434 (noting that old Constitution and new Constitution were very similar and
neither included bill of rights).
249. James Iredell, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 29, 1788), in 4
ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 170, 171-72; accord Letter from Roger Sherman
to Unknown, supra note 240, at 387 (contending that states have nothing to fear
from federal government because the "distinction between their jurisdictions will
be So obvious, that there will be no great danger of interference").
250. SeeWilson, supranote 111, at 455 (challenging opponents to show "what
part of this system puts it in the power of congress to attack [the rights of conscience]"); see also Randolph, supra note 178, at 469 (demanding to be shown "the
particular clause which gives liberty to destroy the freedom of the press"). Such
inquiries are at best disingenuous if the implicit claim actually rests on ajurisdic-
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Equally important, their opponents interpreted these arguments in a
straightforward fashion as reflected by their own carefully constructed arguments attempting to show that various powers delegated by the Constitution would lend themselves to abuse of traditional or widely accepted
natural rights. 251 These arguments were offered without reference to the
Necessary and Proper Clause.

It is equally clear that both sides of the debate concerning the omission of a bill of rights acknowledged not only that the people might relinquish rights that were deemed fundamental, but that they might do so
through the use of generally worded grants of powers, as opposed to provisions expressly relinquishing specific rights. This sort of claim was, of
course, a major premise in the antifederalist contention that the Constitution was fatally flawed without a bill of rights. In perhaps the most important, as well as cogent, antifederalist work, Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer,the

author writes:
The people's or the printers claim to a free press, is founded on
the fundamental laws, that is, compacts, and state constitutions,
made by the people. The people, who can annihilate or alter
those constitutions, can annihilate or limit this right. This may
be done by giving general powers, as well as by using particular
words.252

The Federal Farmer expressed the standard view on both sides of the debate. James Wilson, perhaps the leading federalist spokesman in defending the omission of a bill of rights, accepted the Federal Farmer's premise,
but argued that there was not, in fact, any clause in the proposed Constitution-limiting requirement that executory laws be proper rather than on the substantive content of the power revealed by the language of the grant itself.
251. These responsive arguments took two forms: (1) the Sweeping Clause
itself would be construed as a grant of absolute and unreviewable discretion to
Congress and used pretextually to enact legislation on any subject and (2) specific
grants of power might lend themselves to legislation invasive of fundamental
rights. Compare Cumberland County Petition to the Pennsylvania Convention, CARLISLE

Dec. 5, 1787, repinted in 2

GAZETTE,

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra

note 23, at 310 (stating that Sweeping Clause grants "unlimited powers" because it
makes representatives "the judges of what laws shall be necessary and proper"),

with A Republican I, N.Y.J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 13

RATIFICATION OF THE CON-

supra note 23, at 477, 479 (arguing that Copyright Clause of Constitution grants Congress power over literary publications and therefore press), and
CincinnatusI: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 RATIFIcATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 529, 531-32 (arguing that Congress'
power to "define and punish offences against the law of nations" could empower
Congress to make articles critical of treaties offence against law of nations and
violation of domestic law). Regarding the first argument, Lawson and Granger
supply a powerful critique of this misreading of the clause. See Lawson & Granger,
supra note 7, at 282-85 (supplying critique of reasons why Sweeping Clause might
have been erroneously interpreted to grant "unlimited Congressional discretion").
STITUTION,

252.

LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI,
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tion that could fairly be read to include authority to limit the freedom of
2 53
the press.
In advancing his argument, Wilson freely acknowledged that if the
Constitution had delegated a power "to regulate literary publications," it
would have been critical to include a freedom of the press provision as an
exception to, or limitation on, this general regulatory power. 25 4 Wilson
contended, however, that no general power actually granted to Congress
2 55
would logically include the authority to regulate the press.
Based on such common premises, the debate over the adequacy of
the Constitution's powers scheme was often cast in terms of whether the
Framers had drafted the powers so as to effectively "draw a line" between
legitimate national powers and the powers properly reserved to the states
and the people. Before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,James Wilson contended that it did:
I think there is another subject with regard to which [the] Constitution deserves approbation. I mean the accuracy with which
the line is drawn between the powers of the generalgovernment, and
[the powers] of the particularstate governments. We have heard
some general observations on this subject, from the gentlemen
who conduct the opposition. They have asserted that these pow253. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 167, 167-68 (including "liberty of the press"
as among rights that were reserved to people because no power related to press
was given to Congress).
254. See id. at 168 (stating specific grant of liberty of press would be nullity
and such grant could be construed as implication that power over press was given
to general government by state). Wilson confirmed not only the Federal Farmer's
claim that the sovereign people are empowered to relinquish even the most fundamental rights, but also that they may do so by generally worded grants of power as
much as by provisions that purport to give up some right to government. See id.
(stating that, if given, power to regulate press could be "general in its operation"
and exception would be needed to preserve liberty of press). Thus, when Wilson
and others demanded to be shown the provision whereby rights are relinquished,
they were asking merely for a provision that could fairly be construed as empowering the national government to regulate the matter under discussion. See McAffee,
OriginalMeaning, supranote 15, at 1269-70 n.215 (giving examples ofJames Wilson
and Edmund Randolph asking to be shown specific provisions that give Congress
power to regulate certain matters). Wilson would have agreed with Brutus, an important New York antifederalist who argued in favor of including a bill of rights,
that "[t]he powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by
this constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government." Essay of Brutus II, supra note 236, at 374.
255. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 167-68 (arguing that because proposed
form of government had no control over press any formal declaration on subject
would be nugatory). Wilson asked: "[W] hat control can proceed from the federal
government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom?" Id.
Wilson took these arguments seriously. See id. at 167 (stating that although unprepared to speak, attacks on Constitution induced him to come to its defense). In
other contexts, Wilson acknowledged that the general language of a particular
grant of authority effectively granted discretion to Congress to define and secure,
or to narrow or eliminate, rights that others deemed to be fundamental.
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ers are unlimited and undefined .... [I] t is not pretended, that
the line is drawn with mathematical precision; the inaccuracy of
language must, to a certain degree, prevent the accomplishment
of such a desire. Whoever views the matter in a true light will see
that the powers are as minutely enumerated and defined as was
possible, and will also discover that the general clause.... against
which so much exception is taken, is nothing more than what was
necessary to render effectual the particular powers that are
25 6
granted.
Responding to similar claims, the Federal Farmer agreed that one
could rely on a limited delegation of powers if there were grounds for
confidence that "the particular enumeration of the powers given adequately draws the line between them and the rights reserved." 257 In his
view, however, this was not the case with the proposed Constitution. 258 In
any event, he argued, it was safer to enumerate limitations on rights, at
least as to "the most essential rights," if for no other reason than to reassure those who held doubts about relying on a general reservation from
2 59
granted powers.
Two years later, near the end of the process that eventuated in the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, Madison defended the Ninth Amendment's
focus on securing retained rights, rather than prohibiting an inference of
extended power, on the ground that, under either formulation, the success of the venture would come down to whether federal powers were defined and limited so that, contrary to the claims of the antifederalists,
many rights were preserved: "If a line can be drawn between the powers
256. Wilson, supra note 111, at 493, 496. Subsequently Wilson returns to a
theme already discussed: "Is there any increase of risk, or rather are not the enumerated powers as well defined here, as in the present Articles of Confederation?"
Id.
257. LETrER FROM TIE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 324. The Federal Farmer writes:
[1)n forming a federal constitution, which ex vi termine, supposes state
governments existing, and which is only to manage a few great national
concerns, we often find it easier to enumerate particularly the powers to
be delegated to the federal head, than to enumerate particularly the individual rights to be reserved; and the principle will operate in its full force,
when we carefully adhere to it.
Id.
258. See id. at 326 ("Even a cautionary provision implies a doubt, at least, that
it is necessary ..

.

."). The Federal Farmer explained:

The distinction, in itselfjust, that all powers not given are reserved, is in
effect destroyed by this very constitution, as I shall particularly demonstrate-and even independent of this, the people, by adopting the constitution, give many general undefined powers to congress, in the
constitutional exercise of which, the rights in question may be effected.
Id. at 325.
259. See id. at 324 ("People, and very wisely too, like to be express and explicit
about their essential rights, and not to be forced to claim them on the precarious
and unascertained tenure of inferences and general principles ....").
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granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing,
whether the latter be secured ...

by declaring that [the rights] shall [not

be abridged], or that the former shall not be extended." 260 Notice that
Madison's use of the contingent term "if' reflects both that the rights secured by the Ninth Amendment are defined by reference to the powers
granted, understood in a straightforward fashion, and that the success of
the line-drawing venture by which the rights were identified would depend
on the drafter's success in stating the limited scope of the powers
26 1
granted.
All of these discussions would be incoherent under the broad jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause offered by Lawson and
Granger. Under their interpretation, after all, the security of individual
rights is not contingent upon the selection of powers to be granted, or, by
their definition, as contained in the grants of power in Article I. The line
between power and rights is established by the jurisdictional boundary created by the requirement that every exercise of power be proper; so far as
securing the rights of the people are concerned, the adequacy of the drafting of the delegation of power is largely irrelevant. If Lawson and Granger
are correct in their interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
resulting implication is that the leading spokesmen on both sides of the
ratification debate did not understand its meaning and implications.
Observing that the Framers' arguments for omitting a bill of rights
have typically been portrayed as weak attempts to justify a mistake, Lawson
and Granger suggest that a virtue of the jurisdictional interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause is precisely that it rescues the Framers from being characterized as "fools and knaves who concocted a desperate defense of a flawed
document."262 For it is "under a jurisdictional interpretation of the
260. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 105, at
1190.

261. Cf Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, supra note 102, at
1188 (discussing final form of Ninth Amendment and whether Constitution had
drawn line between powers granted and rights reserved). Burnley argued that the
amendment, as revised, would be effective "if [Congress'] powers are not too extensive already, & so by protecting the rights of the people & of the States, an
improper extension of power will be prevented & safety made equally certain." Id.
Burnley's statement also confirms what is implicit in Madison's, namely that the
"rights of the people" are secured in exactly the same way the rights of the states

are secured, by the limited nature of the powers granted; both statements not only
presume that there is not a separate group of limitations on federal powers in favor
of the states and individuals, but also that there is not a set of affirmative limitations on federal powers packed into a jurisdiction-limiting provision. See id. (rejecting need to distinguish whether proposed amendments should operate as
reservations of rights or limitations on federal power); Letter from James Madison
to George Washington, supra note 105, at 1189-90 (discussing relative unimportance of characterizing amendments as rights retained or abridgment of federal
power).
262. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 325. The point here seems highly
inflated, for it is possible to recognize that the federalist arguments were overstated, and perhaps even influenced by the highly charged political struggle in
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Sweeping Clause, and only under such an interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, [that] the federalists' view that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary
and superfluous makes perfect sense." 263 As a simple matter of logic, the
flip-side of this proposition is equally valid: the acknowledgment that the
Bill of Rights was neither unnecessary nor superfluous, notwithstanding
the enumerated-powers scheme, suggests that the argument from limited
powers was never actually based on the inclusion of a rights-limitation jurisdictional provision in the power-granting section of the Constitution.
Yet this was the view adopted by a rather prominent federalist defender of the Constitution, James Madison. Although Madison advocated
the party line during the debates over ratification, in private correspondence to Jefferson he acknowledged that the argument against the need
for a bill of rights was somewhat overstated. 264 In the long run, of course,
Madison became the central figure in the efforts to amend the Constitution, and he presented a draft proposal of amendments to Congress on
June 8, 1789. In the course of his presentation, Madison summarized all
the main arguments advanced by both sides on the merits of a bill of
rights, including the argument that the enumerated-powers scheme adequately protected rights. This argument includes Madison's construction
of the Necessary and Proper Clause and bears directly on the broad jurisdictional interpretation offered by Lawson and Granger:
I admit that these arguments [from enumerated powers] are not
entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive to the
extent which has been supposed. It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed, they are directed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it
has certain extraordinary powers with respect to the means,
which may admit of abuse to a certain extent,... because in the

constitution of the United States there is a clause granting to
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the
government of the-United States, or in any department or officer
which they were engaged, without seeing them as fools and knaves, or even as
disingenuous. This appears to be the considered view of a prominent member of
their body, James Madison.
263. Id. at 326.
264. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in

11

THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON

299, 300 (William T. Hutcheson et al. eds., 1962)

[hereinafter MADISON'S PAPERS] (acknowledging that Madison did not view bill of
rights as superfluous to extent that other federalists had). Moreover, Madison acknowledged to Jefferson that his strongest reservation about bills of rights went to
their efficacy as a tool for limiting government-an argument suggestive that this
was the core reason that he had not been an advocate of a bill of rights at the
Convention. See id. (discussing potential for abuse of power despite "parchment
barrier" provided by bill of rights). Despite his reservations, Madison wrote that he
could support adding a bill of rights "provided it be so framed as not to imply
powers not meant to be included in the enumeration." Id.
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thereof; this enables them to [fulfill] every purpose for which the
Government was established. Now, may not laws be considered
necessary and proper by Congress, for it is for them who are to
judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special
purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in
themselves are neither necessary or proper; as well as improper
laws could be enacted by the state legislatures, for fulfilling the
more extended objects of those governments. I will state an instance which I think in point, and proves that this might be the
case. The general government has a right to pass all laws which
shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing
the collection are within the discretion of the legislature: may not
general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well
as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of
their constitutions the state governments had in view. If there
was reason for restraining the state governments from exercising
this power, there is like reason for restraining the federal
265
government.
Madison's argument to Congress acknowledges that the federalist reliance on the enumerated-powers scheme had not done justice to the possibilities for abuse inherent in the Constitution's grant of "certain
extraordinary powers with respect to the means" by which the enumerated
powers would be executed. 266 Strikingly, given the emphasis that Lawson
and Granger place on the distinction between the role of a bill of rights in
limiting general legislative power and the contrasting "internal" limits they
find in the Sweeping Clause, Madison justifies his partial rejection of the
federalist position by an extended comparison between the discretion
granted by the state and federal constitutions. In general terms, Madison
argued that just as the general grant of power to state legislatures may
"admit of abuse ... to an indefinite extent," so might the more limited
grants of power to Congress "admit of abuse to a certain extent," within
the boundaries suggested by the limited objects as to which it might regulate. 2 67 Extending the analogy, Madison suggests that just as the Framers
265. Madison, supra note 3, at 82-83.
266. Id. at 82.
267. Id. Madison's argument tracks perfectly with the comparison that Wilson drew when he acknowledged that a freedom of the press guarantee would have
been essential had Congress been granted a general power, similar to the Commerce Clause, to regulate literary publications. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 16768 (arguing that specific grant of "liberty of the press" would be nullity and possibly construed as implication that such liberty was given by state). Wilson stated:
"With respect likewise to the particular district of ten miles, which is to be made
the seat of federal government, it will undoubtedly be proper to observe this salutary precaution [of a free press guarantee], as there the legislative power will be
exclusively lodged in the ...United States." Id. The clear implication of Wilson's
argument comparing a hypothetical power to regulate literary publications with
the general power Congress would have within the district is that the need to se-
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of the state constitutions could have supposed that a general legislature
might have its purposes for authorizing general search warrants, such warrants could equally be thought to further the end of enforcing revenue
laws of the nation. 268 Madison concludes that the prohibition on general
warrants, as provided in what would become the Fourth Amendment, is
justified for precisely the same reasons that such a provision was considered necessary "for restraining the State Governments from exercising this
269
power."
Madison's analysis strikes a fair balance between the federalist's somewhat inflated claims about the rights-protective capacity of enumerated
powers and the overblown antifederalist claims that the Constitution
portended an unlimited national government. For at least a century, the
federal government under the Constitution remained a government directed toward a relatively few objects of national concern, suggesting that
the federalist defense of the omission of a bill of rights was not wholly
cure specific rights against the wrongful exercise of power actually granted to govemnment applies both to governments of general or enumerated powers (to the
extent that the powers actually enumerated raise the potential of threatening particular rights). Madison is making the same comparison. See Madison, supra note
3, at 82 (arguing in favor of bill of rights because even though powers of federal
government are circumscribed it possesses "certain extraordinary powers with respect to the means" that are as susceptible to abuse as general powers possessed by
state governments).
268. Madison, supra note 3, at 82-83.
269. Id. Lawson and Granger focus their attention exclusively on Madison's
description of potential abuses as involving laws that "in themselves are neither
necessary nor proper," and they draw from his use of the language of the Sweeping
Clause the conclusion that he was justifying this limiting provision only by reference to a potential misconstruction of the scope of authorization contained in the
clause. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 323 n.229 (contending that
Madison's hypothetical raises concern about potential misreading of scope of authorization granted by Necessary and Proper Clause). This conclusion, however, is
implausible for several reasons. First, the premise of Madison's analysis was that
the federalists' argument against the necessity of a bill of rights was not completely
accurate. If Madison were alluding only to unanticipated misconstruction of the
constitutional design, he would not have suggested that the federalist argument
was flawed, but only that additional safeguards may prove useful. Second, Madison
is clearly referring to the potential abuse of a legal grant of discretion over legislative means; he never suggests that such abuses were already prohibited by the
Constitution.
Third, Madison's extended comparison to state legislative power, as summarized above, confirms that he was referring to the possibility of legislative bodies
exercising granted authority to enact laws that are improper even though legally
within their grants of authority. Madison, supra note 3, at 82 ("[E]ven if the [general] government keeps within [its] limits, it has certain extraordinary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent. ... "). Considering that Madison used the term "improper" to refer to state laws, as well as hypothetical acts of Congress, it is clear that he was not using the term in a legal and
jurisdictional sense, for his point was that state legislative authority to enact such
laws necessitated bills of rights just as Congress' executory authority necessitated a
federal bill of rights. For a further discussion of Madison's views regarding the
potential abuse of the general government's authority, see infra notes 282-83 and
accompanying text.
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implausible. At the same time, it is difficult to deny the force of the
antifederalist argument that, to use a single example, if it was essential to
secure the right to jury trial in federal criminal cases, it was equally essential to secure the other procedural rights traditionally associated with due
process of law. The federalists never managed any effective responses to
such arguments. Even as to rights in which the federalist arguments seem
stronger, such as freedom of religion and the press, cases like the inaugural free speech cases of the modern era, in which general criminal statutes
designed to support the war effort in World War I were challenged under
the First Amendment, illustrate that Madison's general conclusion regarding the potential reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause is well270
grounded.
270. But cf Barnett, supra note 26, at 780 (modifying antifederalist argument
and concluding that unamended Constitution would allow government invasion of
positive rights). Barnett relies on Madison's descriptive catalogue of provisions
contained in a bill of rights, including both inalienable natural rights and "positive
rights." See Madison, supra note 3, at 81 (including trial by jury as positive right).
Focusing on Madison's example of general warrants, Barnett concludes that government invasion of such positive rights "would have to be expressly prohibited to
be improper." Barnett, supra note 26, at 780. According to Barnett, however,
Madison was still presuming that "interference with the natural right of freedom of
speech would have been improper without the greater caution provided by what
became the First Amendment." Id. Although Madison did so catalogue bill of
rights provisions, he does not purport to rely on any such distinction in advancing
his argument as to the need for a bill of rights based on the potential abuse of
discretion granted by the Sweeping Clause. See Madison, supra note 3, at 82 (arguing that bill of rights would protect rights against abuse of power by general government without distinguishing between natural rights and positive rights).
Moreover, Madison's language comparing the state and federal constitutions was
general in nature and referred to bill of rights guarantees that either might include. See id. at 282-83 (comparing similar potential abuse of power under both
federal constitution and state constitutions). Finally, Madison justified the Constitution's prohibition on religious tests for holding federal offices as an essential
qualification of Congress' implied authority to establish qualifications-as an exception to a specific granted power, rather than as a mere cautionary guarantee.
Yet freedom of religion, or "conscience" as it was often called in this period, would
have been considered an inalienable natural right, one that Barnett insists would
have been covered by the requirement that all executory laws be proper as well as
necessary. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 780 (characterizing right to freedom of
speech as natural right, which could not be interfered with even in absence of First
Amendment).
Nor does Barnett's explanation of Madison's argument square with his own
prior analysis. At an earlier time, Barnett concluded, based on Madison's argument, that the potential for congressional abuse of discretion as to the means for
accomplishing delegated ends explained the need for both the Bill of Rights and
the Ninth Amendment. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: UnenumeratedRights and the
Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 615, 635 n.74 (1991) (stating that Madison
argued for bill of rights as one way to police abuse of discretionary powers given to
general government). Accordingly, an implication was that both the Bill of Rights
in general, and the Ninth Amendment in particular, should be read through this
Madisonian lens rather than through the lens of the losing argument against a bill
of rights based on the enumerated powers scheme. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 1,
10, 14-20 (characterizing limited powers scheme as "a losing argument against
enumerating any constitutional rights" and advocating what author calls "power-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

75

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43: p. 17

Madison's analysis, moreover, is consistent with the alternatives to the
broad jurisdictional reading of the Sweeping Clause, as described above,
but cannot be reconciled with the broad jurisdictional reading proffered
by Lawson and Granger. 27 1 It is Madison's analysis, however, that comports with the weight of the evidence from the historical record, which
includes both a pattern of design running from the Articles of Confederation to Article I of the Constitution and the Framers' understanding of the
enumerated powers scheme in the design of the Constitution.
3.

The Threat to Rights Presented by a Bill of Rights

The Framers' understanding of the enumerated powers scheme and
the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause is further clarified by the
ratification-era discussion of the potential threat that a bill of rights might
pose to the rights thought to be retained by the federal system. After contending that the Constitution granted the federal government no control
over the press, James Wilson argued that a free-press provision might not
only be nugatory, but might even be construed "to imply that some degree
of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent."2 72 Notice
that one of the assumptions underlying this argument is the premise that
one purpose of the guarantees contained in a bill of rights is to define the
extent of a granted power by limiting the scope of its application. Bills of
rights, as Madison later explained, "limit and qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
2 73
Wilgovernment ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode."
son thus makes a fairly compelling point in suggesting that a free press
guarantee might logically be taken as an exception to a presumed or implied power, thereby generating a construction of power where none was
274
intended.
Subsequently, Wilson and others offered an even more expansive variation on the same theme. Just as an express limitation on a nonexistent
power might raise an inference that such a power had in fact been
granted, the inclusion of a comprehensive bill of rights that enumerates
constraint" conception in favor of bill of rights). In none of these prior works did
Barnett suggest any critical distinction between positive and natural rights as a key
to understanding Madison's argument or the asserted need to include limiting
provisions as a device to prevent congressional abuse of the discretionary means
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
271. For a further discussion of the alternatives to the broad jurisdictional
reading of the Sweeping Clause, see supra notes 249-65 and accompanying text.
272. Wilson, supra note 177, at 167-68.
273. Madison, supra note 3, at 81.
274. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 167-68 (arguing that specific grant of "liberty of the press" would be nullity and possibly construed as implication that some
power over liberty of press was given by state to general government); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 575, 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(stating that proposed bill of rights was not only unnecessary, but dangerous, reasoning, "[w]hy declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do?").
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multiple unnecessary provisions would present the risk of completely reversing the governing premise of enumerated powers that all not granted
was retained. 275 Thus, a federalist slogan became that, although under
the proposed Constitution "every thing not granted is reserved," an attempt to comprehensively enumerate the people's rights would raise the
inference "that every thing omitted is given to the general
government."

276

Far from resisting the premises of Wilson's argument, his antifederalist opponents suggested that the argument raised serious doubts about the
validity of Wilson's original claim that under the Constitution all powers
not granted were retained by the states and the people. For example, the
Federal Farmer observed that Article I, Section 9 prohibited Congress
from granting titles of nobility, notwithstanding that a power to grant such
tides was not included among the grants of power in Article I, Section
8.277 From this starting point, he reasons along lines very similar to
Wilson:
Why then by a negative clause, restrain congress from doing what
it would have no power to do? This clause, then, must have no
meaning, or imply, that were it omitted, congress would have the
power in question, either upon the principle that some general
words in the constitution may be so construed as to give it, or on
the principle that congress possess the powers not expressly
reserved.

2 78

In light of their own argument about the dangers posed by a bill of
rights, the inclusion of what was in effect a partial bill of rights became a
source of embarrassment to the federalists. As Leonard Levy has observed, "[t] he protection of some rights opened the Federalists to devastating rebuttal," and the "danger argument" thus "boomeranged" on the
Constitution's defenders. 279 Patrick Henry argued, for example, that the
inclusion of various rights "reverses the position of the friends of this Con275. SeeJames Wilson, Proceedings and Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
382, 387-88, 389 (arguing against necessity of including bill of rights in proposed
constitution). Thus, Wilson was referring to a bill of rights when he asserted that
"[a] proposition to adopt a measure, that would have supposed that we were
throwing into the general government every power not expressly reserved by the
people would have been spumed at, in that house [in which the Convention had
been held], with the greatest indignation." Id.
276. James Madison, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 24, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 19, at 616; see McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at
1249-59 (discussing thoroughly this federalist argument against bill of rights).
277. See LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 323, 326
(arguing, with specific examples, that Constitution violates principle that powers
not enumerated are reserved).
278. Id.
279. LEVY, supra note 7, at 160.
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stitution, that every thing is retained which is not given up; for, instead of
this, every thing is given up which is not expressly reserved. '2 80 Given that
any risks posed by a bill of rights had already been created by the enumeration of rights in the Constitution, it followed that a bill of rights "could do
28 1
no harm, but might do much good."
The federalist struggle to answer this rebuttal is extremely instructive
as to their understanding of the enumerated powers scheme and, only
somewhat less directly, of the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In
a February 1788 letter to James Madison, Edmund Randolph posed the
very question that federalist opposition to a bill of rights had given rise to:
"Does not the exception as to a religious test [for any office under the
authority of the United States] imply that Congress by the general words
had power over religion?" 28 2 On April 10, Madison responded in the negative, contending that the religious test prohibition implied "nothing
more than that without that exception a power would have been given to
impose an oath involving a religious test as a qualification for office. The
constitution of necessary offices being given to Congress, the proper qualifications seem to be evidently involved." 283 According to Madison, the distinction between the limitations included in the Constitution and those
proposed for a bill of rights was precisely that those already included were
necessary exceptions to authority implicit in the granted powers, not exceptions to nonexistent or general powers that might give rise to an inference of new or extended powers to the detriment of the enumerated284
powers scheme.
Far from abuses such as religious tests being prohibited by the grant
of limited powers, understood as including the rights-protective requirement that executory laws be proper as well as necessary, Madison's analysis
makes it clear that such laws might well be adopted in the absence of a
280. Henry, supra note 34, at 406-61; accord Letter from Arthur Lee (Oct. 29,
1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 510, 510 (arguing that "[t]he want of a promised declaration of rights" was important defect,
because "exceptions in the Body of [the Constitution], . . . in which no power is
expressly given, implies that every thing not excepted is given").
281. A REviEW OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION BY A
FEDERAL REPUBLICAN (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 41, at 67, 86.
282. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Feb. 29, 1788), quoted

in,

ROBERT

J.

MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF

RIGHTS 141 (1988); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (mandating that both state and

federal government officials be bound by oath to support United States Constitution but prohibiting application of religious tests as qualification for public office).
283. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 10, 1788), in 9
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 730, 731; see U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that U.S. officers not provided for in Constitution may be
established by law, thereby giving Congress power to establish offices).
284. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 283, at
730-31 (specifically referring to provision under discussion as exception to powers
granted by Constitution).
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specific limiting provision.28 5 Accordingly, even though a comprehensive
bill of rights might well be superfluous, as well as dangerous, the specific
limits included in the proposed Constitution were neither. Randolph
took Madison's insight and ran with it. At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, he provided an analysis of virtually every important limiting clause in
the Constitution in the attempt to show that each one "is an exception,
not from general powers, but from the particular powers therein
28 6
vested.
The key to resolving the controversy over the risks of inserting rights
that might be unnecessary was in the recognition that, ultimately, it had to
be confronted as an issue separate and apart from the larger debate over
whether the limited-powers scheme was drafted with sufficient precision to
effectively secure fundamental rights. The only way to bring James
Madison and Patrick Henry together was to agree to amend the Constitution to include additional individual rights guarantees, as Henry insisted,
and to add an unprecedented provision that would prohibit any inference
extending Congress' powers from the inclusion of specific exceptions
without begging the question as to whether any particular guarantee was
an essential exception to a granted power or an arguably unnecessary limit
on an unintended power.2 87 This is, of course, exactly what happened at
the Virginia Ratifying Convention. James Madison and Patrick Henry
served on a committee that was charged with drafting proposed amendments to the Constitution and that drafted language which confronted
this very problem:
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise
certain powers, be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to
extend the powers of Congress; but that they be construed either

285. See id. Given that the religious-test limitation would have implicated a
fundamental natural right-freedom of conscience-under the jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, Madison should patiently have explained to
Randolph that no such power had ever been granted to Congress and that the
provision was at most a cautionary provision that was declaratory of the limited
power actually granted in any event. There is no such view, however, in Madison's
response.
286. Randolph, supra note 177, at 463-64; see id. at 464-65 (illustrating how
various clauses in Constitution are exceptions to specific powers expressly granted
to Congress in Constitution rather than exceptions to "general power"). Lawson
and Granger cite to Randolph's argument, but appear to miss its implications as to
the federalist view of the relationship between the powers granted and the limits
included in the text of the Constitution. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at
318 n.206 (citing Randolph's argument for proposition that textual protection of
free speech is unnecessary because no constitutional provision interferes with that
right).
287. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 264, at 299,
300 (stating that Madison would be in favor of bill of rights if "it be so framed as
not to imply powers not meant to be in the enumeration").
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as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be
288
the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.
The proposed amendment provided for every contingency and
doubt. Individual rights guarantees might prove in many instances, as suggested by the federalists, to be non-essential, or as "inserted merely for
greater caution." 28 9 Depending in part on the reach of federal powers, as
construed by authoritative interpreters, some provisions would be "exceptions to the specified powers."290 For the purposes of this proposed
amendment, however, the category in which any guarantee would fall was
less important than the recognition that, under either construction of the
included guarantees, such limiting provisions should not be construed as
suggesting powers not included in the enumeration of powers contained
in Article I, as understood in connection with the Necessary and Proper
29
Clause. '
This Virginia proposal, from which Madison drafted the Ninth
Amendment, confirms the measure of consensus achieved despite the
heated debate over the inclusion of a bill of rights. Both sides eventually
acknowledged that the powers granted by the Constitution might in some
instances be subject to abuse, which justified the inclusion of limiting provisions creating exceptions to granted powers. 292 They also concurred
that there may be purpose in adding guarantees that were arguably not
essential because of the limited scope of federal power, if for no other
reason than to reassure those who were uncertain whether federal power
might be construed broadly enough to permit encroachment on an im288. Amendments Proposed at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 27,
1788), in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 844 (listing amendments to Constitution
proposed by Committee of Virginia Ratifying Convention, including statement
that any provision limiting Congress' power shall not be interpreted to otherwise
extend Congress' power).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id. (prohibiting inference that Congress' power is extended because
of limiting provision without regard to whether such extension would abridge natural or positive rights).
292. See LETrER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 323, 326
(anticipating, by several months, Virginia's proposed resolution). The Federal
Farmer first argues that the federalist claim that enumerated powers provide an
adequate substitute for a bill of rights was overstated, especially given the inclusion
of limiting provisions such as the prohibition on granting titles of nobility when
such power was not included in the enumerated powers. See id. (noting that negative clause serves no purpose unless Congress would otherwise be empowered to
act). Even if such a limiting provision, however, did not imply the existence of a
power from which it was excepted, it suggested the value of another kind of provision: "But this clause was in the confederation, and is said to be introduced into
the constitution from very great caution. Even a cautionary provision implies a
doubt, at least, that it is necessary; and if so in this case, clearly it is also alike
necessary in all similar ones." Id.
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portant right.29

3

Given the common denominator that delegated powers

that are potentially subject to abuse should be limited by the written constitution, disagreement as to the nature and extent of power actually
granted became less central; in other words, it was determined that reassurance could be given to both sides of the debate. As the Virginia proposal suggests, neither the debate nor its resolution proceeded on the basis

of anyone's claim that all limiting provisions, or even all guarantees in
favor of fundamental rights, were basically pointless because the Constitu29 4
tion included a general limiting provision in favor of individual rights.
D.

The Sweeping Clause, the Bill of Rights and the Balance Between
Government "Energy" and the Protection of Individual Rights

Lawson and Granger assert not only that their broad jurisdictional
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the most reasonable explanation of the Framers' insistence that the enumerated-powers scheme secures fundamental rights, but that it "is consistent with
almost everything we know about the Constitution's design." 295 The burden of this discussion is to show that the introduction of a wild card into
the system of delegated and reserved powers is the last thing that the
Framers of the Constitution would have intended. Also, this section illustrates that an open-ended limiting provision runs counter not only to the
central idea of a written constitution, but also the Framers' views about the
need to carefully strike a balance between the claims made on behalf of
popular rights and the need for power and energy to accomplish the important purposes of government. 29 6 The Framers would much rather
have relied upon the political and institutional checks built into the structure of government created by the Constitution than to have introduced
29 7
an open-ended and potentially dangerous general limiting provision.
293. See id. It might be thought that the federalists' denial of the necessity of
a bill of rights-whether rooted in a belief in inherent rights, a power-limiting
jurisdictional provision (as suggested by Lawson and Granger) or a relatively strict
construction of national power--entailed a belief that any or all limiting provisions were cautionary at best. The explanation by Madison and Randolph, however, of why limiting provisions did not generate the danger anticipated by
opponents of a bill of rights and Madison's explanation of the need for additional
limiting provisions before Congress, confirm that the debate concerned the
number of limiting provisions actually required, rather than whether any were
needed at all.
294. Amendments Proposed at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note
288, at 840-45 (listing proposed amendments advocated by Virginia Convention,
which included both limiting provisions and declarations of fundamental rights).
295. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 315 (asserting that jurisdictional interpretation of Sweeping Clause is necessary to make sense of federalists' advocation of Constitution without bill of rights).
296. For a discussion of the need to strike a balance between preserving rights
and establishing an effective government, see infra notes 299-322 and accompanying text.
297. For a further discussion on the Framers' reliance on these political and
institutional checks, see infra notes 304-22 and accompanying text.
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These conclusions are confirmed by the Framers' statements of general
philosophy about government power and popular rights, their deliberate
decisions (and the rationales for those decisions) to omit from the Constitution widely accepted limitations on government power and the conservative approach taken by controlling figures in the process of drafting and
298
ratifying amendments to the Constitution.
1.

Striking the Balance Between Energy and Liberty

The formalistic legal arguments that dominated the debate over the
necessity for a bill of rights only partly obscured the very real differences
between the contending forces about the potential costs of placing legal
restrictions on government in the Constitution and the disagreements
they held over the appropriateness of particular limitations. For the federalists, the overriding purpose of the Constitutional Convention in Phila299
delphia was to create a government of greater energy and efficiency,
and the urgency of this goal was often reiterated in defense of the Constitution and, in particular, the decision to omit a bill of rights. 300 In their
minds, the goal of adequately empowering government served the end of
liberty as much as it served the end of meeting needs for national security
and strength. 30 1 In a standard formulation, Madison observed that "lib298. For a further discussion of the Framers' statements, decisions and approach, see infra notes 299-314, 327-88 and accompanying text.

299. See LEW, supra note 7, at 150 (observing that in minds of those most
responsible for Constitution "[t] he principal task of the Convention was to provide
for an effective national government by redistributing the powers of governGOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 238 (1971) (stating that

ment"); see also JULIUS

constitutional convention notes reflect that "no word in the vocabulary of contemporary politics was used less often" than liberty because "I n ] either the task nor the
idiom of discussion required it"); WOOD supra note 90, at 544 (observing that
many federalists proceeded on assumption that well-constituted republican government was "shield and protector" of liberty and that establishing government
with ample authority aided cause of justice and liberty).
300. See, e.g., James Wilson, Proceedings and Debates of the Pennsylvania
Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supa note
23, at 550, 552-53 (disputing claim made by minority that Constitution's opponents were "contending for the rights of mankind"). Wilson described existing
conditions as: "Without a government! without energy! without confidence internally! without respect externally! the advantages of society were lost to thee!" Id.
301. See id. ("Thy various interests were neglected-thy most sacred rights
were insecure."); see also Edmund Pendleton, Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 4,
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 35, 37 (arguing that there is "no
quarrel between government and liberty" because government "is the shield and
protector" of liberty and war is "between government and licentiousness, faction,
turbulence, and other violations of the rules of society, to preserve liberty"); Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 16, 1788), in 2 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 87, at 775, 777 (stating proposed government "secures the liberty of the
citizen" and checks "that excessive licentiousness which has resulted from the relaxation of our laws"). According to Randolph, licentiousness "had produced tyranny" and "contributed as much (if not more) as any other cause whatsoever to

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/6

82

McAffee: The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Mo
1998]

FEDERAL SYSTEM AS BILL OF RIGHTS

erty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of
power," and "the former rather than the latter is apparently most to be
apprehended by the United States." 30 2 Federalists continually reminded
their audience of the social contract theory that the people must necessarily cede some of their natural rights "to vest [government] with requisite
303
powers."

Underlying this rhetoric was the fear that the demand for a bill of
rights might divert the people "from the main task of providing themselves
with effective government." 30 4 Believing that they had already struck the
appropriate balance between granting necessary powers and providing sufficient safeguards for liberty,3 0 5 federalists feared that the attempt to provide a bill of rights would needlessly undermine the prospects for ratifying
the Constitution in generating controversy over which safeguards would
be added and in what form. 3 0 6 Worse yet, they feared that the amending
the loss of... liberties." Randolph, supra,at 777; seeJohn Marshall, Debates in the
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (June 10, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 222, 226
(noting that "friends of the Constitution are as tenacious of liberty as its enemies,"
and that government is empowered "to secure and protect it").
302. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 422, 428-29 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); see id. at 426 (referring to need to "blend stability with liberty").
303. See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting that "[n]othing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of Government" and that "the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in
order to vest it with requisite powers"); ARCHIBALD MACLAINE, PUBLICOLA: AN ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF NORTH CAROLINA

(March 20, 1788), reprinted in 16

RATI-

supra note 23, at 435, 437 (stating that people
"must, in order to obtain protection, give up some of their natural liberty, in order
to secure the rest"). Publicola noted that the tendency was for "small states" to
retain more, but to be "more subject to violence and oppression" from powerful
neighbors; therefore, he touted the benefits of empowering the union to accomplish larger purposes. Id.; cf James Bowdoin, Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(Feb. 6, 1788), in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 290 n.15
("[A]s all government is founded on relinquishment of personal rights in a certain
degree, there was a clear impropriety in being very particular about them.").
304. HerbertJ. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in How DOES THE
CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?, supra note 2, at 28.
305. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan.
11, 1788), in 3 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 569 (arguing
against necessity of including Bill of Rights in Constitution). Parsons argued that
the proposed Constitution
grant[s] such powers as if properly exercised will accomplish the best
good and greatest happiness of the members and.., sufficiently guard [s]
against an undue use [of those powers and preserves] as much political
and civil liberty ... as we have reasonably to expect from a constitution
where so many different interests are to be consulted, and in a case where
union is necessary.
Id.
306. See WooD supra note 90, at 537 (suggesting federalist opposition to bill of
rights actually reflected belief "that the frenzied advocacy of a bill of rights by most
antifederalists masked a basic desire to dilute the power of the national government in favor of the states"). Given that bills of rights had been as much about
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
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process could yield provisions that would upset the balance between the
competing values of securing requisite powers for government and pre30 7
serving the people's rights.
Almost immediately after the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention, two of the Constitution's prominent defenders, Roger Sherman
and Oliver Ellsworth, contended that the Convention's purpose had been
"to provide for the energy of government on the one hand, and suitable
checks on the other hand, to secure the rights of the particular states, and
the liberties and properties of the citizens. '30 8 The Constitution's drafters
attempted to strike this essential balance by two broad and rather distinct
strategies. In the first instance, they relied upon various structural and
political safeguards to supplement and strengthen the security against arbitrary government provided by representative government. 309 Given
declaring first principles as to the collective rights of the people, as about securing
individual liberty, the fear of eliminating the federalism balance of the proposed
constitution fits logically into the idea of opposing a bill of rights. Moreover,
whatever the precise nature of their fears, the federalists exhibited greater concern
about the risks attendant to limiting the national government than to the risks to
basic liberties presented by the Constitution; that their goal was to achieve an appropriate balance, rather than to establish a clear priority for personal liberty, is
reflected in the federalism debate as well as in the debate about specific limiting
provisions to guarantee individual rights.
307. See, e.g., James Bowdoin, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 23,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 81-87 (expressing view that there is
"clear impropriety" in creating exceptions to government powers because such exceptions could prevent government "from doing what the private, as well as the
public and general, good of the citizens and states might require"). Bowdoin recognized what some modern minds have difficulty grasping: the proliferation of
rights guarantees raises the prospect of rights in conflict and may hamper government from protecting the rights of some.
308. Letter from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
471, 471.
309. See generally LEVW, supra note 7, at 150 (discussing features of Constitution
designed to protect states and people from potentially abusive federal government,
including right to trial by jury in criminal cases, bans on titles of nobility, guaranteed privileges and immunities for citizens of each state while in other states, representative government, ban against taxation without representation and
separation of powers); Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 64 CmI.-KENT L. RFv. 89, 106 (1988) (listing features of U.S. republican system that are designed to protect natural rights); Jennifer Nedelsky, The
Protection of Property in the Origins and Development of the American Constitution, in To
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 38, 61-65

(Herman Belz et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter cited as PERFECT UNION] (discussing
Madison's conception of representative government to prevent popular injustice
and balance tension between political liberty and private rights); WOOD,supra note
90, at 547-62 (discussing federalists' reliance on governmental checks and balances
and bicameral system in arguing in favor of ratification of Constitution). Although
Madison and others involved in drafting and defending the Constitution looked
primarily to supplemental safeguards, an important theme among a number of the
defenders of the Constitution was actually that a bill of rights is largely irrelevant in
authentic republican government. See, e.g., An Independent Freeholder, WINCHESTER
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widespread skepticism about the efficacy of the "parchment barriers" supplied by limiting provisions, 310 the Framers placed their greatest confidence in structural features such as a bicameral legislature (including its
respective chambers' varied terms of office) and the system of checks and
balances, as well as the political safeguard provided by the extended na311
ture of the republic created by the Constitution.
More formally, but less centrally, they relied upon the substantive limits to federal authority that they perceived to be inherent in the grant of
limited powers and the relatively small number of provisions establishing
specific limitations on the powers granted. Notwithstanding the federalist
arguments that fundamental rights were not endangered by the limited
powers granted to the national government, they often acknowledged that
various powers given to the national government could lend themselves to
various kinds of abuse, both legal and illegal. 312 Common rejoinders to
arguments from the risks of such abuse were the basic observations that all
power can be abused and that this risk of abuse must always be weighed
against the dangers presented by the failure to grant power that was essential to accomplish the important ends of government. 31 3 They also
VA. GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 23, at 310, 311 (arguing that because Americans "have not been able to divest
ourselves of our early ideas," they mistakenly think "it is equally meritorious to clog
the wheels of government in this country, to circumscribe the legislature, though
constituted and chosen by ourselves" to same extent as "the people of England

have circumscribed the power of their kings").
310. See, e.g., Nicholas, supra note 177, at 449-50 (contending that bills of
rights provide no security against abuse of power because their provisions are "but
a paper check"). See generally McAffee, supra note 82, at 290-91 (arguing that federalists, skeptical of "parchment barriers," sought "clarity, explicitness, and specificity
in stating the nature and limits of government power" (citing Cecilia M. Kenyon,
Introduction to THE ANTIFEDERALISTS lXxv-lxxvi (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966))).

311. See THE

FEDERALIST

No. 9, at 50, 51-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.

Cooke ed., 1961) (focusing on checks and balances, an independent judiciary, republican government and "enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are

to revolve," i.e., the extended republic);

THE FEDERALIST

No. 49, at 332 (James

Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (referring to strategy for avoiding absorption
of all power by legislature-connecting and blending powers to achieve effective
separation of powers "essential to a free government").
312. For a further discussion of the Framers' awareness that the Constitution
granted powers to the national government to act inconsistent with at least some of
the traditional rights that many regarded as fundamental, see infra notes 330-32
and accompanying text.
313. See Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10,

1787), in 7

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23, at 152, 154 (stating

that he had "never yet been able to discover the propriety of placing it absolutely
out of the power of men to render essential Services, because a possibility remains
of their doing ill"); James Iredell, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 26,
1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 95 (arguing that "[n]o power, of
any kind or degree, can be given but what may be abused" and that keys are to
"consider whether any particular power is absolutely necessary" and to recognize
that "possible abuses [of powers] ought not to be pointed out, without at the same
time considering their use").
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pointed to the checks provided by democratic government and the struc314
tural features of the Constitution.
For their part, the antifederalist critics of the Constitution believed
that their opponents held too much regard for the necessity of empowering government and too little for the need to preserve the people's
rights.3 1 5 A central antifederalist theme was the idea that individuals entered into the social contract to obtain greater security for their rights, not
to relinquish them all to government.3 16 Despite these real and important
differences of emphasis, and in assessment of whether the Constitution
would likely pose a threat to liberty, the need to balance collective need
and individual liberty was acknowledged by the Constitution's critics as
well as its defenders. Thus, George Mason and Patrick Henry both objected to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, which they construed as
prohibiting retroactive civil laws, on the ground that there may be occa3 17
sions when such laws would be justified by public necessity.
314. See Wilson, supra note 221, at 514, 515 (opposing argument that assumed
abuse by general government). Reacting to the extreme nature of the predictions
offered by the Constitution's critics, Wilson asserted that when the Convention was
formed it was not supposed that "the legislature under this Constitution would be
an association of demons." Id. at 515.
315. See LET-ER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 323, 329
("[M]any of us are quite disposed to barter [our freedom] away for what we call
energy, coercion, and some other terms we use as vaguely as that of liberty.");
MENTOR (Apr. 3, 1788), reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 23, at 578, 579 (stating that, given powers granted and justifications offered,
"[A]re we not to think that our rights and liberties, our instruction and welfare,
are no longer leading objects in the eyes of those we have set over us ...?"); Letter
from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, supra note 99, at 295 (stating that he
was "grieved to see that too many look at the Rights of the people as a Miser examines a Security to find a flaw in it!").
316. See, e.g., MERCY WARREN, A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 1787), reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 23, at 272, 278 (quoting oft-cited statement of Blackstone that "the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the absolute fights which were
vested in them by the immediate laws of nature"). Although some of the differences of opinion in this competing rhetoric reflected opposing descriptive assessments of the extent of power granted by the Constitution, some of their debate was
normative and substantive, and it is clear that the federalists erred on the side of
government, and especially on the need to empower the national government, to a
larger extent than their antifederalist opponents.
317. See Copy of George Mason's Objections to the Constitution Sent to
George Washington (Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 23, at 346, 350 (objecting to prohibition against ex post facto laws because public safety requires them); Patrick Henry, Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 15, 1788), in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 802-03 (questioning fate of old
Continental paper dollars as example of need for ex post facto laws). It should be
underscored that George Mason was the principle drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which included a general declaration in favor of natural rights, and
the foremost advocate of the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution. See 13
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 346-47 (relating Mason's advocacy of bill of rights and describing influence of Mason's "Objections to the
Constitution"). It seems especially significant that an assumption underlying his
objection to this clause is that, absent such a provision, the matter would be left to
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Given their commitment to balancing the need to limit government
with the need to empower it, it seems clear that the Framers would have
opposed a proposal to include a general limiting provision on behalf of
popular rights, precisely because it would present a serious risk of skewing
the balance. From the process of drafting the Constitution through the
process of adopting amendments to the Constitution, the Framers exhibited a wariness of including unwarranted limitations on government.
Thus, at the Philadelphia Convention, the Committee of Detail stated in
an introduction to a draft of the Constitution that one of its purposes was
"[t]o insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be [accommodated] to times and events." 3 18 The
concern expressed by the committee had at least two dimensions. First,
there was the fear that absolute prohibitions might prove dangerously inflexible or in a crisis lead to disregard for, and ultimately the undermining
of, the Constitution. As Madison wrote to Jefferson, "I am inclined to
think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided."319 Second, the Framers
were deeply concerned that only provisions that could be permanent
should be included in the Constitution. The federalists "endeavored to
exclude from the Constitution such rules and structures as would need to
3 20
be adapted flexibly to changes in American society."

Although the federalists were insistent that the powers delegated did
not extend to the fundamental natural rights as to which concerns were
being expressed, the historical record is equally clear that they deliberately
omitted some traditional rights that they understood to be within the
reach of powers granted to the national government. 321 Considering the
specific powers delegated by the Constitution, these omissions implicitly
recognized discretionary authority in Congress that could be used to redefine, or even to eliminate, the rights in question. Moreover, these omissions reflect that, although the federalists argued that a bill of rights was
legislative discretion to the extent that Congress' powers extended to the particular object of legislation. Mason would have equally opposed a general limiting
provision that would have empowered courts to impose the same restriction on
government authority based on general reasoning.
318. See 2 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 222,
at 137; Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution'sAccommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REV. 239, 277 (1989) (noting that Committee of Detail wanted to include

only essential principles in Constitution to avoid bogging down government's
operation).
319. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 264, at 300
(applying this general idea to proposal for limit on legislative authority as to standing armies in peacetime). The same general concern explained George Mason's
adamant opposition to the prohibition on ex post facto laws.
320. Hamburger, supra note 318, at 275. Hamburger states that, to the Framers, "[r]ules that had to be mutable required the flexibility of ordinary law." Id.
321. For a discussion of specific examples, see infra notes 323-88 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary to secure many important rights and might even pose a danger to rights secured by the enumerated-powers scheme, they also feared
that rights guarantees could harm the nation if unreasonable and inflexible limiting provisions were included in the Constitution.
One of the most pervasive objections to the Constitution during the
struggle over ratification concerned the omission of provisions guaranteeing the right to trial byjury in civil cases and prohibiting the establishment
of a standing army in peacetime. The federalists, however, did not contend that these traditional rights were secured by the concept of limited
powers, let alone the Necessary and Proper Clause; rather, they defended
the Convention's decision to omit these particular limits on government
power. 322 Their arguments confirm that, within the confines of the powers granted by the Constitution, Congress was intended to have a broad
discretion over the means to authorized ends, subject to the limits specified in the Constitution itself. A review of the debate regarding these two
critical omissions is, therefore, most helpful in understanding the general
philosophy and structural design of the Framers.
2.

CivilJuries and StandingArmies: The Rights Omitted

If careful attention is paid to the federalist arguments about the omission of rights, an important distinction emerges. As we have seen with a
number of omitted rights, such as the guarantee of a free press, the federalists clearly and unequivocally argue that the Constitution does not grant
any power that might properly be read as authorizing the abridgment of
the right. 323 In other cases, however, the Constitution's defenders offer

an entirely different set of assurances as to why the people need not fear
the power granted by the Constitution. In the second category of cases,
the federalist arguments proceed on the premise, sometimes assumed but
often made explicit, that a delegated power had granted discretionary authority to Congress as to the degree of protection that would be given to
the right under discussion. 32 4 In such cases, the arguments in defense of
the omission of the right rested on justifications for not restricting legislative discretion, as well as on the mechanisms that would prevent serious
32 5
abuses from the discretion actually granted.
322. For a discussion of the federalists' defense of these omissions, see infra
notes 326-61 and accompanying text.
323. For examples, see supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
324. For a discussion of various examples, see infra notes 326-61 and accompanying text.
325. The claims set forth in text are later developed at some length but it is
striking how much this general analysis is confirmed by the different treatment
given to these various rights when they are taken up together. Following a pattern
established by George Mason, critics frequently complained of the omission of declarations "for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by jury in civil causes,
[and] against the danger of standing armies in time of peace." George Mason,

George Mason's Objections (Nov. 21, 1787), in 14
TION,

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-

supra note 23, at 149, 151. By contrast to the antifederalist tendency to
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Trial by Jury in Civil Cases

The classic example of this distinctive argument is the federalist defense of the omission of a right to trial by jury in civil cases. By almost any
account, this right would fit among the fights that Lawson and Granger
take to be secured by the limits established in the Sweeping Clause. The
jury trial right clearly ranked among the most fundamental of the rights of
Englishmen. 326 From the demands made at the Constitutional Convention 327 through the adoption of the Bill of Rights, this omission from the
Constitution was one of the most oft-cited specific complaints of its critics.3 28 The extent of the outcry during the ratification struggle virtually
equate the status of these rights, the federalist defenses of these omissions proceed
in very different directions. See, e.g., Cassius II: To Richard Henry Lee, Esquire (Mar.
28, 1788), in 9 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 713, 715
(describing Constitution as giving "Congress no power over either [the rights of
conscience or the freedom of the press]," and thus Congress will not "dare to
exercise any"). By contrast, Cassius II relies upon the lack of a uniform rule
among the states as to civil juries to justify the obvious grant of discretion to Congress in "drawing the particular lines" as to the occasions in which ajury trial will
be required. Id. Based on the provision guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in

criminal cases, he also contends that the Constitution "implies" that "when [juries]
can be had in civil controversies, it is preferable." Id. Despite their effort to put
the best face on the omission of a civil jury guarantee, the very structure of the
authors' argument confirms that two quite different defenses are being employed.

326. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 47-48 (1986) (observing that Blackstone
thought trial byjury to be "as fundamental as anything else in British constitutional

law" and referring to "the sacrosanct centrality ofjury trial in British constitutional
thought during the age of the American Revolution"); Sherry, supra note 26, at
1138-40 (treating confederation-era cases on right to trial by jury and viewing it as
among inherent rights that founding generation believed bills of rights did not
establish, but merely declared).

327. See Hugh Williamson, Convention Debates Before the Second General
Constitutional Convention (Sept. 12, 1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUsupra note 23, at 197 (noting that no provision was made for juries in civil
cases and suggesting necessity of it). In response, Nathaniel Gorham argued that
it would be difficult to formulate an appropriate rule and suggested that the "Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter." Id. Roger Sherman agreed that "the Legislature may be safely trusted." Id. Elbridge Gerry
concurred in Williamson's insistence that such a provision was essential. See id. at
199 (refusing to sign Constitution because it gave power "to establish a tribunal
without juries," which would create "a Star-Chamber as to Civil Cases").
328. See Letter from George Mason to George Washington Containing Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 23, at 40, 45 (listing failure to include any declaration for "the Tryal by
jury in civil Causes" as one reason he refused to sign Constitution); An Address of
the Seceding Assemblyman (Oct. 2, 1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 295-96 (criticizing actions of Convention for exceeding authority by forming new constitution that, among other things, abolished juries for
civil trials); LETIER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 323, 326 (noting that trial by jury had long been considered fundamental right); AN OLD WHIG
VIII (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
23, at 52, 53 (stating that calling constitutional convention would be warranted if
only to preserve right to trial by jury); Letter from James Bowdoin to James de
Caledonia (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
TION,
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ensured that it would be included among the rights added by way of
amendment. Thomas Jefferson, whose influential voice added to the momentum of those demanding a bill of rights, included the civil trial jury
right as among six guarantees that the people should, at a minimum, have
protected by the Constitution.3 29 Unsurprisingly, Lawson and Granger
suggest that the right to trial by jury in civil cases was secured by the
330
Sweeping Clause.
The federalist defense of the decision to omit this right proceeded
along lines distinct from arguments about freedom of religion and freedom of the press. 33 1 The reason is clear: although the Constitution did
not by its terms grant any authority that would incidentally include limiting these other freedoms, Congress' authority to establish federal trial
courts, with jurisdiction in civil suits between citizens of different states,
logically includes the power to decide on the mode of trial (including
whether jury trials would be required). The need for such an exception in
favor of civiljuries was powerfully reinforced by the Constitution's explicit
provision for the right to trial by jury in federal criminal cases-a provision that was taken to be, consistent with the terminology pervasively employed, a necessary exception to the power of Congress to establish the
procedures governing criminal cases in the federal courts. 3 32 At a more
general level, given that the question of trial by jury appears to fall within
the powers granted to Congress, the apparent consensus that rights could
only be secured in fundamental law by inclusion in the written Constitution suggests that the right to a civil jury trial would not have any legal
protection.

33

23, at 237, 240 (noting satirically that abolishing trial by jury in civil cases would be
sufficient to "chain down all America"); WARREN, supra note 316, at 272, 279 (criticizing abolition ofjury trial in civil cases while noting "how admirably this mode is
adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce").
329. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in
14 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 482, 482 (declaring his
support of some elements of proposed Constitution while expressing dislike for
other features including omission of bill of rights).
330. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 320-21 ("Congress, under the
original Constitution, could not abolish jury trials in civil cases ....
).
331. These differences were apparent at the Convention. See Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing, supra note 305, at 569, 572 (summarizing arguments against inclusion of civil jury provision, including assurance that
Congress could be trusted with discretion to regulate circumstances under which it
would be provided).
332. See LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI, supra note 77, at 323, 326-27
(noting omission of civil jury guarantee, as well as other fundamental procedural
guarantees, despite inclusion of jury right in criminal cases and contending that
"the implication indubitably is, that [the people] mean to relinquish [such omitted rights], or at least feel indifferent about them"); Robert Whitehill, Proceedings
and Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 513, 514 (contending that Constitution's "direction of trials of crimes by a jury excludes trials in civil cases by a jury").

333.

LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XVI,

supra note 77, at 323, 326-27

(pointing out that omission of civil jury right was especially important because
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The federalists, however, did not contest the basic reasoning of the
antifederalist claims as to the legal effect of the omission of a civil jury
guarantee, nor offer assurances that Congress' power was limited in favor
of civil juries by the jurisdictional boundaries supposedly established by
the Sweeping Clause. 334 To the contrary, they offered an assortment of
arguments as to why it would have been unwise to include such a limitation on legislative discretion and as to why, despite this omission, the people's liberty was not threatened by the Constitution. 33 5 At the center of
this defense was the invocation of the concerns that required distinguishing between matters that ought to be included in fundamental law and
33 6
matters that ought to be left to the greater flexibility of ordinary law.
federal Constitution would be "the supreme act of the people" and hence it would
be "improper to refer to the state constitutions" to establish claim to civil jury and
other fundamental procedural rights). The state constitutions, after all, were "entirely distinct instruments and inferior acts." Id. In a more general vein, the Federal Farmer observed that "[t]hese rights are not necessarily reserved" because
"they are stipulated rights" that must be "secured and established by the constitution or federal laws." Id. at 328; see LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER IV, supra
note 109, at 246 (arguing that Constitution would be people's "last supreme act"
and that "wherever this constitution, or any part of it, shall be incompatible with
the ancient customs, rights, the laws or the constitutions heretofore established in
the United States, it will entirely abolish them and do them away"); Essay of Brutus
II, supra note 236, at 376 (arguing that Constitution "will be an original compact"
that will "vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it" being "ratified by the
whole people, all other forms, which are in existence at the time of its adoption,
must yield to it").
334. Although the Federal Farmer's essays were among the most widely read
and admired of the writings in opposition to the Constitution, it does not appear
that the federalists ever challenged either of the central claims he offered to support the view that the Constitution did not secure a right to a civiljury. See Letter
from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing, supra note 305, at 569, 572
(summarizing arguments against inclusion of civil jury provision including assurance that Congress could be trusted with discretion to regulate circumstances
under which it would be provided). These central claims included the idea that
fundamental English rights needed to be provided for in the written Constitution,
as well as the idea that the state constitutions would be an improper source from
which to infer the existence of such limits on federal legislative power. The failure
to contest the Federal Farmer's grounds for argument as to the necessity for securing the jury trial right thus suggests both that there was no provision in the Federal
Constitution from which to infer legal protection of the right and also that a generally worded provision to keep Congress within its proper jurisdictional boundaries would not have been perceived as incorporating affirmative limits on
legislative power with no cognizable roots in the text of the Federal Constitution.
335. See generally LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER I-XVIII, reprintedin 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 214, 214-357 (noting that supreme
power is in people and not in our government and so there are two options: either
carefully enumerate rights reserved to people and rights given to government or
remain silent).
336. See Iredell, supra note 19, at 144-45 (distinguishing between constitutions and laws). Irdell noted:
[T] here is a material difference between an article fixed in the Constitution, and a regulation by law. An article in the Constitution, however
inconvenient it may prove by experience, can only be altered by altering
the Constitution itself, which manifestly is a thing that ought not to be

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

91

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
ViLLANOVA LAW REVwEw

[Vol. 43: p. 17

One crucial sticking point, according to the federalists, was the lack of
uniformity among the states with respect to the scope of the jury trial
right.33 7 Whereas a provision in the Federal Constitution in favor of any
one approach might have created division and resentment, keeping the
matter as one of ordinary law would grant Congress the flexibility to find a
path acceptable to all, as well as to repeal any provision that proved unacceptable to most states. 338 A related difficulty was that there may be any
number of cases unique to the federal system-such as cases involving foreign parties, including other nations-in which a general rule in favor of
jury trials could work against the security and well-being of the nation as a
whole; Congress, therefore, should have the discretion to make such judg339
ment calls about the appropriate scope of the jury trial right.
Retaining the flexibility of governing the civil jury right by ordinary
law carried a more general advantage as well. Congress would have the
flexibility to adapt the scope of the right to a changing society. Thus, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The bestjudges of the matter will be least anxious for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be
the most ready to admit that the changes which are continually
happening in the affairs of society, may render a different mode
of determining questions of property, preferable in many cases,
in which that mode of trial now prevails .... I suspect it to be
impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at
which the operation of the institution ought to stop; and this is
with me a strong argument for leaving the matter to the discre3 40
tion of the legislature.
Underlying Hamilton's suggestion that the right to trial by jury in civil
cases ought to be subject to change by ordinary legislation was the assumption that, for whatever advantages jury trials in general offered, the presdone often. When regulated by law, it can easily be occasionally altered
so as best to suit the conveniences of the people.
Id.
337. See id. at 145, 151 (discussing how some states have jury trials only for
criminal, some for equity and some for admiralty); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 565-

71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (same); James Wilson,
Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 13 RATiFICATION OF

supra note 23, at 337, 340-41 (same).
338. Such arguments carried little weight with proponents of a bill of rights.
The antifederalists agreed with Jefferson, who contended that the argument from
a lack of uniformity amounted to accepting the least common denominator and to
establishing a "general wrong" rather than a "general right." See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 329, at 482, 483 (arguing that
these states that have abandoned trial by jury should be brought back to it by
provision in bill of rights).
THE CONSTITUTION,

339. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 337, at 568 (relating problems

with jury trial in cases concerning foreign nations).
340. Id. at 573.
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ence of juries in civil cases was not really a fundamental guarantee of
341
liberty, as contrasted with the right to a jury in criminal trials.
While the critics of the Constitution took the arguments about the
need for flexibility as flat admissions that the right to trial by jury was abolished by the Constitution, the federalists insisted that this was not the case
342
because Congress would undoubtedly continue to recognize the right
and would not abuse the discretion it had been granted to define its
scope. 343 In turn, however, the antifederalists were incredulous that their
opponents would actually seek to justify the effective granting of fundamental rights to the government.3 44 For the federalists, however, any risks
posed by this grant of discretionary authority to Congress was not truly
341. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 337, at 341 (defending omission of civil jury
trial right and assuring that, in any event, "the oppression of government is effectually barred, by declaring that in all criminal cases the trial by jury shall be
preserved").
342. See id. at 337, 340-41 (stating that claim that "trial by jury is abolished in
civil cases" is "disingenuous" and right is secured because Congress "is a faithful
representation of the people"); see also Edmund Pendleton, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 30, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 19, at 546 (stating that
"there was no exclusion of (jury trials] in civil cases, and that it was expressly provided for in criminal cases"). Furthermore, as to abolishing the right to ajury trial,
there was never "any tendency towards it." Id Thus, despite their acknowledgment that the Constitution by its terms did not limit Congress' discretion as to jury
trials, the federalists took great offense at the suggestion that they had abolished or
relinquished this fundamental right.
343. See An American Citizen IV. On the Federal Government, supra note 230, at
434-35 (arguing that "[t]he known principles ofjustice, the attachment to trial by
jury whenever it can be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the instructions of the people at large" and operation of federal regulations "on the property
of a president, a senator, a representative, a judge, as well as on that of a private
citizen, will certainly render those regulations as favorable as possible to property");
Wilson, supra note 221, at 516 (contending that "[w]here the people are represented-where the interest of government cannot be separate from that of the
people (and this is the case in trial between citizen and citizen)-the power of
making regulations with respect to the mode of trial may certainly be placed in the
legislature").
344. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph
(Dec. 6, 1787), in 14 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 364, 369
(stating that suggestion that remedy to omissions of natural rights, including civil
juries, will lie with legislature misses point that "a succeeding assembly may repeal
the provisions"). Lee went on to say that where the "evil" rests on a "constitutional
bottom," the "remedy" should not be: placed upon "the mutable ground of legislation." Id.; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Uriah Forrest (Dec. 31, 1787),
in 14 id. at 489 ("I have a right to nothing which another has a right to take away;
& Congress will have a right to take away trials by jury in all civil cases."); AN OLD
WHIG VIII, supra note 328, at 53 (summarizing argument that "[i]f too much
power is vested in [Congress], they will not abuse it" but will "divest themselves of
it"). Instead, the author contended that the people "ought not to repose all our
liberty and all our happiness in the virtue of our future rulers." Id.; see Patrick
Henry, Debates on the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 20, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
19, at 539, 544 (countering federalist assurances that Congress would honor right
because of strong feelings as to its basic nature with suggestion that "the enormity
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threatening because, after all, "the general GENIUS of a government is all
that can be substantially relied upon" for securing liberty, and specific
constitutional provisions "have far less virtue and efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them. 3 45
b.

Standing Armies in Peacetime

Modern Americans have difficulty grasping the importance of the
standing army issue to many founding-era Americans. The foremost authority on constitutional issues surrounding the American Revolution,
John Phillip Reid, has written that there were "few principles better established in eighteenth-century law than that a standing army was unconstitutional." 346 The question of standing armies went directly to popular
freedom because standing armies had historically been tools for establishing tyrannical government. Not surprisingly, constitutional limitations on
standing armies were found in the pre-1787 state constitutions,3 47 and the
omission of a specific limitation on the power to create a standing army
was an oft-stated objection to the proposed Constitution. 348 In turn, such
of the offence is urged as a security against its commission"). Henry implored the
people not "to concede every thing to the virtue of Congress." Id.
345. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 337, at 574. Thus, Hamilton ob-

served that, although civil juries were controlled by legislative discretion in Great
Britain as well as in Connecticut, the right to jury trial had been less abused in
those places than in New York in the years since the American Revolution despite
the inclusion of such a limitation in the state constitution of New York. See id. at
573-74 (comparing rights in areas with and without protection under
Constitution).
346. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49 (1988). Indeed, Reid notes that among the colonies' grievances leading to the American Revolution was the claim that England had illegally
kept standing armies in the colonies in time of peace. See id.
347. See Virginia Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 140, at 3814 (providing "that standing armies, in time of
peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty"). Pennsylvania and North Carolina also had provisions against standing armies in peacetime. See PA. CONST. of
1790, art. I, § 22 (providing that "no standing army shall, in time of peace, be kept
up without the consent of the legislature"); see also N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 30
(stating that "standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty"). Several
other states had provisions recognizing the danger of standing armies, but only
requiring the consent of the legislature. See, e.g., Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. I, § 24
(stating that "no standing army shall, in time of peace, be kept up, without the
consent of the legislature" (emphasis added)).
348. See PhiladelphiensisIX, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Feb. 6, 1787, reprinted in 16
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 58 (observing that under
Constitution lives, liberties and property of American citizens will be subject to the
"president general" who "to all intents and purposes" will be "a king elected to
command a standing army"); WARREN, supra note 316, at 280 (arguing that standing armies "have been the nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from the Roman
legions... to the planting the British cohorts in the capitals of America" and that
"freedom revolts at the idea" that they are necessary for safety of nation); The
Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1788), in 15 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 33 (suggesting that purpose of
authorizing permanent standing army was recognition that Constitution could
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limitations were among the amendments proposed by state ratifying conventions,3 49 as well as proffered by such important figures as Thomas Jefferson and Richard Henry Lee, as among the essential guarantees to be
included in a bill of rights. 350 Consequently, Leonard Levy lists the prohibition on standing armies as among the "positive rights ... deriving from
the social compact that creates government" that he claims the Ninth
351
Amendment was intended to secure.
Lawson and Granger suggest that the jurisdictional limitation they
find in the Sweeping Clause prohibited the enactment of laws that violated
any of the rights that would later be included in the Bill of Rights, as well
as "those rights the violation of which the general public in 1789 would
have thought 'improper."' 352 In these terms, it is difficult to imagine a
more fitting candidate for inclusion among the unenumerated rights secured by a broad jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause. For
example, there is no provision in the Constitution that purports to relinquish this right. Congress' powers to declare war and to raise an army
could readily be construed, given internal limits established by a generally
worded jurisdiction-defining clause, as not including authority to engage
in the improper act of creating a standing army in peacetime.
There is a big problem, however: Congress was deliberately granted
the discretion to keep a standing army, 35 3 and this deliberate delegation
only be implemented by force); Essay of Brutus VIII, N.Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41, at 405, 407 (stating that armies
"have generally proved a scourge to a country" and "destructive of their liberty").
Brutus noted that it is "indeed impossible that the liberties of the people in any
country can be preserved where a numerous standing army is kept up." Essay of
Brutus VIII, supra, at 407. See generallyJoYcE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

155-56 (1994) (discussing threat of standing armies).
349. See Amendments Proposed by the States, in CREATING THE BILL OF
supra note 3, at 16, 17 (containing New Hampshire's tenth proposed
amendment); id. at 17, 19 (containing Virginia's seventeenth amendment); id. at
21, 22, 25 (containing New York's proposed amendment).
350. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 332, at 249,
250 (listing "protection against standing armies" as among six rights that should be
included in a bill of rights to be added to Constitution); Richard Henry Lee, Proposed Amendments (Oct. 16, 1787), in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 23, at 65 (including prohibition on keeping standing armies absent vote
of two-thirds of each house of the legislature as among handful of individual rights
provisions he would insert into Constitution).
351. LEVY,supra note 7, at 278-79. Levy reasons that the right to be free from
standing armies in time of peace was "among existing positive rights protected by
various state laws, state constitutions, and the common law," and that such rights
"could legitimately be regarded as rights of the people before which the power of
government must be exercised in subordination." Id. at 279.
352. Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 330.
353. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12. For a helpful summary of the Convention's decision making about military matters generally, confirming that the
decision to permit a standing army was deliberate and reflected the carefully considered views of those most responsible for giving us the Constitution, see MAI_
RIGHTS,

COLM, supra note 348, at 151-55.
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of authority was universally understood even though it was cast as a gen35 4
eral grant of power rather than as an express relinquishment of a right.
Moreover, this initial decision was defended by the leading supporters of
the Constitution without second thoughts; the attempt to insert such a
limitation in the Bill of Rights was, in the first instance, rejected by
Madison, the initial draftsman, and ultimately rejected by the Congress
that recommended amendments to the states. 355 Equally important,
among the rationales for this decision to leave discretion in Congress were
ones rooted in the general concerns relating to limiting government described above.
For example, when Madison wrote to Jefferson of his concerns about
inflexible prohibitions, he used the issue of standing armies in peacetime
as a primary example. 3 56 No constitutional prohibition would be heeded,
he argued, if Britain or Spain established armies near America's borders. 3 57 More generally, Roger Sherman argued that such a ban could

"embarrass the public concerns and endanger the liberties of the people"
3 58
so that "it might become improper strictly to adhere to" such a ban.
Hamilton concurred, bluntly challenging the demand for such a limit in
terms that Lawson and Granger have described as jurisdictional: "With
what colour of propriety could the force necessary for defence, be limited
by those who cannot limit the force of offence?" 359 As Isaac Kramnick has
perceptibly observed, Hamilton's preference for a standing army reflected
both a liberal skepticism as to the viability of expecting a citizen militia to
adequately provide for the security of the nation's frontiers and a convic354. In defending the Convention's decision as to standing armies, James
Madison framed the issue by posing this question: "[W]as it necessary to give an
indefinite power of raising troops, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining
both in peace, as well as in war?" THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 222, at 270.
355. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 30 n.16, 36 n.13 (noting that both congressional houses rejected proposed amendments restricting
Congress' power to create standing armies). Despite the proposals for amendments relating to standing armies, no such amendment is found among Madison's
proposal. See Madison Resolution, supra note 49, at 11-14.
356. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 264, at
299, 300.
357. See id.
358. Roger Sherman, The Letters of a Countryman, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION 222 (Paul Ford ed., 1892); accord Iredell, supra note 313, at 95-96
(discussing importance of standing armies in time of peace to protect citizens).
359. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 222, at 270; accord Wilson, supra note
337, at 341 (noting that, although standing armies have "always been a topic of
popular declamation," all nations find it "necessary and useful to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquility," no one "who
regards the dignity and safety of his country, can deny the necessity of a military
force, under the control and with the restrictions which the new constitution provides"). But seeJOHN DEWITT, To THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted
in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 211, 214 (David E. Young ed., 1991)
(arguing Wilson's statement shows that he and others were "for unequivocally establishing [standing armies] in time of peace" and that, even worse, "to object to
them, is a mere popular declamation!").
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tion that the future of the nation lay in becoming a powerful commercial
360
state that was capable of protecting its interests around the world.
The point of these arguments in most instances was not that standing
armies were clearly desirable or presented no threat whatsoever to liberty.
Rather, it was that there was a greater danger involved in withholding a
power that might prove essential. Even if the situation presented in 1787
did not require or justify reliance on standing armies, it was contended
that the necessity "might in [the] future exist, of maintaining large armies
and navies." 36 1 The parties to this conflict weighed the competing values
differently and reached differing conclusions but they all understood that
they were deciding for greater protection of national security or greater
security for popular liberty against potentially tyrannous government.
Moreover, neither side of the debate believed that the issue would ultimately be resolved by the judiciary under the guise of construing the traditional rights held by the people.
3.

The Content of the Bill of Rights: The Rights Not Added

The Framers' competing views about how to strike the balance between liberty and government energy, especially within a constitution that
was to endure for the indefinite future, is reflected as well in the first Congress' decisions relating to what became the Bill of Rights. Madison set
OF POLITICS IN 1787: THE CONSTITU
COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE, reprinted in

360. See ISAAC KRAMNIcK, THE DISCOURSE
TION AND ITS CRITICS ON INDIVIDUALISM,

PERFECT UNION, supra note 309, at 166, 173-74, 210-11 (discussing implications of
Hamilton's preference for standing armies); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 24, supra
note 233, at 156 (arguing against use of citizen militia in protecting frontier
against various threats on ground that citizens in militia would be "dragged from
their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of
profound peace"). Hamilton argued that such "frequent rotation of service and
the loss of labor, and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals,
would form conclusive objections to the scheme." THE FEDERALIST No. 24, supra
note 233, at 156. Kramnick observed that Hamilton's argument "was a further
blow to the ideals of civic virtue, which had always seen professional armies as evil
incarnate, undermining the citizen's self-sacrificial participation in the defense of
the public realm that had been the premise of the militia." KRAMNICK, supra, at
173-74.
Kramnick powerfully argued that the standing army debate is thus a reflection
of important differences between Hamilton, and other federalists, and the antifederalist critics of the Constitution, who were rooted in competing models of traditional republicanism, on the one hand, with its emphasis on subordination of
private interest to the public good, and an emergent liberal individualism, on the
other hand, with its emphasis on private rights and personal autonomy. See id. at
169 (stating that proper interpretation requires consideration of both views). In
an environment of such fundamental differences of perspective and philosophy
which lead to disagreements about the necessity for including what had been
viewed as fundamental protections, it seems especially unlikely that there would be
agreement on a general limiting provision.
361. James Duane, The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York
(July 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATE, supra note 19, at 379. In some cases, as with
Alexander Hamilton, this anticipation of potential future exigencies reflected a
belief about the destiny of the nation in the world of states.
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the tone, making it clear from the outset that his purpose was to "proceed
with caution" so as to iaake the "revisal" of the Constitution "a moderate
one."3 62 He thus reassured his colleagues that he intended to support
inclusion of constitutional safeguards "against which I believe no serious
objection has been made by any class of our constituents" and as to which
"they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and
the magistrate who exercised the sovereign power." 363 Madison's goal was
to provide for all "essential rights," 364 but to omit all others, and this determination became the source of debate in Congress. By others' lights,
Madison sometimes erred on either side in striking the balance between
popular liberty and government energy, and the debate in Congress frequently turned to the question of precisely how to strike that balance.
Perhaps the classic example is the proposed clause that would have
exempted from military service any one who conscientiously objected to
bearing arms in a military context. 365 Several state declarations of rights
included such exemptions, and one could certainly build an argument
that such exemptions embodied a natural right-freedom of religion or,
more broadly, freedom of conscience. 3 66 Being apprised of the full scope
of the Sweeping Clause as a limiting provision, the proponents of this constitutional right would not have hesitated in asserting that a law compelling service by those with religious scruples should have been deemed
improper and, hence, unconstitutional; had they only known that the
Ninth Amendment recognized all the traditional and natural rights that
362. Madison, supra note 3, at 79.
363. Id.; see also Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15,
1789), in 12 MADISON'S PAPERS, supra note 268, at 219 (explaining that he would

limit his amendments to those "which are important in the eyes of many and can
be objectionable in those of none"). Madison's greatest concern, of course, was to
avoid structural amendments that would undermine the system of government
proposed by the Philadelphia Convention, but he used this criteria in assessing
proposed popular rights as well.
364. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11
MADISON'S PAPERS, supra note 268, at 404-05 (stating that Congress should recommend "provisions for all essential rights").
365. See THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE NEw FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Augustine
Burke ed., 1788), reprinted inCONTEXTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 135 (Stephen L.
Schechter & Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990) (containing Virginia's nineteenth
proposed amendment in declaration of rights which provided that "any person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an
equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead"); id. at 14041 (containing
North Carolina's nineteenth proposed amendment with proposal similar to Virginia's). The provision was retained in the House Resolution proposing amendments. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 37, 38 (discussing exemption clause
in fifth article). On September 4, however, the Senate voted to amend the proposed article to eliminate the conscientious-objection guarantee. See id. at 38-39
n.13.
366. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. 13 (providing that "[n]o person
who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be
compelled thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent").
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they could not succeed in inserting into the Constitution, they undoubtedly would have concurred as well that this right would be among that
amendment's "unenumerated rights." 367 Madison believed it fundamen3
tal enough to warrant inclusion in the Bill of Rights.

68

The historical evidence, however, reveals that the proposed limiting
clause was opposed by others precisely on the grounds that conscientious
objection is not a natural right, given the claim of civil society on individuals to defend the community against external threat, and that legislative
discretion should not be curtailed when it is impossible to foreclose the
possibility that exigencies warranting compulsory service might present
themselves. 369 Once again, opposition to inclusion of such a guarantee
did not necessarily reflect hostility toward the interests of conscientious
objectors so much as a preference for placing trust in the legislative
branch to balance the competing values. Despite this determination, how367. See Elias Boudinot, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 22,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 198 (stating that Constitution should "let every person know that we will not interfere with any person's
particular religious profession," and that to omit such provision will "lead such
persons to conclude that we mean to compel them to bear arms"). Representative
Boudinot asked: "[W]hatjustice can there be in compelling [conscientious objectors] to bear arms?" Id.
368. See Madison Resolution, supra note 49, at 12 (providing that "no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person").
369. See James Jackson, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 17,

1789), in

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 3, at 182, 183 (arguing that

provision "was unjust" to others "unless the constitution secured an equivalent");

Roger Sherman, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 182, 183 (stating that he did not "see an

absolute necessity for a clause of this kind," given that "[w ]e do not live under an
arbitrary government" and considering that, without such clause, many members
of religious sects opposed to war "will turn out" and "defend the cause of their
country"). Sherman believed it would be "improper to prevent the exercise of
such favorable dispositions" so long as nations are disposed to fight wars. Id.; see
Egbert Benson, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 1789), inCREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 184 (arguing that matter should be left "to
the benevolence of the legislature," given that "[n]o man can claim this indulgence of right" because, although it may be "religious persuasion," it is "no natural
right"). Representative Benson concluded, therefore, that the issue "ought to be
left to the discretion of the government," stating that it is "extremely injudicious to
intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals," especially given that the legislature
will likely "indulge" such persons. Id. at 184; see Thomas Scott, Debates in the

House of Representatives (Aug. 22, 1789), inCREATING

THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra

note 3, at 198 (viewing issue as "a matter of legislative right altogether" and arguing that under such provision "we can neither call upon such persons for services
nor an equivalent"). If the country was unable to call upon conscientious objectors for military service, Representative Scott feared that the result would be that
.you can never depend upon your militia." Id. Scott believed that such a condition would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the country must have "recourse
to a standing army," a state which would then lead to the undermining of the
"right of keeping arms." Id. Scott also feared that such a provision may not have
permanence given that "religion is on the decline" and, thus, the provision would
become merely a pretext "to get excused" from military service. Id.
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ever, the Sweeping Clause as explicated by Lawson and Granger would
remand the question to an unelected federal judiciary, opening the door
to the reversal of the decision of the first Congress.
The same divisions over balancing the claims of government and of
individuals is almost certainly reflected in the decision of Congress not to
include an antimonopoly provision. Some state declarations of rights had
included such limitations, 3 70 and Thomas Jefferson included the antimonopoly limitation among six provisions to which the people are entitled under any constitution. 371 Fears of federally created monopolies
were also voiced during the ratification struggle, 372 and Jefferson's judg373
ment was concurred with by several state-ratifying conventions.
Madison, by contrast, responded to Jefferson's suggestion with the view
that, although some grants of monopoly are inconsistent with equality
under law, the granting of monopolies is a necessary tool in wise government. 374 Unsurprisingly, Madison omitted a prohibition on the granting
370. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 41 (stating that "monopolies are odious,
contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce; and
ought not to be suffered"); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 6 (stating that "[n]o
man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community,
than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public"); N.C.
CONST. of 1776, art 1, § 34 (stating "[t]hat perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed).
371. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 329, at
482 (stating that Constitution should have bill of fights "providing ... for freedom
of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction
against monopolies, the eternal & unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws,
and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land & not by the
law of Nations"); see also id. at 483 (arguing that "a bill of rights is what the people
are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no
just government should refuse, or rest on inference").
372. Cf ELBRIDGE GERRY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, A SECOND GENERAL CONVENTION, AND A BILL OF RIGHTS (Sept. 15, 1787), reprinted in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 23, at 199 ("Under the power over

commerce, monopolies may be established.").
373. See THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note
365, at 124 (providing in Massachusetts' ratification "[tihat Congress erect no
company of merchants, with exclusive advantages of commerce"); id. at 118 (providing in New York ratification "[tihat the Congress [does] not grant monopolies,
or erect any company with exclusive advantages of commerce); id. at 133 (providing "[t] hat no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public
services").
374. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 264, at 300.
Madison also suggested that monopolies posed a less serious risk under republican
governments, where power is in the hands of the many rather than the few. See id.
(expressing doubts about real risks of monopolies). He confirmed that his concern was that "the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many" rather than the
converse (which is the evil posed by monopolies). Id. Madison saw democracy as
an adequate check on the tendency to grant unwarranted privileges; but democratic decision making more clearly risked the deprivation of the rights of those
with wealth and property. See id. Madison's suggestion that the need for constitutional protection of rights might turn on the structural analysis and the likelihood

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/6

100

McAffee: The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Mo
1998]

FEDERAL SYSTEM AS BILL OF RIGHTS

of monopolies in his proposed amendments, and when such a limitation
37 5
was proposed in the first Congress, it was rejected.
Interpreting the precise significance of the omission of an antimonopoly clause is a fairly tricky business. Unlike the issues of standing armies
and civil juries, where the Constitution clearly grants sufficient authority
to invade the interests that many would protect constitutionally, in this
case there is room for debate regarding whether the Constitution is properly read as granting Congress authority to grant monopolies of any
kind. 376 As the Ninth Amendment teaches us, the mere omission of a
limiting provision is not properly taken as evidence that Congress holds
such authority; in fact, this very sort of inference was the one that the
federalists had feared and had sought to draft against. 37 7 Madison, on the
that ordinary political processes will adequately protect particular rights anticipates modern suggestions that the exercise ofjudicial review should be affected by
similar evaluations. See id. See generally ELY, supra note 13, at 4-7 (discussing democracy and judicial review).
375. See Tucker and Gerry Amendments (Aug. 22, 1789), inCREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 36 (recording antimonopoly provision introduced
in House on August 22, 1789, and considered in Senate on September 7, 1789); see
also Additional Articles of Amendment, in

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra

note 3, at 41, 42 (providing "[t]hat Congress shall not erect any Company of
Merchants with exclusive advantages of Commerce"). The omission did not go
unnoticed, as Jefferson wrote to Madison expressing disappointment that a limiting provision as to monopolies was not included. See Letter from ThomasJefferson
to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 2 ScHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 1143 (noting
that he would "have been for going further," and listing antimonopoly provision as
among "alterations and additions" he would make to proposed amendments).

376. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 378, 386 (1977) (suggesting Philadelphia Convention's rejection of proposal to include power of incorporation among Congress' powers confirms intent to withhold such power from
Congress); Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical
Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001', 1004 (1991) (describing how, under originalist interpretation, no power would exist without text). The evidence, however, is far more
equivocal than such claims suggest, inasmuch as the Convention notes reflect the
views of only a few delegates, and some of the discussion emphasized the impact of
such a provision on the prospects for ratifying the Constitution. See Thomas B.
McAffee, Reed Dickerson's Originalism-What it Contributes to Contemporary Constitutional Debate, 16 S.ILL. U. L.J. 617, 642-43 (1992) (discussing compromises made
in ratification process); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV.
659, 684-85 (1987) (same). Moreover, James Wilson expressed the view that the
power to incorporate mercantile monopolies was implicit in the power to regulate
commerce. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
222, at 616 (containing discussions at federal convention between Rufus King and
James Wilson). No one suggested in response that such a construction would be
precluded by the Sweeping Clause, and George Mason used Wilson's position as a
reason for opposing the Constitution. See George Mason: Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
350 (objecting that "[u]nder [the federalists'] own Construction of the general
Clause at the End of the enumerated Powers, the Congress may grant Monopolies
in Trade & Commerce").
377. See 3 THE WORIKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445, 453, 488 (Henry C.
Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (noting that Hamilton subsequently contended that rejected antimonopoly amendments evidenced general belief that Congress held
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other hand, had proposed inclusion of a general power of incorporation
as among the grants of authority to Congress-a grant of power that was
opposed on the ground that it would include authority to establish "mercantile monopolies"-and also opposed inclusion of an antimonopoly provision within a bill of rights as a matter of general philosophy. 378 He
certainly would have been greatly surprised to learn that the grant of executory power in the Sweeping Clause included general words of limitation
by which Jefferson's conflicting view might be written into the
3 79

Constitution.

The final illustration of a fundamental right that was rejected to the
dismay of its proponents is the right of the people to instruct their representatives. At first blush, this might strike some as an odd candidate for a
limitation that might be read in to the Necessary and Proper Clause (even
presuming the broad jurisdictional reading offered by Lawson and
Granger). It is hardly a natural right that individuals were thought to
bring to the social contract, nor is it a long-standing, customary right
under the English constitution. On the other hand, it was a right that had
been recognized in fundamental law in the founding era, which presumably would have been a logical place to look for implied jurisdictional limits
on delegated power. 380 Equally important, an argument can be made that
general power of incorporation that required qualification); see also McAffee, supra
note 376, at 643 n.98 (noting Hamilton refused to draw inferences from rejection
of proposed amendment). What he did not acknowledge was that this form of
argument represented the very sort that he had previously suggested was illegitimate, but might be inferred from the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution, and that the Ninth Amendment had been intended to foreclose this very sort
of argument. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 274, at 579 (arguing that bill
of rights would be dangerous because it might be read as stating exceptions to
powers not granted in Constitution creating misconstruction that could lead to
enlarged powers).
378. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION or 1787, supra note 222, at
616 (discussing Madison's proposal that Congress be granted general power of
incorporation).
379. It is possible, of course, that the provision was not included among the
amendments proposed by Congress because it was perceived as clearly unnecessary
in light of the limited powers of Congress. Considering, however, that the fear of
monopolies was commonly expressed during the ratification struggle, and that
Wilson and others were on record as believing that Congress held a power to create commercial monopolies under its commerce power, it seems more likely that
the failure to include such a provision as at least a cautionary guarantee reflects
that many were opposed to this sort of intrusion on governmental flexibility. What
would have surprised those who believed that Congress' powers included such authority, in any event, is the thought that the fight over Congress' authority would
not be over the meaning of the grants of federal powers, but rather over the existence of an unwritten limitation on those powers that had been smuggled into the
Constitution in the guise of a clause authorizing executory power to Congress. For
a discussion of the remarkable and historically suspect view that Madison opposed
the constitutionality of the first bank on the ground that it violated the right to
protection against monopoly secured by the Ninth Amendment, see infra notes
402-12 and accompanying text.
380. See, e.g., VT. CONST. of 1777 (granting rights to instruct representatives).
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this right flows from one of the fundamental principles of the American
founding, a principle that was itself described as a fundamental natural
right, the doctrine of popular sovereignty.3 8 1 As we have seen, the Federal
Constitution had itself been justified as an exercise of the "unalienable
and indefeasible" right of the people to reform or alter government "in
such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the
public weal."3 82 Finally, more than one ratifying convention proposed a
3 83
right of instruction among their proffered amendments.
As with the restrictions relating to standing armies and creation of
monopolies, however, although the right of instruction was proposed
before Congress, notwithstanding Madison's omission of such a provision
from his proposed amendments, it was defeated. 384 The reasons are clear,
and they reflect competing visions both of the political theory underlying
381. See Samuel Chase, BALTIMORE MD. J., Feb. 13, 1787, quoted in WooD,
supra note 90, at 371 (arguing that sovereignty of people "is like the light of the
sun, native, original, inherent, and unlimited by human authority" while power of
their "rulers or governors" is "like the reflected light of the moon, and is only
borrowed, delegated and limited by the grant of the people"); see alsoJames Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Thomas Lloyd ed., Nov.
24, 1787), reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 36162 (contending that "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in
the people" with consequence that "the people are superior to our constitutions"
and can thus change "the constitutions whenever and however they please"). Wilson contended that this right was one "of which no positive institution can ever
deprive them." Wilson, supra, at 362. Unsurprisingly, advocates of the right of
instruction in the first Congress invoked this fundamental principle of American
constitutionalism. See Elbridge Gerry, Debates in the House of Representatives
(Aug. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 152 (arguing
that if "the sovereignty resided in the people," he "could not conceive why they
had not the right to instruct and direct their agents at their pleasure").
382. PA. CONST. of 1776 (emphasis added).

383. See

THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

supra note

365, at 116 (containing New York's proposed amendment providing "[t]hat the
people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common
good, or to instruct their representatives"); see also id. at 1 (proposing Virginia
amendment for "right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common
good, or to instruct their representatives"). In the minds of its advocates, the
power of the sovereign people to instruct their representatives was closely related
to their right to assemble together and to petition their government. If inclusion
of First Amendment freedoms were simply unnecessary in the Federal Constitution
because the jurisdictional limit embodied in the Sweeping Clause was already in
place, it might plausibly be contended that the right of instruction was among the
rights thereby retained by the people. The only distinction is that, although many
viewed the right of instruction as a corollary of the doctrine of popular sovereignty
and as closely related to the people's right to assemble and petition, many opposed
that view as well. Under the construction of the Sweeping Clause offered by Lawson and Granger, however, this very dispute about the implications of first principles of our constitutional order presumably was consigned to the judicial branch
under their duty to explicate the meaning of the Constitution.
384. See House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 29, 30 n.1 1 (recording that Rep. Tucker proposed to insert
language guaranteeing people's right "to instruct their representatives," but that
motion was soundly defeated).
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the Constitution and of the criteria for inclusion of constitutional limits
on government. The guarantee of a right of instruction rested on a conception of representation that many rejected 38 5 and, in many minds, it
also fit the description of a guarantee that could not serve representative
government in all times and seasons.a 86 Thus, Madison spoke in opposition, suggesting that "this right of instructing was at least a doubtful right"
and that the amendments to go to the people should consist of "simple
and acknowledged principles" that "were certain and fixed. '3 87 In this setting, as in the others we have reviewed, the question of whether the independent exercise of authority by representatives is constitutionally
improper was resolved by the decision not to insert any such limitation on
the legislative power; no one would have thought that it might be addressed and, perhaps, resolved differently by a court consisting of judges
who were sympathetic with the idea that the right of instruction is a corol388
lary of democratic government.

385. See George Clymer, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 15,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 151 (contending that
guarantee "would destroy the very spirit of representation itself, by rendering Congress a passive machine instead of a deliberative body"); Michael Stone, Debates in
the House of Representatives (Aug. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE BIL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 156 (stating guarantee "would change the nature of the constitution" away from being "a representative government"). It is fair to say, in fact, that
the Federal Constitution as a whole embodied a view that was far more suspicious
of popular authority, and hence more oriented toward deliberative governmentas reflected in the terms of legislative office and the system of checks and balances-than the view of popular authority that the "right of instruction"
symbolized.
386. See Thomas Hartley, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 15,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supranote 3, at 151 (arguing that "practice
on this principle might be attended with danger" because there would be "periods
when from various causes the popular mind was in a state of fermentation and
incapable of acting wisely").
387. Id. at 152. Madison also questioned more generally whether particular
constituencies could in any way be equated with the sovereign people and, more
particularly, whether representatives could properly be bound by popular instructions to act unconstitutionally. See id. (discussing uncertainty surrounding right of
instruction in proposed amendments)
388. The possibility of courts taking on such a task might once have seemed
implausible, but it is difficult to make such a claim in an era in which the courts
have entered not only the thicket of legislative apportionment based on a theory of
political equality hardly spelled out in the Constitution, but have more recently
invalidated state-created congressional term limits in part by relying on a supposed
underlying theory of representative government. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (holding that states cannot formulate diverse
qualifications for their congressional representatives); cf Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (holding that plaintiffs must prove race is "predominant factor" in drawing of district lines in racial gerrymander cases); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (articulating equal protection principles that govern state's
drawing of congressional districts).
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The PostratificationEvidence From the FoundingEra: The National Bank
and the Crisis of 1798

Interpreters have often consulted postratification materials that might
shed light on the historical meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision.3 89 Such materials are often relevant to determining the original
public meaning of the provision at issue, even if they arguably deserve less
weight than pre-adoption evidence. 390 At the very least, postratification
materials can often provide evidence to confirm conclusions supported by
the pre-adoption materials or, alternatively, raise doubts or concerns
about the analysis of those materials. One aid we receive from a careful
examination of the debates after ratification is that we are able to test constitutional theories in a setting in which the political goal of ratifying the
Constitution does not impact on the content of the debate. 391 In this
case, during the decade following ratification of the Constitution, two
landmark constitutional debates ensued. They concerned the constitutionality of the proposed national bank and the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts and provided leading figures in the process of adopting the
Constitution with an opportunity to address the meaning and scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The evidence from these heated but carefully constructed debates confirms that the Necessary and Proper Clause
was viewed by leading spokespersons on all sides as a declaratory provision
that merely confirmed what would have been implicit in the Constitution.
The debates also confirm that the ratification argument that popular
rights were protected by enumerated powers was understood as referring
to the residuum from granted powers: the rights reserved were to be determined, and indeed defined, by reference to a proper construction of the
powers granted by the Constitution.
1.

The Debate Over the National Bank

Every law student who has studied McCulloch v. Maryland knows that
the national bank controversy provided the nation with its first opportunity to determine whether priority would be given to ensuring that the
national government would be effective, which arguably suggested wide
389. See, e.g.,
Amar, supra note 2, at 1133-37 (looking to postratification views
of Bill of Rights); Barnett, supra note 3, at 3 (relying on Madison's speech in debate over proposed bank before House of Representatives after Bill of Rights was
ratified).
390. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)
(giving great deference to construction placed on constitutional language by early
congresses, comprised of "men who were members of the convention which
framed it" and stating when such constructions "have not been disputed during a
period of nearly a century" they are "almost conclusive").
391. The influence of politics, however, is ever-present in the universe of the
Constitution, and particular political contexts and the goals of those offering views
to be examined must always be taken into account. Our best hope for reaching
sound conclusions, however, is that many important areas of consensus are reiterated by many individuals on both sides of particular debates.
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latitude and flexibility with respect to choice of legislative means, or to the
contrary, to ensuring that the national government remained a government of a few particular powers, thus preserving the sovereignty thought
to have been retained for the states and the people.3 9 2 As is well-known,
Madison and Jefferson both opposed the first national bank on constitutional grounds, and the constitutional issues were debated both in Congress and in the administration.3 93 In the published accounts of all these
debates, two central points of relevance to our discussion stand out. First,
the debate proceeded as an explication of the limited-powers scheme of
the Constitution; the arguments of advocates often developed a general
theory of implied authority, and more often than not contended that the
Necessary and Proper Clause simply made explicit the generally accepted
agency principle that the authority required to implement authorized
powers is implicit in the powers themselves.3 9 4 In the same vein, no advo392. McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 325 (1819).
393. See, e.g.,
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of
State, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES 91, 93 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., reprint ed. 1967) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK] (insisting that "necessary" be understood as
stating stringent requirement that power to be exercised by implication be "essential" to implementing enumerated power).
394. See 1 ABRIDGMENTS OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 276 (1855)

(Rep.

Madison) [hereinafter ABRIDGED DEBATES] (stating Necessary and Proper Clause is
"merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable implication"); 1
id. at 279-80, 282 (Rep. Ames) (arguing that opponents presume safety lies in
strict construction and relying upon hypothetical of war thrust upon nation when

power to raise army had not been expressly given). Ames concluded that a more

liberal construction of federal power is natural and safe, and clarified that he "did
not pretend that [the Sweeping Clause] gives any new powers," but only that "it
establishes the doctrine of implied powers."

Id. at 282; see id. at 282 (Rep.

Sedgwick) (arguing general premise that it is "universally agreed that wherever a

power is delegated for express purposes, all the known and usual means for the

attainment of the objects expressed are conceded also"). Sedgwick also contended
that the Sweeping Clause "did not restrict the power of the Legislature to enacting
such laws only as are indispensable." Id. at 283; see id. at 284 (Rep. Lawrence)
(suggesting that "we ought not to deduce a prohibition by construction" and contending that "every power necessary to secure [the great objects of this Government] must necessarily follow"); id. at 285 (Rep. Jackson) (arguing against
"latitude contended for in constructing the constitution" and contending that opponents' construction of Sweeping Clause would lead to unlimited government);
id. at 290 (Rep. Boudinot) (relying on same general principle that all necessary
means is to be implied); id. at 293 (Rep. Stone) (complaining that bank's proponents admit "that the sweeping clause in the constitution confers no additional
power," but then developing doctrine of implied powers that undermines limitedpowers scheme).
Moreover, an important common denominator in the debate between John
Marshall and the critics of his McCulloch opinion is their joint claims that common
law and general reasoning supported their position and that the opposing view
presented a significant enlargement or restriction, respectively, of the preexisting
rule. Compare A VIRGINIAN'S "AMPHICTYON" ESSAYS, supra note 194, at 64, 69-70
(characterizing McCulloch as calling for "liberal construction"), with JOHN MARSHALL, "A FRIEND TO THE UNION" ESSAYS (1819), reprinted inJOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 194, at 97-98 (noting Marshall's denial that McCulloch calls for
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cate on either side of the debate advanced an argument that the Clause
was intended to serve as an important limiting device'.

95

Second, at the

center of the debate over the constitutionality of the bank in the arguments advanced by both sides is the question of the nature and degree of
fit required between the ends of the enumerated powers and the means of
asserted ancillary powers (in this case, the bank bill).396 Considering that
individual rights concerns-albeit unenumerated individual rights-were
at least arguably raised by the bank bill, the omission of any serious discussion of the Sweeping Clause's jurisdictional limits in favor of individual
liberty provides fairly strong confirmation that such limits were not contemplated and that the word "proper" was never intended to do as much
work as Lawson and Granger would have it do.
Most students of the subject are familiar with the arguments advanced
by Jefferson and Hamilton, arguments that are replicated in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch. For Jefferson, and subsequently for the
advocates of the state of Maryland, the crucial step in the analysis was the
insistence that the word "necessary" be understood as stating a stringent
requirement; the power to be exercised by implication was required to be
"liberal" or "latitudinous" construction and affirming that clause neither enlarges
nor restrains powers of Congress), and Roane, supra note 215, at 117-21, 124-26
(summarizing authorities on common law and law of nations in support of relatively narrow application of principle of agency at stake and relying on assertions
that clause adds nothing to powers given Congress and arguing that McCulloch
relies upon placement of clause in Article I, Section 8 as justification to enlarge
implied powers). Both sides claim total victory based upon analysis of the rule
governing implied authority had such a clause never been added to the Constitution, and both equally charge the other with manipulating the Necessary and
Proper Clause to alter the rule otherwise established. No one argues that the
Clause was intended to play a decisive role in the constitutional scheme, or indeed
that it was to add anything; rather, they exchange charges that the opposing party
is attempting to wrest its language to alter the established principle.
395. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmund Randolph, in DOCUMENTARY HisTORY OF THE BANK,supra note

393, at 86, 87 (writing opinion as Attorney General

for President Washington's consideration specifically addressing meaning of words
"and proper"). After arguing that "ifit has any meaning," it "does not enlarge the
powers of Congress, but rather restricts them," Randolph concludes that just as
friends of the bank should claim no advantage from this clause, its enemies should
not "quote the clause as having a restrictive effect," but recognize it "as among the
surplusage which as often proceeds from inattention as caution." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). Randolph's argument comports with his own arguments before the
Virginia Ratifying Convention that various prohibitions in the Constitution constituted exceptions to delegated powers-a position that is irreconcilable with the
idea that those powers were already subject to a set of exceptions reflected in the
requirement that executory laws be proper as well as necessary. See Alexander
Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton on the Constitutionalityof a NationalBank, in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 393, at 95, 99 (arguing against
strict construction generally and noting Attorney General's admission that Necessary and Proper Clause "cannot be a rule of restrictive interpretation").
396. The focus was on the word "necessary" rather than the word "proper,"
and the debate concerned whether competing standards for explicating and applying that requirement better comported with the general goals of an effective, but
nevertheless limited, national government.
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essential to implementing the enumerated power, a power that must be
inferred if the granted power is not to be nugatory. 39 7 This was the key to
ensuring that the national government remained a government of a few
powers, leaving the many powers to the states.
It appears, however, Madison sensed the vulnerability of the strict necessity test to the objection that a great many things that are plainly incidental to, and logically comprehended within, a delegated power might
nevertheless not be absolutely necessary. 39 8 Without abandoning the insistence that mere convenience would not suffice, Madison offered the
further suggestion that the nature of the power being asserted as ancillary
should itself be an important area of focus; the question of the required fit
between means and end would be determined on this approach both by
how directly and immediately the ancillary power furthered an authorized
end, as well as by the intrinsic importance of the power offered as a means
to other ends. 399 Under this test, the Constitution would "condemn the
exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is
not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power." 40 0 Put somewhat more bluntly, the more important the implied power, the closer its
connection must be to the express power if it is to be justified under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Despite the differences in emphasis between Madison and other opponents of the bill, however, in each case the
question related to the nature of the relationship required between a law
401
passed as a means and some enumerated power as an authorized end.
This focus on relationships between means and ends in explicating
the Necessary and Proper Clause might be explained away on the ground
that the bank bill presents a classic problem in federalism, but not a serious individual rights issue. On this view, the broad jurisdictional understanding of the Clause simply did not come into play in the course of
397. Jefferson, supra note 393, at 91, 93; see ABRIDGED DEBATES, supranote 394,
at 292 (Rep. Giles) (defining standard of "necessary" as "that mean without which
the end could not be produced").
398. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-26 (1819) (discussing Necessary and Proper Clause in Constitution).
399. The general theme of remoteness, of concern lest a multiplication of
means/ends connections be used to justify actions quite far removed from the
original grant of power, is of course common to the analysis of Jefferson and
Madison. Even so, Madison's analysis emphasized the nature and importance of
the power under scrutiny as a key to determining if the power is fit as a means to
implementing delegated authority. In doing so, he attempts to confront the remoteness problem without undermining Congress' power to select from among a
range of obviously subsidiary actions where the implied power under consideration
poses less of a threat to the balance our federal system sought to maintain.
400. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 899 (1791).

401. The purpose of the present analysis is not to arrive at a complete theory
of federalism or to resolve the historical debate between strict and liberal construction of federal power. Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, this author has
never endorsed ChiefJustice Marshall's relatively broad construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause. But see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 26, at 783 (asserting that
McAffee advocates "Marshallian" concept of necessity).
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considering the proposed national bank. It is striking, however, that some
did object that the bank bill established a monopoly; indeed, it arguably
created the sort of monopoly that some had expressed fears that the Constitution would be read to authorize. 40 2 In fact, two scholars have advanced the argument that, in attacking the bank bill, Madison relied upon
the Ninth Amendment and one of its unenumerated retained rights, in
providing a limited construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Lawson and Granger would say a jurisdictional construction). 40 3 Specifically,
they contend that Madison focused on the fact that the bank created a
monopoly in violation of the equal rights of citizens. 40 4 To the contrary,
however, Madison's speech in Congress opposing the bank illustrates that
his opposition to the bank was based on a straightforward application of
his own variation on the appropriate means/ends test for determining the
reach of the delegated powers. It did not rest on any sort of theory of
implied rights or on an affirmative rights reading of the Ninth Amendment.40 5 Accordingly, although the occasion of the debate over the bank
provided a perfect opportunity to assert unenumerated rights, the debate
turned instead on competing theories of the scope of enumerated powers
402. For a further discussion of the fear of a monopoly, see infra note 370-75
and accompanying text.
403. Barnett, supra note 26, at 781-86 (analyzing Madison's position); Mayer,
supra note 26, at 318-19 (same).
404. Barnett, supra note 26, at 782 (noting that Madison focused on need to
guard against danger of congressional abuse of discretionary powers to enact laws
that were "neither necessary nor proper"); Mayer, supra note 26, at 319 (discussing
Madison's view).
405. Barnett, supra note 26, at 781, 784-85 (contending that Madison relied
on Ninth Amendment to buttress conclusion that law affecting equal rights would
be subject to level of scrutiny appropriate in case of invasion of retained right and
would require especially strong necessity to be justified as falling within Congress'

powers).
Barnett explains away Madison's prior concession that Congress' discretion
might well include authority to invade traditional rights, absent their enumeration
in a bill of rights, by insisting that Madison made this concession only as to positive
rights, such as the prohibition against general search warrants. See id. at 778-82
(discussing Madison's distinction between natural and positive rights). If it is
clear, however, that the prohibition on general search warrants stated a positive
right that would have received no security from the Necessary and Proper Clause
(and hence the Ninth Amendment), it would be equally clear that the right to be
free from government-created monopolies would give way to government power
under the same analysis. In each case, the right in question, just as with the right
to trial by jury, fits perfectly with Madison's definition of a positive right-a right
that is not an inalienable natural right, but that "may seem to result from the
nature of the compact" and that "regulates the action of the community" in a way
viewed "as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature." Madison, supra note 3, at 81. The case against freedom
from monopoly being treated as a retained right under Barnett's own analysis
would be strengthened further by the fact, shown above, that Madison did not view
freedom from monopoly as any sort of fundamental right, natural or positive, that
was deserving of protection in a bill of rights.
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and the relationships between means and ends required by the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
Moreover, this debate proceeded along straightforward lines of argument about the meaning of the grants of powers and the appropriate understanding of the Sweeping Clause when read against the backdrop of
general principles of agency. Just as with the debate over ratification of
the Constitution, implied rights advocates insisted upon reading their own
special meaning into the dialogue over enumerated powers. Thus, Randy
Barnett contends that Madison and others relied upon the old assurances
about the limited nature of the delegated powers and offered such a guarantee of protection by adopting "a restrictive interpretation of necessity."' 4 0 6 Barnett's argument, however, appears simply to equate an
additional reason for a relatively restrained reading of enumerated powers
with a special limiting rule that precludes any reading of powers, together
with the Sweeping Clause, in a way that would impinge on perceived fundamental rights. 4 0 7 In effect, Barnett has reversed means and ends. A
careful construction of enumerated powers and a fairly constrained reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause was for Madison a means of reserving popular rights (but equally reserved state power); Barnett, on the
other hand, reads Madison's arguments as suggesting that the people's
rights supply a distinctive means for limiting federal power and indeed
justify a special rule for construing the delegated powers as they are perceived as impinging on rights.
The crucial premise of Madison's argument against the bank was precisely that the establishment of a bank was the exercise of a great and
important power. 40 8 As we have noted, for Madison an implication of the
critical premise that these are limited grants of power is that there is a barrier to the exercise of a "great and important power, which is not evidently
and necessarily involved in an express power." 40 9 In supporting the thesis
406. Barnett, supra note 26, at 781 (finding significance in Madison's insistence that only restrictive reading of Sweeping Clause enabled Constitution's defenders to disprove that powers threatened fundamental rights). No one doubts,
of course, that strict construction was favored because it better protected the states
and the people; the question is whether it amounted to a rule that the powers
would be invariably limited whenever they bumped up against independently defined retained rights.
407. See id. at 784 (describing McAffee as arguing that enumerated powers
should not "be cabined in such a way as to protect unenumerated rights"). Read
carefully, Barnett trades on a certain equivocal method of expression, continually
blurring the line between a general method of strict (or at least stricter) construction, in which the question concerns displacing state power or individual prerogative, and a special rule for explicating the word "necessary" in the case of
individual rights deemed sufficiently important to require more scrutiny.

408. See 2 ANNALS
gressional powers).

OF CONG.

1894-1909 (1791) (describing desire to limit con-

409. Id. at 1899. In elaborating on the analysis, Madison stated that the power
to incorporate is by "its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution, could never have been
meant to be included in it, and not being included, could never be rightly exer-
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that it is undeniable "that the power proposed to be exercised [in the
bank bill] is an important power, ' 4 10 Madison relies on a number of critical factors, including the legislative nature of the proposed bank's power
to make by-laws, the power granted to the bank to purchase and hold real
property, the support the bank would receive from penal regulations and,
finally, the particular point that the bank was effectively granted a monopoly in derogation of the "equal rights of every citizen. ' 4 1 1 Madison's net
conclusion is that these factors, when taken together, show that "the
power of incorporation exercised in the bill" may not "be deemed an accessory or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a means of
4 12
executing another power."
cised." Id. at 1900. Notice, however, that one implication of Madison's reasoning
is that the Convention might well have included such a power among the enumerated powers; there is no hint that an implied right would have made such a decision a nullity, and indeed we know that Madison proposed the inclusion of such a
power at the Convention.

410. 2 ANNALS

OF CONG.

1899.

411. Id. at 1900. The question whether the bank established a monopoly or
was objectionable on that account did become a subject of some discussion, but no
one advanced the argument that this was a ground for concluding that the bank
bill was constitutionally improper under the Sweeping Clause or that this feature
should prompt a unique, rights-protective stringency in applying the means test of
necessity. See ABRiDGED DEBATES, supra note 394, at 285 (Rep. Lawrence) (contending that proposals to prohibit power to establish "companies with exclusive privileges" shows that those states "considered that Congress does possess the power to
establish such companies"); see also id. at 273 (Rep. Jackson) (referring to bank
monopoly as something that "contravenes the spirit of the constitution" because it
uses "the public moneys for the benefit of the corporation to be created"); id. at
304 (Rep. Sherman) (contending that bank does not "restrain the States or private
banks, or even individuals, from negotiations of a similar nature with those permitted to the stockholders" and, therefore, "has not a feature of monopoly"). The
issue of whether a proposed public action adversely affects private rights and interests or works an injustice to those who are not beneficiaries of the legislation is
always an appropriate subject of legislative debate. The debate over the bank included discussion of the policy merits of the bank bill and its constitutionality.
What is most significant about the comments directed to the "monopoly" issue,
however, is that it did not yield a separable argument that the bank transgressed a
jurisdictional boundary as an improper means to the end to be achieved by the
establishment of a national bank or constituted a violation of an unenumerated
right.
412. Id. The most interesting question raised by Madison's argument is
whether the threat posed to a traditional or natural fundamental right, of itself,
might suffice to characterize the power claimed as important enough to require an
explicit grant of power to warrant a right-threatening law. Madison does not say as
much, and his argument as to general search warrants in presenting the Bill of
Rights to Congress cuts against this view. At least, however, with respect to a general regulation of the press or of religious establishments, even prior to the Bill of
Rights, Madison and others logically could have contended that such general regulations would have too many important implications to be justified based on relatively remote relations to granted powers. The logic of such an argument,
however, cannot be separated from a general theory of federal powers; unlike
modern commentators, who seem to want to have their McCulloch and their Roe,
too, Madison and Jefferson would never have unhinged the enumerated-powers
scheme's protection of the people and the states-it was a single system of enu-
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At no point did Madison state or imply that the monopoly status of
the bank would be a sufficient basis by itself to warrant constitutional objection. Furthermore, he did not suggest that the bank's monopoly status
held any connection to the Ninth Amendment. 413 Finally, Madison did
not claim that any jurisdictional limitation in favor of personal rights
lodged in the Necessary and Proper Clause, whether framed in terms of a
proper exercise of authority or a unique rights-protective requirement
stated in terms of whether the exercise of power was sufficiently necessary. 4 14 Rather, Madison propounded a general theory for construing
enumerated and implied powers, without explicating an individual-rights
4 15
theory under the guise of construing federal powers.
merated powers and retained rights and powers, and the key in their minds was to
make sure that the system did not become one of theoretically limited ends but
unlimited means.
413. Madison used the Ninth Amendment in this speech to buttress his argument for a restrained reading of federal powers, not to refer to unenumerated
affirmative-rights limitations that served to limit the reach of implied powers. But
see Barnett, supra note 270, at 637 (contending that Madison saw Ninth Amendment as authority for rule of strict construction of delegated powers when legislation affects rights retained by people). Barnett quotes Madison's statement that
"'[t]
he latitude of interpretationrequired by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself,'" and then points to Madison's citation to the
Ninth Amendment as the apparent source of this rule limiting the reach of the
means that can be employed under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. (quoting
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (Rep. Madison)). Madison's reference, however, to "the
rule furnished by the Constitution itself' alluded to the practice in Article I, Section 8, of expressly providing for important powers that related to, but did not
clearly fall under, other express powers. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (Rep.
Madison) (arguing that established practice of including all important powers
among express grants in Article I establishes "a general rule of construction" that
forbids finding important power to be "implied power"); see also id. at 1901 (linking Madison's reference to Ninth Amendment with Tenth Amendment and relying on its general purpose "guarding against a latitude of interpretation" and
including no reference to general rule of construction).
414. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 637 (noting that argument as to whether
bank was proper by reference to background individual rights was never advanced). If the broad jurisdictional reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause
was correct, however, and had Madison been relying on affirmative limits he perceived in an unenumerated right against monopoly, it seems fairly obvious that he
would have used the straightforward contention that the bank law was an improper
exercise of federal power, quite apart from the issue of the fit between means and
ends. Despite endorsing the Lawson and Granger thesis, however, Barnett offers
no explanation as to why Madison would have foregone a straightforward argument in favor of an (at best) obscure reliance on means-ends analysis.
415. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (concerning meaning of Necessary and
Proper Clause and promoting "a rule of interpretation very different from that on
which the bill rests"). Nor does Barnett advance his case by insisting that
Madison's reference to the Ninth Amendment in his antibank speech proves that
Madison believed that the Ninth Amendment had an important constitutional role
beyond preventing a misconstruction of the Constitution based on its inclusion of
individual rights. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 782 n.137 (relying on Madison's
speech to argue that McAffee unduly restricts application of Ninth Amendment in
reading provision as preventing only misconstruction of inclusion of rights). In
the first place, it is the text of the Ninth Amendment that states that it is "[tihe
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It would have been surprising, moreover, had Madison been relying
on an antimonopoly right, given his history of opposition to an antimonopoly constitutional prohibition. 41 6 Equally important for our purpose is
that Jefferson was included among the prominent opponents of the national bank, and he had a record of supporting antimonopoly provisions;
yet Jefferson failed to rely upon unenumerated rights, the Ninth Amendment, or the word "proper" in objecting to the constitutionality of the

enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights" that should not be construed to
deny or disparage other rights retained by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. IX
(emphasis added). The amendment does not speak to any other situation. Moreover, the overwhelming consensus among scholars of the amendment is that its
purpose was not to create new rights, but to ensure that an inference against preexisting rights would not be drawn from the inclusion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution. See Russell Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
69 VA. L. REv. 223, 238-39 (1983) (describing conflict over bill of rights and stating
that "[a] dvocates of a bill of rights were concerned that individual liberties would
be lost under a Constitution that did not expressly declare them reserved"). If
Madison were really purporting to give great substantive content to the amendment outside this context, he would be contradicting the text and everything
known about its adoption. Considering that Madison knew that history, and was
the principle draftsman of the text in question, it is necessary to understand his
argument before attributing constitutional innovation to his argument.
Fortunately, a fair reading of Madison's speech does not require such an attribution. As noted above, Madison relied on both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in opposing the bank even though it is well known that Madison viewed the
Tenth Amendment as purely declaratory of the implications already established in
Article I. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (referencing Ninth and Tenth Amendments
and stating their purpose to guard "against a latitude of interpretation"). Madison
also relies on the general idea of limited government, as embodied in Article I, in
arguing that the bank would represent a departure from constitutional first principle. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 785-86 (discussing Madison's use of "limited
government" idea). In each of these cases, Madison is relying on a rhetorical reminder to his audience of the importance attached to the idea of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. The Tenth Amendment does not answer
the question whether the bank fits within an appropriate exegesis of implied powers, but it suggests that the idea of limited powers was a matter of great and central
concern of many during the ratification process; it was of sufficient concern to
prompt inclusion of a clarifying amendment to nail down the idea of enumerated
and reserved powers. Similarly, the anxiety with which the ratifying conventions
and, eventually Congress, approached the possible expansive arguments about
power derived from the inclusion of debatable exception reflects how strongly they
would have opposed any form of "latitudinous construction" (including an approach to implied powers that would undermine the enumerated-powers scheme).
Although the Ninth Amendment was not literally applicable to the fact pattern at
hand, given that Madison was not responding to a claim that arguments against
the bank were foreclosed because of the specific limits provided in the Bill of
Rights, Madison undoubtedly viewed the Ninth Amendment as important confirming evidence of the importance attached to the goal of preserving the federal government as one of enumerated powers-powers that were not to be "extended by
remote applications." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951.
416. For a discussion of antimonopoly arguments, see supra notes 373-75 and
accompanying text.
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bank bill. 4 17 As in other areas, of course, Jefferson did not have the benefit of modern commentary.

2.

The Crisis of 1798

The debate over the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts provided an
opportunity for constitutional thinkers to discuss the implications of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of disputing the exercise of
federal power that clearly implicated claims of individual right. Given its
individual-rights setting, this debate may be even more relevant to assessing the merits of the broad jurisdictional reading of the Sweeping Clause.
Notwithstanding the existence of the First Amendment and its guarantee
of freedom of the press, the opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts
placed at least as much weight on the argument that Congress lacked authority to pass such laws in the first instance as they did on the First
Amendment prohibition. The opponents of these laws even interpreted
the First Amendment as resting on premises of federalism more than on
concepts of personal liberty and natural right; the protection offered to
personal rights was of an indirect nature. Although this construction of
the First Amendment is deservedly controversial, it nonetheless shows that
the original debate over congressional power to regulate the press
sounded in allocation of power rather than in a jurisdictional barrier in
favor of personal rights emanating from the Sweeping Clause.
In perhaps the most complete critique of these laws, Madison's Report
on the Virginia Resolutions, the author devotes a number of pages to demonstrating that in the Sedition Act Congress exercised "a power not dele417. See Jefferson, supra note 393, at 91, 93 (discussing bill for establishing
national bank). Jefferson alludes to the monopoly status of the bank, but he uses
the point as Madison does. He questions whether
for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most ancient and fundamental laws of the several
States, such as those against mortmain, the laws of alienage, the rules of
descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, the
laws of monopoly?
Id. at 93. Responsive to his own query, Jefferson concludes: "Nothing, but a necessity invincible by any other means, can justify such prostration of laws, which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence." Id. at 93-94. The
argument relates to the question of necessity and sounds in federalism and respect
for state law, not to any limiting principle rooted in a doctrine of implied rights,
whether rooted in the word "proper" or otherwise. In Hamilton's effective response, he does not construe Jefferson's argument as an individual rights claim.
If these are truly the foundation laws of the several States, then have most
of them subverted their own foundations: or there is scarcely one of them
which has not, since the establishment of its particular Constitution,
made material alterations in some of those branches of its jurisprudence,
especially the law of descents. But it is not concerned how any thing can
be called the situation, unalterable by the ordinary legislature. And, with
regard to the question of necessity, it has been shown, that this can only
constitute a question of expediency, not of right.
Id. at 100.
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gated by the Constitution." 418 In the course of that treatment, Madison
does not suggest that such a power had not been delegated because its
exercise would be improper as an invasion of individual liberty. In fact, he
spends several pages addressing the bases for federal authority proffered
by those who defended the Act.419 All of this discussion is directed at the
question of the powers that were granted to the federal government and
their connection to a law such as the one passed by Congress. Considering that Madison viewed the law as an invasion of a fundamental right, one
would have expected a fundamental-rights analysis to at least supplement
his treatment of the powers granted to Congress if fundamental rights limitations were contained in the Sweeping Clause and were considered part
of what comprised the original delegation of power.
In the course of this analysis of possible bases for such federal action,
Madison took up the Necessary and Proper Clause. Considering that Lawson and Granger take Madison's argument against the Sedition Act as supportive of their position, it is important that we consider his entire
analysis:
The plain import of [the Necessary and Proper Clause] is, that
Congress shall have all the incidental or instrumental powers
necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the express
powers, whether they be vested in the government of the United
States, more collectively, or in the several departments or officers
thereof.
It is not a grant of new powers to Congress, but merely a
declaration, or the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of
carrying into execution those otherwise granted are included in
the grant.
Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question is, whether
the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question
is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry, must be,
whether it is properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress.
If it be not, Congress cannot exercise it.
Let the question be asked, then, whether the power over the
press, exercised in the Sedition Act, be found among the powers
expressly vested in Congress. This is not pretended.
Is there any express power, for executing which it is a necessary and proper power?
418.

MADISON'S REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS,

reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S

supra note 19, at 546, 561-68 (citing several possible constitutional bases
for Sedition Act).
419. See id. at 569 (discussing how defenders of Sedition Act cite Sweeping
Clause for support and citing to provisions of Constitution that could be interpreted to do same).
DEBATES,
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The power which has been selected, as least remote, in answer to this question, is that "of suppressing insurrections;" which
is said to imply a power to prevent insurrections, by punishing
whatever may lead or tend to them. But it surely cannot, with the
least plausibility, be said, that the regulation of the press, and
punishment of libels, are exercises of a power to suppress insurrections. The most that could be said would be, that the punishment of libels, if it had the tendency ascribed to it, might prevent
the occasion of passing or executing laws necessary and proper
420
for the suppression of insurrections.
Madison's treatment makes it clear that the relevant consideration,
for the purpose of applying the Necessary and Proper Clause, is the proximity (or lack thereof) between libels and insurrections; he does not treat
the fact that this is a regulation of the press, as opposed to a prohibition
on oral slander to other private parties, for example, as having any particular relevance to the means/end analysis called for, or to the scope of the
grant of power to Congress. When Madison subsequently examines the
Sedition Act by reference to the First Amendment freedom of the press,
he again alludes to the Necessary and Proper Clause, but his statements
there must be understood against the backdrop of his earlier analysis of
42 1
congressional power.
Lawson and Granger focus on Madison's First Amendment treatment
in which he recapitulates federalist assurances about fundamental rights,
"that the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the press,
was neither among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of them:
and consequently that an exercise of any such power would be manifest
usurpation."' 422 They supply a longer excerpt from Madison's work, but
the quoted language is placed in italics, with the apparent implication that
Madison is suggesting that the people retained their right to freedom of
the press by virtue of an individual rights jurisdictional implication of the
Sweeping Clause. 423 This reading, however, is manifestly incorrect, given
that Madison had previously clarified, as shown above, that the claim
about freedom of the press was a factual claim about the powers actually
granted, read in light of an appropriately constrained idea of what could
be viewed as incidental to those powers; it was not a claim about the nor420. Id. at 567-68.
421. See id. ("[TIhe construction here put on terms 'necessary and proper' is
precisely the construction which prevailed during the discussions and ratifications
of the Constitution ... [I] t is a construction absolutely necessary to maintain their
consistency with the peculiar character of the government, as possessed of particular and definite powers only .... ).
422. Id. at 571-72; Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 319.
423. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 319 (reiterating Madison's opposition to Alien and Sedition Acts and emphasizing portions of cited passage in
which 'James Madison recalled this federalist consensus and indicated that it specifically extended to the Sweeping Clause, which in no way authorized Congress to
violate rights such as the freedom of the press.").
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mative implications of any language in article I, whether it was proper or
necessary and proper, functioning as a source of a jurisdictional barrier in
favor of fundamental personal rights.
The balance of Madison's treatment of the First Amendment issue
provides strong confirmation that his powers analysis did not rest on thinking grounded on traditional individual rights constraints on government.
Madison's free-press analysis operates at two levels. At one level, he assumes for purposes of argument that the provision limits the federal government in the same way that a state free press guarantee would limit state
government; and the burden of his treatment is to defend the position
that freedom of the press properly receives greater protection under
American constitutions than it was given under English common law.4 2 4
At a second level, however, Madison offers the far broader claim that the
First Amendment went beyond merely securing the general idea of freedom of the press understood as an individual right against government
interference, actually codified reassurances about the absence of any federal power over the press and, thus, was intended as "a positive denial to
4 25
Congress of any power whatever on the subject."
In effect Madison reads the First Amendment as an attempt to affirm
in positive language what he believed had been achieved by the lack of
inclusion of any express power over the press; although this provision
might thus give security to a free press against any threat of federal encroachment, his claim is that the Clause operates as a broad subject matter
disability rather than as a means constraint on the exercise of federal
power in favor of individual liberty. 426 In fact, on Madison's reading, the
First Amendment functions as a guarantee of exclusive state power to regulate the press up to the boundaries of a proper understanding of the
freedom of the press as much as it serves as a guarantee of personal liberty. 427 To the extent that personal liberty is implicated, it is not so much

424. MADISON'S REPORT, supra note 418, at 569-71 (discussing common-law
freedom of press and concluding that " [t]
he essential difference between the British government and the american constitutions will place this subject in the clearest light").
425. Id. at 571. In fact, the language from Madison's work upon which Lawson and Granger rely, in which he looks back to the ratification-era assurances that
Congress lacked power over the press, was offered to lend support to his reading of
the First Amendment as a broad subject matter disability. Cf Bybee, supra note 2,
at 1567 ("The real issue for the Republicans was not what comprised the freedoms
of speech and press, but whether Congress had any power at all in these areas.").
426. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 1556 (adopting view similar to Madison's, contrasting First Amendment with other limits in Bill of Rights that "restrain the way
the government conducts its legitimate functions," such as conducting criminal
investigations and trials). Bybee concludes that the First Amendment "is a subjectmatter disability, as opposed to a procedural disability" in that it "puts a category of
laws beyond the competence of Congress." Id.
427. See MADISON's REPORT, supra note 418, at 570 (noting that "freedom of
the press" is not absolute right even while asserting view that Congress lacked all
authority respecting it). Hence he acknowledges "the difficulty of all general questions, which may turn on the proper boundary between the liberty and licentious-
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about personal liberty per se as it is about personal liberty vis-it-vis the national government. 428 If Madison's original claims about the absence of
federal power over the press had rested on an individual rights jurisdictional barrier, however, his subsequent analysis of the First Amendment
would be incoherent; he should properly have confined himself to contending that the Sedition Act prohibitions invaded the sphere of freedom
of the press rather than claiming that all regulation of the press had been
reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
There may be room to doubt whether Madison and his allies correctly
read the First Amendment as a broad subject matter disability to Congress
precluding all regulation of the press. This view certainly has not prevailed historically, and perhaps for good reason. AsJohn Marshall pointed
out, by contrast to the Establishment Clause's broad prohibition of all laws
respecting an establishment of religion, the Free Press Clause merely prohibits laws "abridging the freedom of ...the press. '429 Moreover, the very
ness of the press," even as he eventually insists that the First Amendment embodies
a
policy of binding the hands of the federal government from touching the
channel which alone can give efficacy to its responsibility to its constituents, and of leaving those who administer it to a remedy, for their injured
reputations, under the same laws, and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties, and their properties?
Id. at 570, 573. Madison believed that the press might be held accountable for
abuses, but only tinder state law; Congress had passed a federalism-based boundary
that incidentally worked to protect personal freedom from interference from the
national government. Madison would have specifically denied that Congress could
have regulated the press provided they did not improperly invade freedom of the
press. Cf Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 19 at 54041 (stating that in light of First and Tenth Amendments "all lawful powers respecting [the press] did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the people" and thus people were determined "to retain
to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech, and of the
press, may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those
abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated rather than
the use be destroyed").
428. See Palmer, supra note 2, at 115 (writing without considering relevance of
issues to proper construction of Necessary and Proper Clause). In fact, it seems
fair to say that the tendency of Madison and others to see the issues primarily in
terms of affirming the lack of federal authority contributed to the failure of the
first Congress to clarify fully their intentions as to the scope of the liberties guaranteed in the First Amendment. See id. at 115-17 (describing proposal of amendments by Madison to First Congress and his state-oriented idea of bill of rights).
429. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 4 ("Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
");seeJOHN MARSHALL, REPORT OF THE
MINORITY ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 136, 138 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (discussing how term
"abridgment" differs from "respecting" and stating that "[i] t becomes then necessary in order to determine whether the act in question be unconstitutional or not,
to inquire whether it does in fact abridge the freedom of the press"). Less acceptable is Marshall's suggestion that the wording of the First Amendment was evidence
of a power to regulate the press because it would have been unnecessary to modify
the legislative power "if the power itself does not exist." Id. at 137. This is precisely
the argument about the implication of including a free-press provision that the
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linkage of the First Amendment language to the ratification-era debate
over the omission of a Bill of Rights seems suggestive that the guarantee
was a cautionary provision in the truest sense-a guarantee of an individual right that the legislative power was not to abridge, but that many
claimed would never have to be invoked because no power over the press
had been granted, either expressly or by implication. 43 0 The assurances of
the Constitution's proponents that a power to regulate the press had not
been granted, upon which Madison relies in explicating the First Amendment, cannot be conclusive on the original question of federal authority
any more than the antifederalists' claims to the contrary. 43 1 Nothing in
the drafting history of the First Amendment, moreover, suggests that its
federalists had feared and had sought to guard against in adopting the Ninth
Amendment. Cf MADISON'S REPORT, supra note 418, at 572 (describing opponents' position as declaring that states denied that any power of press had been
delegated by Constitution).
430. See Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments as a Declaration of Rights, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 351, 389-94 (1992) (stating that driving force behind inclusion of Bill of
Rights was concern for individual liberty that might potentially be threatened by
federal power). The Bill of Rights became the handiwork of "pragmatic Federalists" who did not believe that a Bill of Rights was essential, but were willing "to
support formal protections of individual liberty" to obtain a wider acceptance of
the Constitution. Id. at 395. Finkelman's thesis is consistent with a recognition
that federalist confidence in the protection of liberty secured by the unamended
Constitution contributed to a relative inattention to issues concerning the intended scope of the guarantees included.
431. See, e.g., MADISON's REPORT, supra note 418, at 576 (relying on Virginia
ratification Convention's recital of understanding that Constitution granted no authority to United States to affect liberty of press). The question of whether any
given regulation of the press can be viewed as incidental to some other power,
express or implied, can only be answered by recourse to the powers themselves
and an appropriate application of the Necessary and Proper Clause; this is a difficult question to answer a priori, except perhaps as to a fairly broad and general
regulation of the press as such. Cf Bybee, supra note 2, at 1567-68 ("Any law might
incidentally affect speech and press, but the Sedition Act was, after all, a law about
speech and press, and that Congress had no power to enact."). Even the Sedition
Act was targeted at protecting federal officials from purportedly seditious speech, a
task that (if legitimate at all) seems an unlikely one to reserve to the states, that
might have conflicting interests when it came to the federal government and its
enemies. The Sedition Act reads in part:
That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or
procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either House of the said Congress, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either House of the said Congress, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them into contempt or disrepute; or to excite
against them or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of
the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to
excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any
law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States,
done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defend any such
law or act, or to aid, encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

119

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43: p. 17

purpose was to do anything beyond reassuring the people that freedom of
speech and of the press, as they understood those freedoms, would not be
threatened-whether because Congress lacked any authority over speech
or press in the first instance or because it was expressly precluded from
4 2
abridging the legitimate exercise of press freedom. 3
Finally, although a broad subject matter disability on congressional
regulation of speech and press could have been an option considered, it
appears an extreme outcome in light of the language actually employed in
the First Amendment. It could also be read to preclude what seems to be
obviously reasonable exercises of congressional power that, nevertheless,
directly or indirectly constitute regulations of speech or press (though not
necessarily invasions of the respective freedoms). To use an obvious example of an extreme result it could occasion, Congress is expressly granted
nation against the United States, their people or government, then such
person being thereof convicted, etc.
Act of July 14, 1798 (Sedition Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
432. See Madison, supra note 3, at 79-80 (describing his proposed Bill of
Rights as designed to satisfy public that fundamental rights were secure under
Constitution); see also Egbert Benson, (Aug. 15, 1789), inCREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 159 (acknowledging that freedom of speech, press, and
assembly are "inherent" and asserting that purpose of provisions is "to provide
against.., their being infringed by the government"); Elbridge Gerry, supra note
381, at 160 (finding First Amendment rights also to be "essential" and only "a
declaration to that effect" can make people "secure in the peaceable enjoyment" of
these rights). Others stressed that such provisions gave reassurance that these
rights were secure for those who did not accept the argument from limited powers.
SeeJohn Vining, Debates in the House of Representatives (Aug. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 160-61 (agreeing to provisions if they
were "harmless" and "would tend to gratify the states that had proposed amendments"); Rep. Hartley (Aug. 19, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
3, at 160-61 (observing that rights and powers not granted to government "were
retained by states and the people" and that provisions "were as necessary to be
inserted in the declaration of rights as most in the clause"). None of these statements suggested that a broad subject matter disability was contemplated rather
than a guarantee of a traditional freedom in terms recognized as such by all; nor
was there any suggestion that the guarantee ran in favor of the states, as opposed
to individuals. See generally Finkelman, supra note 430, at 378-79 (examining arguments of those demanding bill of rights and attempting to show bill of rights "as a
protector of individual liberty").
Moreover, Madison's favorite proposed amendment, which was not adopted
by Congress, was a proposal to limit state power, and it provided that "no state shall
violate... the freedom of the press." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 1113 (emphasis added). This language tracks with both Madison's original proposal
for a press guarantee to be included in Article I, Section 9, and the text of the First
Amendment. Compare id. at 12 (stating Madison's proposal for Article I, Section 9,
as reading "[t]he people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak,
to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable"), with U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging . . .freedom of the press").
There is every reason to think that the two statements of government disability as
to the press were substantially identical in scope, but were to be applied to two
different levels of government.
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the power "to declare the punishment of Treason," 43 3 and it is difficult to
imagine that a press revelation of a critical military secret might not fit the
definition of "treason" supplied by the Constitution. 434 To the extent that
a law punished such an act, however, it could be characterized as a regulation of the press subject to the broad subject matter disability supposedly
embodied in the First Amendment, and purely as a matter of logic, one
might insist that even such an extreme abuse of press freedom should be
reserved for redress in the states. 435 There are good reasons, however, for
the federal government to be able to prosecute a member of the press who
commits an act fairly characterized as treason and no reason to think that
the Framers of either Article I or the First Amendment intended to pre43 6
vent it.
433. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
434. See id. at art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (defining treason as consisting "only in levying
War against" country, or "in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort").
435. See MADISON's REPORT, supra note 418, at 572-73 (taking up question
whether federal government is "destitute of every authority for restraining the licentiousness of the press, and for shielding itself against the libelous attacks which
may be made on those who administer it?"). His answer is terse; if such a law "be
expressly forbidden, by a declaratory amendment to the Constitution,-the answer must be, that the federal government is destitute of all such authority." Id. at
573. It is not clear why Madison's express prohibition would not equally apply to
an act of treason committed through either an exercise or abuse of liberty of the
press, and the same factors that Madison relies upon to justify this broad exclusion-the magnitude of powers granted the national government, duration required for the function of some of its departments, peculiar distance between the
seat of that government and its constituents and great need for a press to circulate
knowledge about the actions of the federal government-are equally applicable in
the more extreme case. See id. (concluding that "these considerations ...

account

for the policy of binding the hands of the federal government" and "leaving those
who administer it to a remedy, for their injured reputations, under the same laws,
and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties, and their
properties").
436. See id. at 573-74 (discussing penalty for publication of any scandalous,
false or malicious writing against U.S. government or any house of Congress). Similarly, even under stringent modem standards giving significant protection to freedom of speech, press, and assembly, it seems apparent that acts of speech and the
press can incite illegal and violent conduct against federal interests, undermine
legitimate exercise of federal authority and adversely impact on important national
goals such as the successful prosecution of a war. It seems implausible to think
that the language of the First Amendment requires that Congress is totally disabled
from meeting such threats to valid national purposes merely because the conduct
in question fits within these broad subject matter categories, regardless of whether
they fall within the scope of legitimate exercise of freedom. See U.S. CON T. art. I
(creating Congress and its powers). As illustrated by the treason example in text,
such a guarantee appears to operate as an arbitrary limitation on the reasonable
application of the general language of federal powers; its force would be felt in a
range of much more mundane cases. Can Congress, for example, provide reasonable time, place and manner regulations on protest gatherings outside federal
buildings around the country, or is all authority to restrict petition and assembly
reserved to the states? May Congress prohibit individuals from threatening the life
of the President, or may only the states weigh the speech interest against the threat
to government?
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Even if the opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts overstated their
case, however, the overall debate does not-offer any support to the broad
jurisdictional reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Under a fairly
constrained reading of federal powers, the federal structure of the Constitution has in fact offered a considerable amount of protection to freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. At the same time, consistent with the
outcome of the Bill of Rights debate itself, the First Amendment stands as
a backstop to secure legitimate exercise of speech and press freedoms in
those cases in which the enumerated powers scheme fails to operate as a
barrier. There is no reason to think, however, that the individual-right
guarantees that would be placed in the First Amendment had previously
stood as individual-right limitations on federal power under the language
of the Sweeping Clause. Neither the ratification debate nor the debate
over the Alien and Sedition Acts supports such a reading.
F.

Concluding Observations

Lawson and Granger are hardly the first to suggest that the adoption
of a Bill of Rights may have served to promote inattention to the rightsprotective potential of the federal system. 4 3 7 Before the theme was picked
up by contemporary advocates of the unwritten Constitution, Herbert
Storing floated the idea that individual-rights limitations might have been
read into the federal structure absent the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. 438
Lawson and Granger also seem to intimate that we have basically lost track
of the Sweeping Clause as a jurisdictional limitation that secured various
individual rights because we have come to rely exclusively on the Bill of
Rights; they propose to reinvigorate the Sweeping Clause in part as a
means of realizing the Framers' rights-protective goals. 439 Such ap437. See Storing, supra note 304, at 16 (observing that federalists gave Constitution to America and antifederalists gave Bill of Rights to America and "when so
much of constitutional law is connected with the Bill of Rights" it is "plausible...
to conclude that the antifederalists, the apparent losers in the debate over the
Constitution, were ultimately the winners."). Storing noted:
It is interesting to consider what our constitutional law would be like today if there had been no Bill of Rights. Its focus would presumably be to
a far greater extent than it is today on the powers of government. We
might expect a more searching examination by the Supreme Court of
whether federal legislation that seems to conflict with cherished individual liberties is indeed "necessary and proper" to the exercise of granted
powers. We might expect a fuller articulation than we usually receive of
whether, in Marshall's term, "the end" aimed at by given legislation, "is
legitimate." Might this not foster a healthy concern with the problems of
governing, a healthy sense of responsible self-government?
Id. at 24-25.
438. See id. at 25 (relying on federalist assurances that natural rights were secured by structure of Constitution and suggesting that natural rights might have
been relied upon directly in absence of Bill of Rights).
439. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 7, at 274 ("The Sweeping Clause, when
properly understood as a jurisdictional limitation on the scope of federal power, is
a vital part of the constitutional design. That understanding has largely been lost
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proaches strike one as back and fill operations, designed to read into the
Constitution what was never intended to be there; there is no avoiding the
reality that the Constitution enumerated powers sufficient to authorize invasion of fundamental freedoms and that there was a critical need for the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Even so, modern attempts to rescue the Constitution from itself point
to some truths worthy of our consideration. First, given the importance of
a number of fundamental rights to the people of the United States, the
search for a savings clause of some kind was and is a natural enough temptation. Second, there is something to be said for the idea that dangerous
reliance upon a bill of rights may lull us into a false sense of security that
may prompt us to pay insufficient attention to alternative devices for securing liberty. There is little room for doubt that, despite their concerns
about the possibility of overburdening government with unnecessary limitations, the federalists were not bent on establishing aristocratic tyranny,
notwithstanding the sometimes harsh claims of their opponents. Partly
out of haste, partly out of concern of getting bogged down in conflict over
the content of limits on government, and partly out of skepticism about
the value of parchment barriers, the Framers did not make the effort to
provide a comprehensive list of limitations on government. 440 They did
believe that the federal nature of the government established by the Constitution made the enterprise less essential than under the state constitutions, but they did not sufficiently think through the implications of this
general position or the fact that this distinction could not satisfactorily
441
account for all the rights omitted.

Considering that the defense of the decision to omit a bill of rights
began to falter at the outset and never really recovered, it should come as
no surprise that a very small number of defenders of the Constitution were
tempted to rely upon the time-honored nature of some of the threatened
rights and to suggest that legislation invasive of such rights violated norms
inherent to government itself or would constitute improper laws under
the Sweeping Clause. 442 It is the existence of such statements, and the
tradition of unwritten norms of fundamental law on which they all to some
degree rely, that explains why there is a debate over whether the Framers
in modern times. We hope to reclaim it here."). Lawson and Granger argued that
the jurisdictional meaning of the word "proper" in the Sweeping Clause was the
best interpretation of the word. See id. at 286 (stating that "ajurisdictional meaning of 'proper' was in ordinary usage during the framing era").
440. See McAffee, OriginalMeaning, supra note 15, at 1227 ("The lack of sustained debate on the inclusion of a bill of rights suggests that the leading members
of the convention underestimated the effect of the decision not to include a more
complete set of rights provisions on the prospects for ratification of the new
Constitution.").
441. See id. (giving historical overview of Ninth Amendment and debates surrounding Bill of Rights).

442. See id. at 1270 n.216 (discussing similar argument advanced by proponent of Constitution).
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intended an unwritten Constitution. Even if such statements serve as a
starting point for building a normative theory of the Constitution, the historical evidence shows that these statements contradict the pervasive and
predominant themes of the ratification debate. They are thus unlikely
candidates for aiding the attempt to discover the best construction of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
IV.

STATE POWER TO CREATE AND PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FROM

FEDERAL INTRUSION

The final theory linking the federal system to fundamental rights is
the most novel-and perhaps least plausible-of the group. As has been
demonstrated, those who opposed the Constitution often linked the concern for protecting personal liberty to the preservation of state authority.
A variation on this theme was the claim that the Supremacy Clause (and
the Constitution generally) empowered Congress to enact laws that would
override conflicting state laws, including basic individual rights embodied
in state declarations of rights.

443

This line of attack was partly defensive in

nature because the Constitution's proponents argued against a bill of
rights on the ground that the people's rights would continue to be secured by tie declarations of rights in the state constitutions. This defense
rested on a premise of a limited national government that had not been
empowered to override those rights. 444 Nevertheless, statements about
the potential threat to state law rights posed by the Constitution have
prompted some scholars to suggest that the other rights retained by the
people in the Ninth Amendment consist of, or at least include, rights se4
cured by state law.

45

443. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 109, at 9, 11 (arguing in favor of bill of rights

and observing that "the Laws of the general government" are "paramount to the
Laws and Constitutions of the several States").
444. See Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown, supra note 240, at 386-87
(underscoring that Federal Supremacy Clause applied only to laws not exceeding
powers granted by Constitution and noting that states will police system to ensure
that national government has not overstepped boundaries). Sherman, of course,
would have had no disagreement with Mason as to the legal effect of the
Supremacy Clause; the real substance of their disagreement concerned whether
the powers granted to the national government granted sufficiently broad authority to invade the fundamental sorts of rights included in the state declarations of
right. See id. at 389 (stating Sherman's view that "[i]n order to [have] a well regulated government, the legislature, Should be dependant on the people, and be
vested with a plenitude of power.., to be exercised only for the public good").
Some opponents of the Constitution, however, relied on the text of the Supremacy
Clause as independent evidence that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
create a consolidated, all-powerful government over the nation as a whole. See, e.g.,
LETTER OF CENTINEL V, supra note 109, at 168 (arguing that if "foregoing powers
should not suffice to consolidate the United States into one empire" Convention

added Supremacy Clause "as if to prevent the possibility of doubt" and result will
be "iron-handed despotism").
445. See Caplan, supra note 415, at 227-28 (discussing rights included in Ninth
Amendment); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth
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The most extreme version of this theory, set forth in several works by
Calvin R. Massey, posits that one purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to
serve as a kind of "Reverse Preemption Clause. '44 6 For example, rights
protected as fundamental by state constitutions would trump inconsistent
acts of Congress, despite the Supremacy Clause, because the inclusion of
rights in a state constitution would assure their status as rights retained by
the people and limit the scope of federal power. 44 7 Not surprisingly, Massey's claim that the Ninth Amendment secures state-created rights as affirmative limitations on federal power had not been advanced by a single
commentator between 1789 and the 1980s. This reading, moreover,
presents an incoherent amalgamation of diametrically opposed readings
of the text and history of the Ninth Amendment.
A.

State Law Rights and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments

As originally set forth in the work of Russell Caplan, upon which Professor Massey relied, the state-law rights thesis was an attempt to reinforce
the close historical link between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The
thesis posited that the Ninth Amendment took the role of securing the
rights, existing under state law, that had been guaranteed by Article II of
the Articles of Confederation. 448 As we have seen, Article II was the state
sovereignty provision of the Articles, which provided that each state "retains.., every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States."44 9 Article II was a rights
guarantee in exactly the same sense that the Tenth Amendment is a rights
Amendment, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 305, 322-29, 343 (1987) (stating that Ninth Amendment protects positive rights having source in state law); Wilmarth, supra note 2, at
1285-89, 1297-98 (same); cf McConnell, supra note 309, at 229 (suggesting that
state law rights, along with other federal positive law rights, were among
unenumerated rights to which Ninth Amendment referred). McConnell stated:
[T]he [Ninth] Amendment neither creates new rights nor alters the status of pre-existing rights. Instead, it simply provides that the individual
rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state enactment, by federal preemption, or by judicial determination of unconstitutionality.
Id. at 228.
446. See MAssEY, supra note 16, at 123-73 (discussing Ninth Amendment and
"Reverse Preemption Clause"); Massey, supra note 42, at 988 (same); Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its Implications for State Constitutional
Law, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1229, 1254-61 (same).
447. See Massey, supra note 445, at 1233 (stating "state citizens have the power,
through their state constitutions, to preserve areas of individual life from invasion
by the federal Congress in the exercise of its delegated powers."). He characterizes
this view as "radical stuff, for it amounts to a form of reverse preemption." Id.
448. See Caplan, supra note 415, at 262 ("[T]he ninth and tenth amendments
both derived from article II of the Articles of Confederation."). Caplan also contends that the Ninth Amendment has its origins in the seventeenth Virginia
amendment. See id. at 254 n.132 (stating that commentators usually acknowledge
descent from seventeenth Virginia amendment to Ninth Amendment).
449. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (declaring completely that "[e]ach
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdic-
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guarantee-it secured for the states the sovereign power, including the
authority to recognize rights in state law, beyond the authority granted to
the nation. 450 The security this added to personal rights was purely an
indirect result. One implication of this retained sovereignty was that the
rights guaranteed by state law would continue to be secure to the extent
that powers actually delegated to the national government did not include
45 1
authority sufficient to displace such state-law rights.
Caplan's article suggested that the rights referred to, and secured by,
Article II of the Articles of Confederation were the individual-right guarantees found within state law, whether constitutional or statutory. 452 He
concluded that the rights in question were state rather than federal
rights. 4 53 Therefore, just as with reserved powers under the Tenth
Amendment, Caplan found the security given these rights by the Ninth
Amendment depended entirely on an appropriate construction of federal
powers to determine whether those powers extended far enough to permit
federal preemption of such state law rights. 4 5 4 In support of this reading,

Caplan pointed to a statement attributed to Edmund Randolph that
linked together the texts of the Virginia equivalents of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. 455 Caplan concluded that inasmuch as the Tenth
tion, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States in Congress assembled").
450. See id. (providing in part that states retain "sovereignty, freedom, and
independence").
451. See Caplan, supra note 415, at 236 (explaining that under Article II of
Articles of Confederation, states "retained the right of self-government and, consequently, the fight to enact and maintain laws regarding individual liberties.").
452. See id. ("The Articles of Confederation recognized that the country's fundamental law consisted of the states' fundamental laws.").
453. See id. at 243 (contending that "enforceable rights beyond those enumerated in the Constitution (or in the form of federal statutes) would exist only in the
governments of the various states"); id. at 262-63 (arguing that Ninth and Tenth
Amendments were each derived from Article II of Articles of Confederation and
"were paired in the final version of the Bill of Rights probably because of their
analogous residual purposes"). Clearly, Caplan sees the Ninth Amendment as securing only residual rights. Moreover, unlike Massey, he places no weight on
whether the rights exist as a matter of ordinary positive law, as in a statute or in a
state's fundamental law; each sort of state law, on his reading, receives the same
security as being guaranteed to the extent that it is not preempted by a valid exercise of granted power.
454. See id. at 261 (stating that Ninth Amendment rights "cannot form a basis
for holding acts of Congress unconstitutional" because "they are state rather than
federal in character").
455. See id. at 255-56 (discussing view that Madison based Ninth Amendment
on First and Seventeenth proposed Virginia amendments). Madison recounted
Randolph's opposition:
His principal objection was pointed agst. the word 'retained,' in the eleventh proposed amendment [the Ninth Amendment], and his argument
if I understood it was.., that as the rights declared in the first ten of the
proposed amendments were not all that a free people would require the
exercise of, and that as there was no criterion by which it could be determined whether any other particular right was retained or not, it would be
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Amendment, unlike Article II, referred only to powers and not to rights, it
followed that the Ninth Amendment became the textual grounding for
securing rights that exist under state law, but which are subject to the exer456
cise of powers actually granted by the Constitution.
Professor Massey, on the other hand, culled from Caplan's analysis
the bare conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was at least in part "an
attempt to be certain that rights protected by state law were not sup457
planted by federal law simply because they were not enumerated."
Contrary to Caplan's analysis, however, Massey found that the Ninth
Amendment's state law rights trump federal powers in the event of conflict.458 He rested this conclusion on two arguments: (1) the textual argument that, if the unenumerated state-law rights limit only state power, and
not federal power, these unenumerated rights would be disparaged vis-imore safe and more consistent with the spirit of the 1st and 17th
amendts. proposed by Virginia that this reservation agst. constructive
power, should operate rather as a provision agst. extending the powers of
Congs. by their own authority, than a protection to rights reducible to no
definite certainty.
Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 105, at
431).
Another commentator who embraced Caplan's thesis, Arthur Wilmarth, also
relied upon the same dialogue from Virginia to which Randolph had contributed.
See Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1302 & n.209 (concluding that Ninth and Tenth
Amendments reflect "parallel intent" and were designed to "work together to restrain the extension of congressional powers by implication").
456. See Caplan, supra note 415, at 263-64 (comparing Ninth and Tenth
Amendments and concluding that "[t]he ninth amendment looks to the past, to
established rights that have been or shall be 'retained'; the tenth amendment
looks to the future, allowing the states to legislate, to revise their constitutions, and
in general to engage in appropriate governmental operations"). At first glance,
Caplan's conclusion might seem more plausible because the Virginia proposal that
anticipated the Tenth Amendment used Article II's "rights, powers, and jurisdiction" language, while Madison's Tenth Amendment proposal used only the language of "powers." Compare Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra
note 19, at 659 ("That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress
of the United States, or to the departments of the federal government."), with 1
ANNALS OF CONG.

454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) ("The powers delegated by this

constitution are appropriated to departments to which they are respectively
distributed.").
457. See MASSEY, supranote 16, at 121-22 (discussing purpose of Ninth Amendment "to do more than secure unenumerated state-sourced rights from federal
invasion" and "serve as a barrier to encroachment upon natural rights retained by
the people" (citing Caplan, supra note 415, at 254)); see also id. at 123-24 (stating
that "even originalist commentators such as Russell Caplan have concluded that
the Ninth Amendment 'simply provides that the individual rights contained in
state law are to continue in force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state enactment, by federal preemption, or by ajudicial determination of
unconstitutionality"' (quoting Caplan, supra note 415, at 228)).
458. See id. at 124 (arguing that Ninth Amendment rights "are, by definition,
federal constitutional rights, whatever their ultimate source may be").
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vis the enumerated rights, which do limit federal power; 4

9

and (2) the

historical claim that the antifederalistswere seeking to limit federal power
and would not have agreed to a provision that did not protect fundamen460
tal state-law rights against federal power.
A fundamental problem, however, is that the two proffered reasons
for refusing to limit the state-law rights as proposed by Caplan would
equally be grounds for rejecting Caplan's conclusion that the Ninth
Amendment was about securing state-law rights as such-a conclusion that
rested on the finding that the purpose was only to reserve state law rights
461
that were not superseded by the powers granted by the Constitution.
Thus, if we reject Caplan's attempt to analogize the protection given statelaw rights by the Ninth Amendment to the protection given residual state
powers by the Tenth, as Massey insists we must based on the Ninth Amendment's prohibition on disparaging unenumerated rights, we equally undercut the major piece of evidence Caplan relies upon to link the Ninth
Amendment to securing state law rights: Edmund Randolph's statement
linking together the basic thrust of the Virginia equivalents of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. 462 Similarly, if it is true that the antifederalists
would not have been satisfied with a simple reassurance that state-law
rights would not be displaced except by the legitimate exercise of delegated power, it follows that the very foundation of Caplan's argument459. See id. (stating that Ninth Amendment forbids interpreters to "deny or
disparage" other rights retained by people in state constitutions); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
460. See Massey, supra note 445, at 1244 (finding fault with Caplan's reading
in part because it "assumes that the Anti-Federalists failed to realize that the ninth
amendment would not do what they demanded of it: preserve individual rights
rooted in state law against federal invasion"). Massey went further to state: "Given
the evident and overriding concern of the Anti-Federalists on this point, it is highly
unlikely that the Anti-Federalists would have acceded to an amendment so illsuited to their purpose." Id..
461. See id. (discussing Caplan's view). Remarkably, Massey states these contradictory conclusions without questioning the line of analysis by which Caplan
reasoned that state law rights were protected by the Ninth Amendment, including
his use of evidence linking both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to Article II of
the Articles of Confederation. See id. ("Caplan contends that the [Ninth] amendment simply provides that the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state
enactment .... (quoting Caplan, supra note 415, at 254)). Massey's analysis attempts to link the Ninth Amendment to the debate over the Supremacy Clause
and the adequacy of the state declarations of rights, but Caplan's analysis links the
amendment to the fears expressed as to the omission of Article II of the Articles of
Confederation. Id. at 1254 (arguing that his interpretation of Ninth Amendment
does not violate Supremacy Clause). Consequently, whereas Caplan's analysis is
premised on the view that all state-law rights are secured, but only residually (to
the extent not preempted by powers granted the nation), Massey focuses exclusively on state fundamental law. Id. at 1258-63 (discussing Ninth Amendment as
preserving state fundamental law).
462. For a discussion of Edmund Randolph's view, see supra note 102-03 and
accompanying text.
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that the Ninth Amendment grew out of Article II of the Articles of Confed463
eration-must equally be rejected.
Massey's state-law rights thesis and Caplan's analysis, however, begin
at fundamentally opposed starting points for understanding the project
embodied in the Ninth Amendment. Caplan sees the Amendment as an
outgrowth of Article II and, therefore, as a complementary provision to
the Tenth Amendment's general reservation of all power not granted to
the national government. 464 Massey sees the Amendment as an expansion
of the limiting provisions of the first eight amendments and, thus, as complementary to the idea of stating affirmative limitations on powers
granted to government. 465 Although these views are superficially similar,
virtually every bit of evidence that would support Caplan's reading would
undermine Massey's, and vice-versa.
The key to resolving the issue of the relationship between concerns
about state-law rights and the Bill of Rights is to understand that the fear
of displacement of state law was really a variation on the general antifederalist themes of unlimited powers and consolidated government. Maryland's antifederalist minority, for example, proposed that "Congress shall
466
exercise no power but what is expressly delegated by this constitution."
Its proponents claimed that, pursuant to this provision, the "general powers given to Congress" by the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Supremacy Clause would be restrained, constructive powers prevented
and "those dangerous expressions by which the bills of rights and constitutions of the several states may be repealed by the laws of Congress, in some
degree moderated, and the exercise of constructive powers wholly pre463. See Massey, supranote 445, at 1238 n.50 (suggesting that his own state-law
rights interpretation is bolstered because other commentators have followed
Caplan's lead in perceiving Ninth Amendment as guarantee of rights secured by
state law). This claim is unwarranted. In each case, the authors linked up with
Caplan's idea that the rights secured by the Ninth Amendment are state-law rights
in their nature and concluded that the Ninth Amendment performs the same
function for state-law rights that the Tenth Amendment performs for state powers.
See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1302-03 n.209 (distinguishing view that Ninth
Amendment is "barrier against the extension of federal powers by unwarranted
implication," which follows Caplan, fiom view that Amendment acts as "limitation
on the means by which [federal] powers could be exercised"). Although Caplan
and those who have followed his lead may well have confounded the purposes of
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the evidence and analysis they rely upon
hardly furthers Massey's conception of the project embodied in the Ninth Amendment. For a discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see supra notes 37882 and accompanying text.
464. For a discussion of Caplan's Ninth Amendment analysis, see supra note
445 and accompanying text.
465. For a discussion of Massey's view of the Ninth Amendment, see supra
notes 457-60 and accompanying text.
466. See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, supra
note 41, at 94 (agreeing to this amendment to Constitution by "unanimous vote" or
"great majority" and restraining powers given to Congress in Article I).
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vented." 46 7 This state-law-rights-based argument and proposal leads directly to the Tenth Amendment as drafted by Madison. Furthermore, it
underscores that inferences against rights to be reserved structurally, by
the grant of limited powers and the reservation of all powers not granted,
were feared as much as deficiencies in the elaboration of specific, affirmative limitations on government power.
To put the same basic point another way, the debate over the significance of the Supremacy Clause begged the question presented by the balance of the debate over the Constitution as a whole. The Constitution's
defenders conceded that the Supremacy Clause meant that federal law
would displace conflicting state law, but they denied that the powers
granted to the national government were extensive enough to present a
real threat to traditional rights secured by state law. Those who opposed
the Constitution believed that the Supremacy Clause eliminated the security of state-law guarantees because the rest of the Constitution could be
read to grant so much power to the national government as to render
state-law protections meaningless. The debate over the Supremacy Clause
became simply another angle from which to continue the dialogue between those demanding and those opposing a bill of rights in general and
a clause reserving power to the people and the states in particular.
Caplan argues correctly that the resolution of the debate over the
continuing efficacy of state-law rights can be linked to antifederalist demands that the Constitution include a provision analogous to Article II of
the Articles of Confederation to ensure that the states retained all powers
and rights not actually delegated to the federal government. 468 Caplan is
wrong, however, that the provision called for by this debate is the Ninth
Amendment; rather, it is the Tenth Amendment. 469 In both the ratification-period debate, as well as in the proposals offered by the state ratifying
conventions, the demand for a general reservation provision was cast in
terms of reserved powers or reserved rights, as well as in terms of "rights,
powers, and jurisdiction" (the language of Article II).470 There is no evi-

dence suggesting that the variations in the proposed language in these
demands implied any difference in the substance of the proposed amendment. In every case, what was proposed was a general reservation of sovereign power that would secure rights guaranteed by state law to the extent
467. See id. at 94-95 (referencing one of thirteen amendments agreed to by
Maryland convention and referred to committee). This proposal is simply another

version of the general reservation clause demanded by antifederalists at every convention; it is the functional equivalent of the Tenth Amendment.
468. See Caplan, supra note 415, at 245 (stating that "antifederalists pointed
out that Article II of the Articles of Confederation had embraced individual as well
as state rights, and argued that a bill of rights was necessary to guarantee individuals the same protection under the proposed Constitution").
469. See id. at 259-60 (finding that provision that antifederalists envisioned
ultimately became Ninth Amendment).

470. For a discussion of the Constitution's scheme of enumerated powers and
reserved rights, see supra note 56-62 and accompanying text.
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that the powers actually granted to the national government did not conflict with them.
The Ninth Amendment protected exactly the same rights-those defined as the residuum from the powers delegated to the nation by the
Constitution-but from an entirely different potential threat. Federalist
critics feared that a bill of rights, as described above, that attempted to
enumerate specific limitations on the powers delegated by the Constitution might threaten the rights secured structurally by creating the inference that the federal government was limited only by the specific rights
contained in the bill of rights. 4 7 1 A related argument was that the inclusion of fundamental rights as to which no power had in fact been granted
could itself raise an inference that unintended powers had been granted
472
as to which such specified rights served as exceptions or limitations.
The Constitution's antifederalist critics, who demanded a bill of rights,
simply added to the concerns that led to the Ninth Amendment, inasmuch
as they chose to adopt the thrust of these arguments, in responding that
the partial enumeration of rights in the proposed Constitution itself suggested the very implications that the federalists feared from a bill of rights.
The Ninth Amendment's purpose to secure the rights reserved by the
Constitution's enumerated powers scheme is reflected in Virginia's seventeenth proposed amendment, drafted by Madison and prominent antifederalists and later drawn on by Madison in drafting the Ninth
Amendment. 473 This provision prohibited an inference of extended national powers from the enumeration of specific clauses limiting the exercise of federal powers and clarified that these stated limitations might in
some cases be mere cautionary provisions that do not qualify any power
4 74
actually granted.
471. The federalists feared that the attempt to set forth a comprehensive set
of rights would be taken as exhausting the people's rights as against the new government, in effect demolishing the distinction between the federal government,

intended as a government of enumerated powers, and the state governments,
which were conceived as governments of general powers. See 4 ELLIoT'S DEBATES,
supra note 19, at 149 ("A bill of rights, as I conceive, would not only be incongruous, but dangerous."). For a further discussion of Iredell's fears, see supra note 19
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the fear of such a bill of rights, see
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
472. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 274, at 579 (asserting that bill
of rights is not only unnecessary but also dangerous). Hamilton expressed concern that a bill of rights "would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim
more than were granted." Id.
473. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1236 (noting that
Madison served on committee appointed by Virginia Ratifying Convention, which

included prominent antifederalists George Mason and Patrick Henry, to draft Virginia proposed amendments which later became Madison's basis for Ninth
Amendment).
474. See 2 ScHwARTz, supra note 87, 'at 844 (discussing Virginia's seventeenth
proposal). It read:
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When the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are understood in this way,
it becomes clear why Massey's fails to turn concerns of the antifederalists
about state-law rights into a sword against delegated federal powers. If the
goal of these amendments was to ensure that state-law rights secured by
reserved state sovereignty remained unthreatened, the rights referred to
in the Ninth Amendment would in no sense be disparaged. They would
only be disparaged if, contrary to the amendment's command, interpreters inferred enlarged rights-threatening federal power from the enumera475
tion of the specific limitations in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Massey's other argument against Caplan's state-law-rights analysis, that the
antifederalists would have insisted that state-law rights serve as affirmative
limits on federal power, is simply not supported by history. The evidence
overwhelmingly shows an insistence by the antifederalists that the Constitution should be amended to include the rights-protective features of both
specific affirmative limitations on delegated powers and a general reservation of all powers not granted. At the same time, the antifederalists were
full participants in the process by which amendments were proposed by
the state ratifying conventions, and none of the conventions that proposed
amendments included any proposals for an amendment that would have
qualified the Supremacy Clause or empowered states to overcome its effect
by the adoption of individual rights guarantees in state law.4 7 6
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain
powers, be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the
powers of Congress; but that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise, as
inserted merely for greater caution.
Id.; see McAffee, supra note 15, at 1278; see also Wilmarth, supra note 2, at 1298
(discussing evidence suggesting that Ninth Amendment was linked to Virginia's
proposed limit on appropriate inference to be derived from inclusion of particular
limiting clauses).
475. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 15, at 1247 n.131 (noting textual argument that Ninth Amendment disparages unenumerated rights to afford
them lesser power in constitutional system). After all, no one claims that the rights
secured by Article I's enumerated powers (as argued by its leading defenders) are
disparaged simply because they do not serve as affirmative limitations on delegated
powers, nor that the rights that antifederalists sought to protect in the Tenth
Amendment are disparaged because they flow from the truism that all not granted
is reserved to the states and people. These are all, however, unenumerated rights.
Moreover, if the summary of the historical purpose of the Ninth Amendment set
forth in text is correct, these sources of rights are the proper baselines for comparison, and the text of the Ninth Amendment is fully implemented by recognizing
that it protects state law rights, but only in a limited way. See id. (observing that
text-based disparagement argument begs question). Most disappointingly, despite
the proffered critique, Massey writes as though the point is both unassailable and
unchallenged.
476. See Massey, supra note 445, at 997 (discussing constitutional amendments
proposed by Pennsylvania Ratification Convention). The statement in the text is
true notwithstanding Massey's assertion that his reading receives "explicit support"
from "such declarations" as the one he states was "proposed by the Pennsylvania
ratification convention." Id. The proposed amendment in question provided that
"every reserve of the rights of individuals" in the various state constitutions "shall,
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B.

only
well.
have
cally

State Law Rights and the Supremacy Clause

The Reverse Preemption Clause theory of the Ninth Amendment not
rests in unsupported speculation, but it is inherently implausible as
Madison and the federalist-dominated first Congress would never
advanced or accepted a constitutional amendment that so dramatiqualified federal supremacy. 477 During the ratification debate, the

remain inviolate, except so far as they are expressly and manifestly yielded or narrowed by the national Constitution." Proceedings of the Meeting at Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania (Sept. 3, 1788) [hereinafter Harrisburg Proceedings], in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 19, at 545. The Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention did not
propose any amendments to the Constitution. The proposed declaration to which
he refers was drafted in September of 1788, almost a year after Pennsylvania ratified the Constitution, and was adopted by a "convention" comprised of antifederalist opponents of the Constitution. See id. at 542 (proposing twelve amendments to
Constitution). In addition to adopting a specific list of proposed amendments, a
number of which contemplated significant structural changes reflecting fundamental objections to the Constitution as adopted, this convention also proposed a
second general convention for the purpose of revising the Constitution. See id. at
544-46 ("[I]t is necessary to obtain a speedy revision of said Constitution, by a
general convention."). The work of this particular convention was not, in short, of
a nature to have been a likely source to which Madison would have looked in
drafting his proposed bill of rights. Considering that the Ninth Amendment, especially as drafted and proposed by Madison, closely tracks with language actually
adopted by the Virginia Ratifying Convention, there is no reason to think that this
"Harrisburg" amendment influenced the drafting at all. See McAffee, Original
Meaning, supra note 15, at 1278-82 ("Virginia's seventeenth proposal, on the other
hand, spoke more directly to the Federalist argument that enumerating rights
would threaten the principle of limited powers.").
Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that even the Harrisburg amendment was
intended to have the effect that Massey attributes to it. The amendment does not
by its terms purport to give state constitutional rights priority over the exercise of
federal powers, but to preserve them "except as they are expressly and manifestly
yielded or narrowed by the national Constitution." Harrisburg Proceedings, supra,
at 545. There is every reason to think that the Constitution's express and unqualified grant of power to Congress to raise and support an army, to use a prominent
example from the ratification debates, would be understood as trumping state constitutional limits on the creation of standing armies in peacetime even under the
"Harrisburg" amendment. Although this proposed amendment could potentially
have suggested a strict construction of federal powers, it is a virtual certainty that
had such a proposal received serious consideration the requirement that state constitutional provisions be "expressly or manifestly" yielded to the nation would have
been eliminated for the same reasons that the word "expressly" was eliminated
from the Tenth Amendment over the objections of the antifederalists. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 107, at 303-04 (stating reasons that Framers did not
track article II's use of term "expressly" in stating principle of reserved sovereignty); cf MASSEY, supra note 16, at 310 n.27 (explaining change in Ninth Amendment language away from focus on power to focus on rights as decision against
restricting congressional power to "the express grant of the Constitution," which
reflected "Madison's commitment, at the time, to a strong federal system").
477. See Massey, supra note 445, at 1231 (suggesting that Ninth Amendment
together with rest of Bill of Rights should be viewed as part of "Anti-federalist constitution" that was "concerned with preserving the states as autonomous units of
government and as structural bulwarks of human liberty"). In support of this conclusion, he mainly relies on the antifederalist demands for a bill of rights during
the debate over ratification, as well as the close historical association of the Ninth
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federalists were adamant that federal supremacy over the limited objects
of national power would have been implicit, even without an express
clause stating the principle of supremacy, 47 8 and that such supremacy was
absolutely essential to the achievement of the goals of establishing a new
constitution with enlarged powers. 479 Given that Massey sees the Ninth
Amendment as reflecting "a desire to retain for the states maximum flexibility in defining the content of retained rights," he is not troubled by the
prospect that federal laws within the scope of the powers granted by the
Constitution could be valid in some states but not in others. 48 0 James
Amendment with the Tenth Amendment-a provision universally demanded by
antifederalist critics of the Constitution. See id. at 1233-38 (finding support
through textual origins of Ninth Amendment and evident connection between
that Amendment and Tenth Amendment). Although it is true that without the
pressures generated by the antifederalist demands that the Constitution more adequately secure traditional rights we may not have obtained a Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that the meaning of crucial provisions is to be sought in antifederalist
political and constitutional philosophy.
Massey's analysis ignores the work of constitutional historians showing that the
federalist supporters of the Constitution dominated the amendment process, consistently supporting Madison's fixed determination to insert only the amendments
that secured long-established fundamental rights that would not be controversial.
See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 363, at 219 (explaining that under his proposed amendments "the structure & stamina of the
Govt. are as little touched as possible," and that proposed amendments would be
limited to those "which are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in those of none"); see also Finkelman, supra note 430, at 368-78 (describing
how Madison and his federalist counterparts in Congress systematically supported
well-established individual rights guarantees while rejecting proposed amendments that "sounded in structure" and were viewed as posing threat to powers
established by Constitution); Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16
S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 258 (1992) (arguing careful review of state proposals and
Madison's proposed amendments confirms that Madison "avoided any alteration
in the institutions defined by the Constitution, largely ignored specific prohibitions on national power, and opted instead for a list of rights that would clearly
connect with the preferences of state governments, but would not increase state
power vis-A-vis the national government defined in the Constitution"). Similarly,
the Tenth Amendment was drafted to reaffirm the assumptions implicit in Article I
without suggesting a rule of strict construction of national power, and antifederalist attempts to insert the word "expressly" were defeated. See House Committee
Report, supra note 384, at 33 n.33 (noting that on August 18 and 21, 1789 Committee of the Whole in House rejected proposal to insert word "expressly" in proposed
reserved powers amendment); House Resolution and Articles of Amendment,
supra note 365, at 41 n.21 (recording that on Sept. 7, 1789, Senate rejected motion
to insert "expressly").
478. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 107, at 204 (stating that
Supremacy Clause "would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication
from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain
specified powers").
479. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 107, at 306 (stating attack on
Supremacy Clause reflects "indiscreet zeal" because without it, Constitution "would
have been evidently and radically defective" and arguing "saving clause" in favor of
state constitutions would have reduced new national government to impotence).
480. See MASSEY, supra note 16, at 134 (describing advantages to approaching
Ninth Amendment rights as varying with differing state constitutions because
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Madison, however, saw it as a fatal objection to any attempt to preserve
state powers against federal supremacy that "a treaty or national law of
great and equal importance to the States would interfere with some and
not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of
48 1
the States at the same time that it would have no effect in others."
Moreover, considering the vagueness and generality of the Ninth
Amendment, especially when read as a guarantee of affirmative limitations
on government in favor of rights rather than as a clause securing the rights
implicit in the original federal structure, the first Congress would have
viewed a reverse preemption purpose, had it actually been proffered, as a
rule lacking any sort of meaningful limits. Nothing in the Amendment's
text suggests any possible limiting principle by which to judge the potential scope and implications of a provision guaranteeing state constitutional
rights. One consequence of this lack of a limiting principle would be that
preexisting state constitutional rights that the Framers had purposefully
rejected would properly be held to limit federal power. For example, we
have seen that the Framers of the Constitution granted Congress an unqualified power to raise standing armies. 48 2 This was true even though
opposition to peacetime standing armies, as a threat to liberty, had deep
taproots in English constitutionalism, 48 3 and several state declarations of
rights had stated limitations on the use of standing armies. 48 4 Considering that limits on standing armies were viewed as essential guarantees of
liberty, particularly by the antifederalists to whom Massey attributes the
Ninth Amendment, these provisions would logically be included among
the retained rights under Massey's theory, and would not give way to conNinth Amendment rights have their origin in state constitutions, find that "Ninth
Amendment decisional law would develop a richly variegated pattern."); see also id.
at 135 (acknowledging that many would be troubled "that some Americans would
enjoy more individual liberty than others," but arguing that this sort of outcome is
implicit in federal system in any event).
481. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 107, at 306.
482. See MALCOLM, supra note 348, at 155-56 (discussing difficulty of preserving liberties where numerous standing armies are kept).
483. See REID, supra note 346, at 49 (stating that there were "few principles
better established in eighteenth-century law than that a standing army was
unconstitutional").
484. See, e.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights, supra note 347, at 3814 (providing "that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to
liberty"). Pennsylvania and North Carolina also had provisions against standing
armies in peacetime. See North Carolina Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 140, at 2788 (stating that "the people
have a right to bear arms, for the defense of the State; and, as standing armies, in
time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up . . .");
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 140, at 3083 (same). Several other states had provisions recognizing the danger of standing armies, but only requiring the consent of the
legislature. See, e.g., New York Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 140, at 2673 (differing from previous state constitutions); New Jersey Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 140, at 2600 (same).
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flicting federal law. Thus the deliberate decision to extend this very power
by the Federal Constitution-a decision that engendered great controversy, but which was fiercely defended by the Constitution's proponentscould be effectively nullified by the state-rights aspect of the Ninth
Amendment.4 85 Such a result, however, is simply not plausible.
Similarly, the text of the Ninth Amendment provides no clue as to
how to resolve the conflicts among rights that such a regime would inevitably give rise to. For example, Massey assumes that the Supremacy Clause
dictates that a right "with its substantive source in federal law," such as one
of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, prevails over a state constitutional guarantee with which it conflicts. 48 6 But if state constitutional
rights might prevail over enumerated federal powers, notwithstanding the
Supremacy Clause, as Massey's theory posits, it is not clear why state-law
rights might not also prevail over rights rooted substantively in federal law.
In fact, Massey does not explain how to reconcile this priority for rights
rooted in federal law with the Ninth Amendment's asserted purpose to
establish that "l(t] he citizens of each state would be entitled to define their
relationship with all of their governmental agents. ' 487 Nor does he at-

485. See THE

FEDERALIST

No. 44, supra note 107, at 305 (discussing invasion of

rights of states). Indeed, this power of Congress fits into Madison's criticism that
any system of exemption of fundamental state law could rob essential federal laws
of critical uniform application. See id. at 306. It is not even clear how such a statelaw right could be enforced, whether by a prohibition of the state's citizens from
service in such a standing army or a ruling that the army could not be stationed
within the boundaries of the state protecting this right. Although Massey might
suggest that this prohibition is not the sort of liberty-bearing individual right contemplated by his understanding of the Ninth Amendment, given that it secures
liberty for the collective citizenry by a structural limitation on power, it would be
difficult to build a case that the founding generation would have relied upon any
such distinction. Both the First Amendment right to assemble and petition and
the Second Amendment declaration of the importance of a well-regulated militia,
supported by the people's right to keep and bear arms, constitute guarantees that
run in favor of the people collectively as much as to individuals. If guarantees of
liberty, rights retained by the sovereign people of the several states, are not to be
"disparaged" because of the Ninth Amendment, it is difficult to provide a principled ground for rejecting a right many Americans deemed among the most
fundamental.
486. See Massey, supra note 445, at 1255 ("[I]f one right must yield, the
supremacy clause appears to dictate that the right with its substantive source in
federal law should prevail.").
487. See id. at 1248 (describing "legacy of a system of dual sovereignty" and
probable intention of Ninth Amendment). Massey even relies on this Supremacy
Clause technique to resolve the conflict between a hypothetical state constitutional
"right to life" guarantee and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Massey, supra
note 445, at 1255 (assuming Roe v. Wade is still good law and analyzing conflict
between Ninth Amendment rights of fetus and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights of pregnant women). To the extent, however, that Roe is
based on a Court-created unenumerated right of privacy and, thus, is properly
seen as a Ninth Amendment right, a question raised is why a judicially-created
right should prevail over one adopted by the people of a state. Without entering
the mysteries of the Fourteenth Amendment and any difficulties associated with
incorporating the Ninth Amendment at all, it might be wondered why the
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tempt to explain how giving priority to enumerated federal rights fits together with the argument that the Ninth Amendment itself prohibits
disparaging the unenumerated retained rights. Thus, Massey's own
Supremacy Clause appears to give the unenumerated retained rights the
lesser status he elsewhere rejects.
Recognizing that the Supremacy Clause and structural analysis cannot
do all the work required to avoid unwelcome outcomes of his state-law
rights thesis, Massey eventually comes down to simply delegating to the
Supreme Court the task of preventing potential state abuses that such a
guarantee might permit. 48 8 The Supreme Court thus would determine

whether particular state constitutional guarantees were truly designed "to
limit the ability of any government-state or federal-to invade the individual rights the sovereign people deem precious," 489 or merely to "frustrate national policies squarely within the legitimate powers of the
national government." 490 Ultimately, even as to state guarantees reflecting a bona fide theory of individual liberty, the Court would be empowered "to limit putative ninth amendment rights to those that do not
4 91
significantly impair other existing and recognized fundamental rights."
Although Massey offers an extensive analysis as to how the Court might go
about the task of balancing fundamental rights and federalism values and
prioritizing fundamental rights, the suggested approach reads like a rescue operation designed to avoid the clear implications of granting
Supreme Court's view of unenumerated rights should prevail over the views of the
sovereign people of a particular state-especially given the purpose attributed to
the Ninth Amendment in the statement quoted above in text. Can there be any
doubt, after all, how the antifederalists would have resolved such a conflict if they
were choosing between rights deemed fundamental by the people of the individual states and the United States Supreme Court?
488. See Massey, supra note 445, at 1256 ("Some judicial good sense would be
necessary to sort the 'liberty-bearing norms' from the purely administrative
ones.").
489. See id. at 1256-57 (describing "proper structural function" of Ninth
Amendment).
490. See id. at 1256, 1263-65 (suggesting also that Court might invalidate statelaw guarantees that threaten "the kind of economic or social balkanization that the
original Constitution was designed to prevent" along lines of modern dormant
commerce clause doctrine).
491. See id. at 1257 (giving example of how expanding fundamental rights
under Ninth Amendment limits rights held by other people by stating "if the right
to speak includes the right to hurl racial insults, there is a corresponding reduction in another's claimed right to be free of racial harrassment [sic]."). Once
again, however, Massey offers no reconciliation between his own apparent preference for fundamental rights carved from the text of the Federal Constitution and
his historical claim that a purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to empower citizens of each state to order their relationship with all levels of government. In fact,
the only logical explanation for the preference for court-created unenumerated
rights over fundamental state-law rights is the familiar modern distrust of states as
historical sources of oppression, a concern that cuts sharply against Massey's statelaw rights thesis.
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492
subordinate units the power to create rights that trump federal power.
Apart from Massey's failure to link any of this more extended analysis to
any plausible theory of the text and history of the Ninth Amendment,
these qualifications substitute unbridled judicial discretion to balance national interests with state constitutional rights for what would otherwise be
a states' rights guarantee that would have supplied the means of sabotaging the federal system established by the unamended Constitution.

V.

CONCLUSION

What all these commentators share is an unwillingness to accept the
straightforward understanding that the federal structure as originally conceived served in part to secure popular rights, and that it was the device of
enumerated powers that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were intended to preserve. One obvious reason for this is because, although
these proponents of expansive readings of the Ninth Amendment refer to
restoring our federal system as a guarantee of liberty, they are more
friends of expansive national power to secure fundamental rights than of
federalism as it was originally conceived. If we want the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to serve the cause of liberty, while remaining true to the
Constitution as it was drafted and understood, our best bet may be to look
more sympathetically at the Supreme Court's decisions in New York v.
4 94
49 3
and United States v. Lopez.
United States
Another implication is that we might be forced to acknowledge that
we have come to value other goals above those of the liberties secured by
our federal system. One simple lesson is that perhaps the antifederalists
were right, and it is a good thing we included a federal bill of rights. If the
rights we obtained in the Bill of Rights as supplemented by the subsequent
amendments, are insufficient, Article V of the Constitution sets forth a
method for adding additional rights. The one thing we should not do is
misread the Constitution and its history to justify informally amending the
Constitution to secure limits on government that the Framers never conceived of and would never have adopted, or to empower the judiciary in
ways that the Framers, with good reason, would never have thought
acceptable.
492. See, e.g., MASSEY, supra note 16, at 148-73 (discussing balancing of fundamental rights and federalism values). Massey commmented that "the positive aspect of the Ninth Amendment was designed to preserve state-sourced fundamental
liberties but was rooted in an attempt to strike a balance between federal power and
the individual liberties of citizens whom that power could affect." Id. at 152.
493. 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (limiting federal power to dictate affirmative action
by state governments based on assumptions underlying federal scheme).
494. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (recognizing, for first time in 60 years, limits on
regulatory powers of Congress under Commerce Clause).
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